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# ***JPRS Report***

# **Soviet Union**

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***Military Affairs***

# Soviet Union

## Military Affairs

JPRS-UMA-88-006

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28 MARCH 1988

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**Moscow Round Table on Improving Training of Political Officers**

18010209 Moscow KOMMUNIST  
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 24,  
Dec 87 pp 46-54

[Roundtable discussion held by the editor's office of the journal KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL under the "Higher Military School on the Way to Renewal" rubric: "Theoretically Prepared but in Practice?"; first four paragraphs are KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL introduction]

[Text] In October, a scientific-methodological conference of the leading personnel of the higher military political educational institutions was held at the Lvov Higher Military Political School. In the course of that conference, the editor's office of the journal KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL held a "roundtable" meeting. Participating in it were the workers of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, the directors of the military political schools, political officers of Carpathian Military District, and students at the Lvov Higher Military Political School.

Does the level of training of the political officers fully meet the requirements of the day? What has already been done to change the teaching and educational process for the better in the higher military political schools [VVPU's]? What new approaches to the training of graduates of VVPU's have been dictated by the time? How can one strengthen party influence on the resolution of the pressing tasks in the professional training of young political officers? These and other important questions were the focus of attention of the participants in the meeting.

On the eve of the meeting, a number of VVPU's carried out surveys in the final courses for the purpose of determining the opinions of students on their preparedness for future practical work.

Below are published the statements of the participants in the "round-table" discussion and excerpts from the questionnaires of the students.

**Col P. ABRAMOV**, deputy chief of the personnel administration of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy:

We are constantly analyzing the quality of the training of graduates of the VVPU's and their activities in the assigned sectors. In the 20 years of their existence (the school in Lvov, as you know, has a longer history), the schools have graduated a large group of political officers. The overwhelming majority of them show their best side. Favorable comments about the young political workers are coming from the units.

One cannot fail to note, however, that the quantity of "complaints" by troops against the work of a number of VVPU's is declining only slowly. An especially large number of them are aimed at the Tallinn Higher Military Political Construction School, the Simferopol Higher Military Political Construction School, the Donetsk Higher Military Political School for Engineering and Communications Forces imeni Army Gen A.A. Yepishev, and the Kurgan Higher Military Political Aviation School. And the complaints about the poor practical training of graduates are not unfounded. Unfortunately, one encounters the following facts: young political officers do not always have a clear understanding of their place and role in the resolution of the tasks facing military collectives and do not know how to organize purposeful party political work aimed at the quality fulfillment of the plans for combat training and at the strengthening of military discipline or how to rely on communists and Komsomol activists in their work, etc. There are also complaints against the personal conduct of some graduates of VVPU's.

All of this understandably is cause for concern. The necessity of strengthening the practical direction of the instruction and education of students at VVPU's is now being felt especially acutely. The intensiveness of military training is so great and the tasks in combat training have become so complex that the young political officer coming to his first position has no time to "get rolling." The graduate must, as they say, be prepared from his first steps to work with the necessary rhythm. But is this readiness always fully demonstrated?

**Maj Gen A. GAYDUKOV**, director of the Leningrad Higher Military Political School for Air Defense imeni Yu. V. Andropov:

I will begin with the questionnaires that we recently distributed among the fourth-year students. Therein we asked them to assess the level of their preparedness for work in the forces. Of those questioned, only 24 percent answered that after their practical training they may be fully able to carry out the duties of deputy commander of a subunit in a political unit. And 67 percent expressed themselves very carefully (with reservations) about their readiness to work on their own.

These figures, of course, give serious cause for thought. Above all about the fact that we are still not able to overcome the gap between theory and practice. One cannot assert, let us say, that the teaching of social sciences is closely related to the problems in the life of the troops. They are not yet doing everything to see to that theory helps the students master the forms and methods of teaching and instruction and the skills of working with people.

It is clear that not all of our teachers, commanders and political workers have thoroughly understood that the strengthening of the connection between theory and practice is not a fashionable slogan. It is the key to the restructuring of our entire training and educational work.

This year we redistributed the training time in the direction of practical studies. We are trying to put the accent on active forms of instruction—group lessons, individual interviews, practical games, the resolution of logical tasks, and others. We are also striving to turn to individual work.

It was not so long ago that professional training became part of our practice. Every day we allocate 1 hour of time for independent training. Its essence is that teachers, commanders and political officers create role situations analogous to those in which a young political worker may find himself. The student has to resolve logical tasks in the scope of the course of party political work. Opinions are discussed and correct decisions are worked out together.

**Col A. PAVLOV, deputy chief of the social sciences section of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy:**

It seems to me that it is extremely important to stress the role that the social sciences departments of the VVPU's are called upon to play in strengthening the practical direction of the training of their graduates. It depends largely on them how successful young political workers can apply the imparted knowledge in practice.

But it must be noted that not all social sciences departments are restructuring their work in accordance with the spirit of the time or are fully utilizing their potential for the formation of the students' precise world view and methodological discipline of thought. In some places, they have not put an end to the mechanical summarizing of the works of the founders of Marxism-Leninism and party documents or to the mindless sound recording of previously prepared texts of speeches, which does not allow students to realize in depth the methodological value of the theoretical positions for their own future practical work. Lectures and seminar studies have not yet been freed of simplified interpretations of particular social phenomena and problems in military theory and practice. And is this not what the results of the analysis of this year's state examinations indicate? Some graduates of the VVPU's were not able to reveal the new content that our party is giving to the development of Marxist-Leninist theory and to the doctrine of war and the army and did not have a sufficiently clear understanding of how, for example, to reveal the essence of the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact member states in the process of the elucidation of combat-training tasks by soldiers.

There are also other omissions in the teaching of social sciences. In my view, they also lead to a reduction of the social action of those being taught and to gaps in their knowledge of practical matters. The main reason for the negative phenomena that we are talking about is the low demands of a number of communist managers and their adherence to old work methods. Here is just one example.

Energetic and seeking people work in the department for military pedagogics and psychology of the Novosibirsk school. Here they have turned decisively toward active forms of instruction. And there has been a noticeable increase in the cognitive activity of students and in the quality of the course study. But no. Some continue to stress the traditional question-and-answer method. There is a clear unwillingness to reorganize.

**Cpt S. FILIPPOV, deputy commander of a motorized rifle battalion in the political unit:**

I would like to talk about the military technical training of the political officer and about his personal example in the mastery of weapons and equipment.

All graduates of VVPU's come to the units (as I once did) in the summer. This is the height of combat training, a time of exercises and intensive field studies. One must get involved in the combat training immediately and work actively. And here you sense: there is knowledge but a shortage of skills. You realize this especially clearly in a tense and extreme situation.

I began my service as part of the limited contingent of Soviet forces in Afghanistan. And I know from personal experience that in a combat situation the political officer is seen above all as a fighting officer. They assess how he acts in difficult moments, how he relates to subordinates, and how he handles equipment.

I remember, for example, the following instance. One day the commander was not at his "spot" and here came a signal that new equipment was arriving. Indeed, infantry combat vehicles of the new modification were on the "spot" within 2 hours. There was much that I was not familiar with. In school, we studied vehicles of the old model.

The subordinates look at me, expecting that I will explain and show everything—after all, I am the deputy commander. And I am ashamed that I myself was not trained as I should be. I honestly admitted that I had not studied such a vehicle. The people apparently understood my sincerity and so my authority was not undermined. I received a good lesson.

**Col V. ODEGOV, chief of the personnel section of the political directorate of Carpathian Military District:**

I would also like to emphasize the importance of good military technical training of the graduate of the VVPU as an indispensable component of his authority and success in instructing subordinates. One must directly acknowledge that for some political officers it leaves something to be desired.

We assembled young political officers. In control studies in several special military disciplines, many graduates of VVPU's showed poor training. They included pupils from different schools. Is it really normal for a political

*officer to have poor results, let us say, in firing or technical training? For his personal example means a lot in the mobilization of people for the successful fulfillment of tasks in military training.*

Before this meeting, I talked with many chiefs of political sections. They are also concerned by the fact that graduates of VVPU's do not feel completely confident in questions related to the combat training program for ground forces and have an inadequately reliable command of equipment and weapons. This is very serious. Much attention is now being paid to problems in raising the quality of combat training. But will the influence of a poorly trained political officer on the resolution of these problems be sufficiently effective? Experience indicates precisely the opposite.

#### FROM THE QUESTIONNAIRES OF FOURTH-YEAR STUDENTS OF HIGHER MILITARY POLITICAL SCHOOLS

"The school is supposed to get primarily models of new equipment and weapons. We simply do not have them. We are taught with old equipment. How will we look in the forces?..."

"In our practical training, we were not allowed to fire from the combat infantry vehicle.... And in general, there are many prohibitions against everything: you cannot drive and you cannot shoot. In this connection, the commanders of the units refer to the leaders of the practical training and they refer to some sort of instructions. It is simply that no one wants to take responsibility."

#### REMARKS BY THE EDITOR'S OFFICE

*In speaking about the level of training of a school graduate, the participants in the "round-table" meeting shared the opinion that in-depth knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theory, the doctrine on the defense of the socialist Fatherland, and the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the ability to impart this knowledge to people are what do the most to make a political officer authoritative and his words effective. At the same time, in the course of the discussion, the following facet of the problem was illuminated more and more clearly: do young political workers always (in the course of training and under the conditions of a situation approximating that of combat) have a clear idea of their place and do they know how to organize work in political education? And this turn in the conversation is legitimate. As practice shows, some graduates of VVPU's cannot organically link political education work with the tasks to be resolved by collectives. They become lost in particular everyday situations, because at times they do not know how to approach and influence people. A typical shortcoming of many is that they have a poor command of the methods for carrying out political studies and other measures and do not know how to rely on the aktiv in their work.*

**Sr Lt S. Guba, deputy commander of a subunit in a political unit:**

As a matter of fact, these shortcomings do characterize many graduates of VVPU's, especially at first. I judge this in accordance with my own situation. I studied at Sverdlovsk Higher Military Political Tank and Artillery School imeni L.I. Brezhnev and graduated in 1983. In my view, we were given enough theoretical material. Our instructors did this rather well. It is with gratitude that I remember officers Shkarubin, Govorukhin, Cherniyevskiy and others.

Problems in practical training did show up, however. I also served in the limited contingent of Soviet forces in Afghanistan and personally experienced how difficult, for example, it is for a commander and political officer to put together a multinational military collective. It is often said that this happens by itself in a combat situation. So it is but not entirely. The people in the subunit are different in character and in temperament. They were educated under different conditions and each one has different ideas about life and different habits. Can you really ignore this? And here it is not enough to say that all of us were united by our military duty. And how was the understanding of this duty formed and strengthened? I am convinced that here is seen the significance of the party political work organized by the political officer. Everything in it is important: the personal example, the ability to find ways to approach people, and the ability to rely on the collective opinion. In the final analysis, it is even important how the chart of fighting strength is drawn up and how the party or Komsomol meeting is prepared.

I also experienced considerable difficulties in the organization of individual work with subordinates. It seems to be clear: observe, talk and influence. But does one specifically organize the work, let us say, with those who already took part in combat? And with those who will smell gunpowder tomorrow? To what should one pay special attention and what pedagogical methods should be utilized? This is many other things had to be understood in practice. And why not, as was already said here, create situations in the school studies that are similar to those that can arise in service?

**Maj Gen V. PAVLICHENKO, director of the Simferopol Higher Military Political Construction School:**

I would like to ask Senior Lieutenant Guba a question. You "had too little" of one thing or another in the school. As you see it, what is the main reason for this? For the school, as far as I know, has pretty good possibilities for the quality training of political officers.

**Sr Lt S. Guba:**

That is true, it would seem that the possibilities are good. I remember that I and my comrades in the class were enthusiastic about our training from the very beginning.



It seemed that I was ready to move mountains! But here is where life became prosaic. They interrupted us for different tasks fairly frequently, sometimes taking us away from our studies. There was almost no independent training after the midday meal. There were repairs, clean-up work or something else—that is all they knew. How does one prepare for this seminar study? Primarily in the evening or later at night. You can sit through it once or twice but if the interruptions of the training are systematic? One's enthusiasm wanes....

#### FROM THE QUESTIONNAIRES OF FOURTH-YEAR STUDENTS AT HIGHER MILITARY POLITICAL SCHOOLS

"They give us little social and political practice. One needs to be in the garrison units and subunits more often. This can be done through part of the time allocated to independent training. But we are frequently involved with operational tasks after lunch."

"The first 2 years, we did not know what independent training is. Only in the third and fourth years did they stop sending us out to do operational tasks."

#### COMMENTS BY THE EDITOR'S OFFICE

*It seems that in some schools interruptions from studies have become a chronic disease. Checks carried out this year showed that almost 10 percent of the study time is used for goals not related to training, including for operational tasks. By way of justification, references are made to different circumstances. Even though the demands in this connection are well-known, students must qualitatively master the curriculum.*

Above all the school director, the chief of the political section, and other communist managers must bear responsibility for this. Their most important concern is to create an atmosphere of intolerance to any kind of deviations from the established order.

**Col V. OSIPENKO, commander of a battalion of officer candidates:**

Today we are not doing all we can to strengthen the practical direction of the training of students. This is also noted in the comments on our graduates. It seems to me that it is necessary to put special emphasis on the formation and development of the graduates' skills in dealing with people. For the political officer of a subunit is the soul of a military collective. People are attracted to him and he is obliged to have a good sense of the mood of the collective and to know everyone. And it is primarily to him that the Leninist words are directed: live among the people, know the masses and know how to approach them and gain their absolute trust.

It seems to me that above all it is this "know how to approach" that we must teach our pupils. Teach through our own example and the skillful organization of individual educational work in the subunits of the officer candidates. For they absorb everything: how we commanders and political officers of the subunits study them and take into account their possibilities and needs and how we organize educational work. Therefore, there must be no trivialities here, and especially no serious omissions. We pay a great deal of attention at conferences with officers and at party meetings to questions in individual work with students. We demand that all officers have a mastery of pedagogics. We utilize the experience of the best educators—that of the officer S. Malikhov, a company commander, for example. He is certainly someone who knows how to influence people, to enrich them with his knowledge of life, and to arm them with the habits of an individual approach. He is calm, thoughtful, unhurried in his conclusions, and patient. He strives above all to reveal what is positive in people and to develop it.

We somehow compared the practical training of the company students. In our view, it is higher in the company of Malikhov.

**Lt Col Ye. SIGUDKIN, director of the tactics department of the Donetsk Higher Military Political School for Engineering and Communications Forces imeni Army Gen A. A. Yepishev:**

Among instructors of special military disciplines, unfortunately, the opinion exists that our business is the military side of the training of the future political officer. Give him a certain amount of knowledge, form the necessary command skills, and teach him to handle weapons and equipment—that, they say, is the main task.

Do we have the right to limit our role to this alone?

I am convinced that the instructors of special military disciplines can also increase their contribution to improving the practical training of future political officers.

Take the following aspect of our practice. In carrying out field lessons, the instructors of the department strive to work out training questions with a complex tactical background under conditions approximating those of combat. But this is not all. It is also important to point out how the political officer is to act in some situation or other and what forms of party political work can be used effectively.

This, for example, is how lieutenant colonels A. Orlov and V. Litvinov act. They are officers with great experience in life and both performed their international duty

in Afghanistan. They became convinced in practice how great is the importance of party political work and party influence and how they multiply the strength of the soldier's spirit.

I saw more than once how these instructors carry out lessons in the field. Let us say they are working on some subject. The students take turns acting in the role of company or platoon commander. Orlov and Litvinov certainly force them to consider: what must the political worker undertake.

Let us suppose that a rest period has been declared. The officers talk with the editor of the chart of fighting strength, with the agitator and with the Komsomol group organizer and they will suggest how best to handle the assigned task. They also present examples from their own personal combat practice. All of this has a strong impact on the students.

**Col L. VILEYKO, chief of the political section of the Minsk Higher Military Political Combined-Arms School:**

First of all, about what Senior Lieutenant Guba was saying concerning interruptions in their studies. Here, of course, the position of the political section and party organizations means a lot. We, for example, look into every violation of the curriculum and daily work schedule and take the strictest measures to eradicate the reasons for the violations. In the political section, we listen to the information of communist managers on the most current questions in the organization of the teaching and educational process, together we analyze the situation, and we outline measures to eliminate shortcomings and to strengthen party influence on the quality of the training of future political officers.

At our recommendation, the party organizations listen to the reports of secretaries and members of the party committees and party bureaus on their fulfillment of party duties. The conversation, as a rule, is extensive and effects all communists, encouraging the comrades to work more responsibly in the assigned sectors and to fight actively against negative phenomena in the teaching and educational process.

I would especially like to say something about the training in line units. We introduced the following rule: prior to the training, the departments send instructors to those units where the trainees will be sent. The commanders and political officers familiarize the instructors with the tasks that the collective is to resolve, tell about people and current problems. What does this do?

In the first place, it helps in the planning of the training and in the drawing up of individual plans by the students. They take into account the specifics of the unit and subunit as well as the peculiarities in the life of the military collective.

Secondly, the time required for the trainee to get to know the unit and subunit is reduced. To some extent, he has already been introduced to the situation and therefore gets involved in the work without delay.

**Lt Gen O. ZOLOTAREV, director of the Lvov Higher Military Political School:**

We too consider the strengthening of the link between training and education and troop practice to be one of the main and dependable means to strengthen the practical direction of the training of future workers in the cultural field and military journalists. The agreements that we reach with the units, for example, have become a good form of such cooperation. The essence of this innovation is that the commanders and political officers strive to establish favorable conditions for the practice and practical training of students. And we provide continuous help to the party and Komsomol aktiv in political educational work. The agreements raise the responsibility of both sides noticeably.

**Student R. MARKOVETS, Lvov Higher Military Political School:**

In accordance with a preliminary agreement, we visit military collectives on our days off. We meet commanders, political officers, and party and Komsomol activists. We talk with soldiers and sergeants about problems in the life of the troops. For us, future military journalists, such meetings are very valuable. Here is where the subjects of our addresses often arise. For us, this is like mini-training.

**Maj Gen V. PAVLICHENKO:**

To begin, I would like to talk about our lectures. You must agree that lectures and seminars often suffer from their remoteness from life. And now you frequently observe a striving to give as much theoretical material as possible, whereas practice, they say, is something that one acquires.

For this reason, we have the instructors focus on the following: the lecture itself must include an analysis of some particular phenomena of life in the troops, practical advice and recommendations. Our best pedagogues colonels M. Novozhilov, A. Stepanov and M. Krapivin are doing this successfully. Does this mean that others can also handle the lectures this way?

Now about the strengthening of the connection "VVPU-troops." There are many forms of this connection and the most suitable certainly need to be developed. We, let us say, invite experienced commanders and political workers from different units to conduct individual classes on party political work. Recently, for example, a class was conducted by the officer Ya. Galass, a political



officer in one of the units. Such specialists from the troop shop, as one is accustomed to say, bring their own experience and the spirit of military construction to the lecture halls of students.

**Lt Yu. GUSAR, secretary of the Komsomol committee of an antiaircraft missile regiment:**

Indeed, the graduates of VVUP's are not always able to apply the knowledge gained in the school successfully in practice. How can this situation be remedied? Is it possible or necessary to introduce practical lessons in the troops as early as the second or even the first year? Prior to the meeting, I talked with students at the Lvov Higher Military Political School. It seems that as early as the second year they have organized excursions to the units. I studied at the Sverdlovsk school. There we did not begin to acquire practical skills until the third year.

It is necessary to lengthen the period of practical training. The way it is, you come to a unit and, just as you start to delve into things, it is already time to go back.

And something else. It is necessary to get the students actively involved in the Komsomol life of the school. This not only educates but is also instructive. I was deputy secretary of a battalion Komsomol organization. I believe that I received a certain amount of practice in work within the union. And this was so useful in my service!

#### FROM THE QUESTIONNAIRES OF FOURTH-YEAR STUDENTS OF HIGHER MILITARY POLITICAL SCHOOLS

"In the troops as well, they must also think through questions in practical training. Otherwise it will happen as it did with us: we wound up in a unit of the wrong specialization. The results of the practical training were not what they should have been...."

"It is indispensable to increase the time of practical training and to find a way to introduce it in the second year."e

"It is necessary to provide an opportunity to work more in the school itself—in a support subunit."

#### COMMENTS BY THE EDITOR'S OFFICE

*The question of the effectiveness of practical training is raised by life itself. Much is being done to resolve it. In particular, it has been decided to lengthen the period of practical training by fourth-year students.*

But the training continues to be one of the acute problems. The troops are still, to put it mildly, sometimes paying too little attention to trainees from VVPU's. This applies, for example, to Moscow Military District. There they took a formal approach in some units this year to

the organization of the practical training of students. In the Nth Formation, let us say, the chief of the political section did not even consider it necessary to talk with the trainees.

The problem at hand is, of course, multifaceted. But why not listen to the opinion of those participating in the "round-table" meeting, who were proposing a review of the system for assigning graduates to the troops after their graduation from school? Why not send the young political officer to the unit where he had practical training? It seems that such an approach would help to raise the responsibility of troops for the quality of the training.

**Sr Lt S. SHKEDA, deputy commander of a subunit in a political unit:**

I am also going by my own experience: it is extremely necessary for the students to meet with former graduates. Their experience and parting words are so necessary. For they tell about life and work without embellishments. I remember that our instructors and commanders often presented things better than they are. In practice, however, you sometimes see a different picture. You see complexities and the negative aspects....

**Sr Lt S. GUBA:**

You also encounter cases of nonstatutory interrelationships and those who tried drugs before being called up. They did not talk about this in the school....

#### FROM THE QUESTIONNAIRES OF THE FOURTH-YEAR STUDENTS OF HIGHER MILITARY POLITICAL SCHOOLS

"During the time of the training, we often lose sight of the changes that are taking place in the civilian life of our young people. We do not know much about their problems. But later we have to work with these lads...."

"Do not hide from us the shortcomings in the troops and in the school. Talk about them honestly and directly."

**Maj Gen Yu. SHIRINSKIY, director of the Novosibirsk Higher Military Political Combined-Arms School imeni 60-letiya Velikogo Otkryabrya:**

You know, one of the senior students turned to me one day: "Comrade Major General, do you want to look at our film?" It was their film about themselves. In a broad sense, it was a film about all of us—commanders, political officers and instructors—done with a juvenile maximalism. With a keenness of vision that prominently outlined our achievements as well as many shortcomings. They even filmed drunken girls loitering near the school.

But the film was truthful. All the officers later saw it. It provided something to think about.

In short, the students gave us a lesson of truth. But it is we who are supposed to give them such lessons! And the party is directing us communist managers to talk honestly with people. Sometimes we smooth everything out, "brush it up." We are not always able to show the conviction to acknowledge our own omissions. In teaching practice and in educational work. We did not raise our demands on the teaching staff. For this reason, some are in no hurry to reorganize themselves. I was once in a class on party political work. The instructor stated the theory of the question rather thoroughly. But the lecture did not relate to life and no methodological recommendations were heard. What will the student get out of it? And tomorrow he has to be an organizer of people.

#### COMMENTS BY THE EDITOR'S OFFICE

*In one way or another, the participants in the discussion related many shortcomings in the preparation of students for work in the troops to the central figure in the teaching and educational process in the school—the instructor. Indeed, in connection with perestroika, the problem of the selection, disposition and education of teaching personnel is becoming more and more acute. Today their scientific and methodological qualification is no longer completely satisfactory. A situation has developed in which some teachers are not concerned about their professional growth. Few carry out dissertational investigations and most have become accustomed to a tranquil flow of life. In the Sverdlovsk school, for example, one of the teachers planned out the work on his candidate's dissertation to take 12 years.*

In some VVPU's, there are instructors who were not in academy courses. Cases are known in which pedagogues do not complete personal practical training in the troops or fleets in the time determined by order of the USSR Ministry of Defense. In the Donetsk school alone, more than 15 percent of instructors were last in the troops for practical training more than 8 years ago. The question arises involuntarily: why are these officers not striving to raise their professional level?

**Student S. VERSHININ, Lvov Higher Military Political School:**

It seems to me that a poorly trained officer has no right to work in the school. What authority does he have? None. You learn everything from a good teacher. His pedagogical skills and entire moral face also educate.

**Maj Gen V. CHEREMISOV, senior inspector of the directorate of organizational party work of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy:**

What is hindering the soundly based preparation of instructors? You cannot point to any one thing. There are a number of reasons here. One is that not all teachers have a developed sense of responsibility for raising their own professional level. Some of them are not strict on themselves, are satisfied with what has been achieved,

and the party organizations are not accentuating this question. On the other hand, many instructors need time to prepare for lessons and work on a dissertation. But they do not have it and are being distracted by matters unrelated to the teaching and educational process. Unfortunately, the political offices sometimes ignore such facts and do not give them a high-minded evaluation.

The lack of high-mindedness and glasnost in resolving personnel matters also has a negative impact on sound scientific preparation. It sometimes happens that the candidacies for the positions of senior instructors are discussed in secret, without considering the opinion of department communists about some person or another. It is essential to be resolute in renouncing old approaches to work with people.

**Col P. Abramov:**

Certainly in the course of one meeting one cannot cover the entire range of problems that need to be resolved. But one thing is certain: it was a useful talk. I think that all of us saw more clearly that there are reserves for strengthening the practical direction of the training of graduates of VVPU's. It is important to show initiative, to evaluate our own work in a fresh and more demanding way as perestroika requires, and to proceed further relentlessly. In many VVPU's, one observes significant positive changes in the organization of the teaching and educational process. In the Minsk school, let us say, the experience in the work of graduates who did a good job in the troops is actively used in the teaching of party political work. In the Riga Higher Military Political School imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union S.S. Biryuzov, they are persistently introducing such forms of instruction as practical games, discussions and seminars—disputes into teaching practice. Here, for the purpose of encouraging the most successful students, they introduced the "Certificate of the Outstanding Student," which gives the right to take tests and examinations early and other privileges and stimulates cognitive activity. In the Kurgan school, they are actively conducting scientific investigations in the interests of raising the quality of the practical training of graduates.

In short, a search is under way and the activeness of many comrades from the schools is commendable. Here I would just like to warn against the previous mistakes—formalism, ostentation and whitewashing. In some places, they are trying to do things in the old way and to create the impression of vigorous action. As checks in a number of schools showed, individual commanders of student subunits plan as many as 60 measures per month!

We do not need a show of effort but real efforts, not words and intentions but real actions.

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**Lt Gen Kurinnyy on Shortcomings in Party Workers**

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*VOORUNZHENNYKH SIL in Russian* No  
24, Dec 87 pp 16-22

[Article by Lt Gen I. Kurinnyy: "Control Is Valuable If It Is Effective"]

[Text] The style and methods of the work of the political offices and party organizations are now undergoing pronounced changes. There is more frankness in our party ranks, many problems in improving combat readiness and strengthening military discipline are being raised more pointedly, and new approaches are being affirmed in teaching the official and public activities of communists. The sphere of influence of party organizations on the life of military collectives is growing. And this requires that political offices have the ability to seek and find the methods for the organization of control that best meet the spirit of the time, to expand its glasnost and to raise efficiency.

Practice gives many examples showing that if one leaves the party organization alone with its problems and fails to give attention and help to it even for a short time complacency and tolerance of shortcomings can take root. Today, however, there are already inadequate direct demands being put on communists to fulfill their official and party obligations. The question is considerably broader and the very content of the control work of political offices is in need of change.

Such experience exists. New approaches, in particular, appeared in the political section where Col P. Petrenko is deputy director. And above all here they went the route of expanding the zones of party control. Thus, it turned out that lately the party organization of the staff and administration have been practically beyond criticism. Although in it, as it developed, by no means everything was favorable. The directors of the sections and services rarely visited the units, a style of administrative pressure prevailed in the methods of their management, and a number of communist managers lost the sense of responsibility for the situation in the sectors assigned to them. But the members of the party bureau, having become accustomed to the absence of control, seemed not to notice these shortcomings. Time and definite efforts by the political section were needed to make them face the work, to force them to carry out their own decisions.

For a time, the principle of equal responsibility of members and candidate members of the CPSU was not observed in all party organizations by any means. Mainly rank and file communists were called to account. When the director of the political section proposed to the commanders of the units and their deputies in the political unit that they report at the party meetings, most of them were psychologically unprepared for an open

conversation with people. Such reports have now become a permanent practice. And this measure noticeably raised the responsibility of communist managers for the results of their work.

Continuous control covering all areas of party work helped to raise the activity of communists, their initiative and independence. Previously, for example, the secretaries of the primary party organizations were basically required to ensure the personal exemplariness of the members and candidate members of the CPSU in military training and discipline. But one time they were invited to the political section and became interested in how the party committees participate in the resolution of social questions. They responded with excuses, saying that this was a matter for the commander and his deputies and that they had never been asked about the state of living conditions and the organization of leisure time. The workers of the political office had to explain that those times had passed. And now the party organization and the secretary personally will answer for everything that takes place in the military collective.

In expanding the zones of control, the members of the political sections are devoting more and more time to work locally. And they see their main task in supporting what is new and advanced in the practice of party work. Having decisively renounced auditor's methods of checking, they help the political workers and party aktiv to organize the fulfillment of the decisions and teach the art of working with people.

Today this is the only correct way making it possible to have full control of the situation in the units and subdivisions and to eliminate shortcomings expeditiously. As a rule, the lack of effective control by the political offices creates the illusion of vigorous restructuring of party and political work, an illusion of well-being arising on the basis of unobjective and embellished information from below. In a number of places, they rather clearly identified a "one-sided movement," when recommendations are given to the units but there is no control over how they are carried out.

If, for example, one judges by the reports coming from the political section in which officer N. Paliy works, then he gets the impression that the political office is actively managing the primary party organizations and, as they say, has its hand on the pulse of life. A check showed, however, that in many subdivisions more than half of the communists who had obligated themselves to become outstanding workers in military and political training do not confirm this calling, that only one-third of masters of military science have a level of knowledge corresponding to this qualification, and that there was a sharp increase in the number of violations of military discipline in the unit. Why do the evaluations of the political section not coincide with the real situation?



A year ago, the political office recommended that each party organization regularly evaluate the official and public activity of communists. He made the recommendation and...forgot about his own decision. Another fact. At the meeting of the party aktiv, many shortcomings in the organization of party political work in the unit were named openly and communists made a specific decision but it was not carried out. The members of the political section reduced the entire control over the realization of the critical comments and proposals to the taking of telephone reports from the secretaries of the party organization. And the reports were not objective. Accustomed to the fact that reports sent to the top are a dead weight in the folders of the political section, the secretaries took the course of deception. Within a month, they reported that the decision of the party aktiv had been carried out in full. But this is on paper. It turned out that half of the violations of military discipline were covered up, the evaluations of the military and political preparation of many servicemen were raised, and most of the measures planned by party organizations were not carried out. The members of the political section, satisfied with the fine reporting, did not check the reliability of these reports and reduced the entire management of the primary party organizations to the issuing of instructions and orders.

There is no doubt that the officers Paliy, Karapetyan and Golovin are at fault. But an analysis of the situation that has developed in the party collective of the unit would be incomplete without mention of the passivity, indifference and inertness of the communists themselves. Today all possibilities are open for the active participation of each member and candidate member of the CPSU in the control over the execution of the decisions that they themselves make. Precisely those who in due course had elected the secretary, party bureau, party committee or party commission are obligated to ask the activists invested with their trust why they do not organize the fulfillment of their own decrees. But this, alas, did not occur. In response to the question on the prospects for the renewal of party life in the unit and on their personal role in this process, most communists said: but what can I do; however the leadership decides, that is how it will be.

We will say that this acknowledgement is not completely sincere. Hardly anyone in the collective fails to see that a significant part of the party decisions are not being carried out but not one of the communists has come to his secretary with the question of why and who is guilty. For the answer is clear to everyone: all are guilty and he himself among them. To show highmindedness means that he himself must be actively involved in the work. But most communists are too accustomed to a tranquil life.

Now, under the conditions of the democratization of inner party life, it is becoming especially important to raise the level and efficiency of control from below. Every communist, regardless of the position that he

holds, is obligated to feel his own responsibility to the party organization at all times. And here a role must be played by such a very important instrument of control emanating from the rank and file party members as the regular reporting of communist managers to their party collectives. Criticism and self-criticism, practical proposals and the objective evaluation of the work of those who report serve as a dependable barrier to negligence and nonexecution. Precisely the political office is obligated to say a decisive word here and to see to it that control from below exists in fact and is expanded continuously. Officer N. Paliy, for example, did not work in primary party organizations for more than 3 months. And other officers of the political office do not visit the subdivisions a great deal more often. When they do, they go to people who often have no clear idea of what question they intend to study, whose actions to control, or how to help the party aktiv.

You cannot call the style of the work of this political office anything but theoretical and separated from real life. The evaluations here are unequivocal: officers N. Paliy, Yu. Karapetyan and others are negligent toward the fulfillment of their official duties and work more with paper than with people. Recently, however, the dangerous and not immediately recognizable phenomenon of half-execution was identified rather clearly. Frequently presented as energetic restructuring, it "crept" inconspicuously from stagnant times to our time. The workers of the political section where Lt Col N. Perov serves do not sit around in their offices. They spend more than half of their duty time in the low-level party organizations, regularly participate in meetings and other measures, and at all times are aware of what the secretaries of the primary party organizations are doing. It would seem that you cannot accuse the workers in the political section of weak control. But what, as a rule, does the performance check amount to? A worker of the political office comes to the section, for example, and immediately takes a look at the minutes. He sees that the recommended question was discussed at the meetings and sessions of the party committee and party bureau, practical and specific decisions were made, and those responsible for their realization were appointed. As required, he descends to the party groups and takes an interest in who among the communists spoke at meetings how many times and what assignments he has carried out lately. This is the end of the check. But the main question of what specifically was done and what has changed in the life of the party collective is not considered.

If one considers what the sources of such a style of half-execution are, then one sees that they are above all in the insufficient conscientiousness of those who control and verify performance. The current course of vital and specific activity, confirmation of the unity of verification everywhere, and elimination of the revealed shortcomings is evoking opposition among some workers of the political offices and giving rise to a kind of "blindness," in which they do not notice even major

omissions. In such cases, they have a ready explanation: I overlooked it or I did not understand. But behind this is clearly seen a parasitic attitude. They are saying, in effect, why delve into the problems, for I will have to solve them myself later.

The following phenomenon was rather widespread in the recent past: a political section worker from the unit brought a whole list of shortcomings, put it on the table of the chief and thereby considered his duty to be done. Perestroika rejects this style as unsuitable. For to control and to verify means to work with people, to determine the true situation together with them, and to help the political workers and party aktiv develop and implement practical measures to eliminate the shortcomings. Such verification in combination with high demands on communists becomes a good school and an effective means of educating secretaries and members of party committees and party bureaus.

Here it is appropriate to recall once again the requirement of the 27th CPSU Congress: not a single party organization must remain beyond control. As a matter of fact, it frequently happens that one examiner after another comes to a unit from the higher political offices but they do not visit a neighboring unit for months. They explain this by saying that the lagging military collectives require more attention. So it is. But by no means do the results of a unit's personnel in military training always serve as an accurate criterion for the efficiency of the work of the party organization. It sometimes happens that you hear flattering comments on the work of the party committee but when you begin to find out what specifically was done by the activists you become convinced that you have nothing to say to your comrades other than figures on the increase in the number of outstanding workers and the decline in the number of violations of discipline. Often the workers of the political office still evaluate the degree of maturity of the party organization in a one-sided manner without delving deeply into whether the communists possess sufficiently high political and practical qualities, what their mentality is, and whether they are self-critical and uncompromising in their actions. That is, in checking the party organization they leave untouched what is perhaps the main question: were the high indicators achieved on this basis or on some other?

Until recently, for example, the officers of the political office, where Lt Col N. Ivanov is deputy chief, gave a rather high assessment of the efforts of the party organization headed by Maj A. Smirnov in teaching the personnel execution and discipline. The facts, it seemed, spoke for themselves: for several years now, there have been no gross violations of statutory requirements in the collective and an exemplary military order is maintained. The regular information from the secretary on the situation in the subdivision produced no doubts—it had been checked repeatedly by workers of the political section and the facts always corresponded to reality. But an integrated group of the higher political office assessed

the work of the bureau differently. A close analysis revealed that the achieved successes were primarily the result of the volitional efforts of the commander and of help and control by the senior superiors. But the party organization, figuratively speaking, only raked up the final results for itself; it did not check independence and initiative, although formally it was fulfilling all the recommendations of the political section. But this was done not so much in the interests of the work as it was to give a favorable report to the political office.

This fact leads to the conclusion that it is necessary to study in depth not only the situation in the party organizations of the lagging units but also to delve into how positive results are being achieved in the advanced military collectives and to be able to determine where the lack of party initiative is compensated by the energetic action of the commander and other factors. So that at the end of the check one can form a clear concept of how and by what means the final result was achieved. And, the main thing, through whose efforts?

I would like to indicate the final circumstance separately. For it is necessary to evaluate not only the course of the carrying out of the instructions and recommendations of the political office but also people and to study their practical and moral qualities, strong and weak points, and methods of working with personnel. After all, the verification of the actual performance of the work and the checking of people are not separate but interrelated parts of a single process. The value of such an approach to the organization of control is above all in the fact that it helps select and control able managers and energetic party workers.

Here is a typical example. At one time, Col A. Mistryukov was elected secretary of the party committee in one of the units. He tackled the work energetically but often the party leader was hindered by his hot temper, brusqueness and indisputability of judgments and sometimes by rash actions. It happened that the secretary made decisions by himself, tried to replace other members of the party committee and was rude to those who deviated from the moral standards. Initially this repelled some communists. For a time there was a decline in the life of the party organization, which those on whom Colonel Mistryukov had put strict demands did not fail to utilize. Complaints were made to the higher authorities.

After working in the unit for a few days, the workers of the political section came to the conclusion that the effectiveness of many of the decisions made by the party committee was indeed still low. It was time to draw the most severe conclusions. But the workers of the political office saw something else: the fact that Mistryukov was a man of firm principles, incapable of compromise, and possessing a high capacity for work and practical qualities. This, by the way, was said even by those communists who initially disliked the demanding nature of the new secretary. At times using kind words and support



and at times through strictness and continuous control, the workers of the political section helped the party leader get rid of his shortcomings, unite people around himself, and organize the work in the collective. And now the party committee is a dependable help to the commander in the resolution of the tasks facing the unit.

If the workers of the political section had studied the actions of the secretary according to reports, minutes and plans, they would hardly have been able to comprehend the nature of the conflict that was about to arise in the collective. And they could have lost a good worker. But their control methods were valuable in that the officers of the political office based their conclusions not on papers but on the opinion of the communists who worked side by side with Mistryukov. Precisely numerous conversations with people and the comparison of different points of view helped the workers of the political section to work out specific recommendations to the secretary and the entire party organization.

Unfortunately, there is still much formalism in the forms and methods of control. Some staff workers are still trying to introduce different control charts for the execution of leading documents, hanging them on the walls of the offices. Initially, to be sure, when the rule that they should work most of their time locally with people became part of the system, they began to disappear as "monuments" of a bureaucratic style that had outlived their day. But later individual managers again revived all sorts of journals, notebooks and diagrams, presenting them as the results of *perestroika* while in reality driving active control of execution into a dead end.

It is essential, of course, to account for incoming documents, deadlines for reports, and the performance of instructions. But it seems that practice has not found a better means for these purposes than a working notebook. And the most effective form of control, which can only give an objective picture, is still the individual conversation. It cannot be replaced by any minutes or report, even one drawn up in the most conscientious manner. Working recently in the party organization of the unit where Maj V. Senchenko is a member of the party committee, I asked the communists what decision they made at the most recent party meeting. And no one could answer. The secretary of the party committee was also silent. One asks, is it really impossible to remember the content of a decision if each communist dealt with it a minimum of three times: when it was discussed and adopted, when it was being carried out, and when the secretary of the party organization reported at the next meeting on what was done?

One of two things: either the decision contained only general phrases or the fulfillment of the outlined plans was not being organized at all. Meanwhile, everything was recorded clearly and accurately in the minutes.

The striving for ostentation and the pursuit of numerical indicators to the detriment of active specific work with people does irreparable harm to control. In one of the political offices, its chief proudly showed a colorful diagram of the course of a candidate's probationary period along the entire wall. It was clear from the table that all candidates for membership in the CPSU—and there are more than 30 of them in the unit—had reported once or twice to the party organization on their work. They talked with each of them. And it turned out that all of this information is a fiction. The young communists did not know much about the duties of a member of the CPSU. No one was studying the Party Program and Rules with them and no one was providing any help in their formation. But the political section was demanding data and the secretaries of the party organizations, accustomed to telephonic methods of control, presented false information.

Control of performance is valuable precisely through contact with the individual and not with paper. By questioning people, we found out that almost half of the decisions made in the party organizations of this unit are not carried out. Where were the workers of the political office looking? They explained the lack of reliable information on the local situation through a shortage of manpower and time and through the multitude of tasks that the political section has to resolve. Such references are not very convincing. As a rule, it is the adherents of a bureaucratic style of work who resort to them. If the officers of the political office spend even half of their duty time in the units, then it is possible to have every party link under continuous control. Under one condition, of course: that they do not sit in the office of the deputy political officer or secretary of the party committee but instead that they go to the battalion and company party organizations. And act not thoughtlessly but carry out planned and comprehensive control.

Recently, over the course of 10 days, our integrated group worked in the unit where Lt Col A. Khudikov is deputy chief of the political section. Setting aside reports, minutes and plans, we went to the lower-level party organizations. We were able to talk with many servicemen of all categories. When we summarized the opinions and points of view of the people, it turned out that more than 50 proposals and critical comments directed at the higher authorities require immediate consideration. All of them were taken to the corresponding sections and services and checked out. This time, no one was able to get by with formal written responses. A few months later, an officer from the integrated group again went out to the unit. And those decisions that were left hanging were carried out in full.

It was necessary, of course, to spend some time and to demonstrate will and persistence. Otherwise it is impossible to count on a final result in control work. To this day, however, you encounter the attitude that checks are a simple and unburdensome matter. This is an echo from those times when they basically amounted to reprimands

and exhortations. Today the question of the examiner's competence and own ability to provide an example of the organization of execution is raised rather pointedly. This is why before going out to the unit it is necessary to have a clear idea of the problems facing the party collective, of the questions that need to be studied, and what means can be used to influence the situation.

By no means all workers of the political offices yet see clearly the final objectives of the checks that they are carrying out. It has somehow been the case that heretofore the emphasis has been on the search for and elimination of shortcomings and the calling of their perpetrators to account. Everywhere the summary documents on the work of the commissions are full of information about errors made at the localities and stern conclusions but there is extremely little positive experience. Meanwhile, as a rule, there are good sprouts even in the party organizations of the lagging units. And it is the priority obligation of the examiner to note and support them and to help them grow. Precisely this is the key to raising the effectiveness of control.

But the objectivity of evaluations is only one side of the matter. It is now becoming more and more the practice to discuss the results of the work of those in the political sections not in a narrow circle, as was formerly the case, but in party meetings. And this is the right way to go. Extensive glasnost and a collective search for ways to eliminate shortcomings stimulate the action of communists and open up possibilities for expanding control from below and for the participation of all members and candidate members of the CPSU in it.

The report-back meetings now taking place in the primary party organizations and the meetings of the party aktiv gave a new impetus to criticism and self-criticism and involved a large group of communists in a serious analysis of the first results of perestroika. The political offices, party committees and party bureaus, and secretaries are receiving well-founded observations and specific suggestions, including on the improvement of the control over the execution of decisions previously made. Their essence is that a number of party leaders are continuing to be carried away with the drawing up of plans and the preparation of comprehensive resolutions and are not very involved in active organizational work.

At one of the meetings, the following figures were named: in a party organization where only 30 people are registered, in some months as many as 50 to 60 points of decisions by bureau meetings and sessions were adopted. Add to this another 15 to 20 measures from current plans and it turns out that there are two or three measures a month per communist. It becomes understandable why almost half of the decisions remain on paper, control bogs down, and there is not enough time for organizing the work. And communists put the matter correctly: those who check and control the activities of the aktiv

are obligated to help it renounce the "gross-numbers approach" in party work, coordinate its own efforts, and direct them toward a final result.

The processes of renewal are developing more and more extensively and deeply in the party organizations of the units and subdivisions. And so that they can proceed more actively and energetically, the political offices and party committees and bureaus are obligated to be persistent in improving the entire system for the control and verification of performance, striving for a further strengthening of party influence on the resolution of the tasks of combat readiness and the strengthening of discipline.

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#### **Belorussian MD: Political Work Being 'Restructured'**

18010207 KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 24 Dec 87 pp 36-40

[Article by Col N. Deyko, chief of the section for propaganda and agitation and deputy chief of the political directorate of the Red Banner Belorussian Military District, under the "Ideological Work: Content and Effectiveness" rubric: "The Training of Propagandists: Depths and Shoals"]

[Text] The process of perestroika is gaining strength in the units and subdivisions of our district. The more profoundly people realize the nature of the innovative aims of the party and understand them as their own vital cause, the more actively it will proceed. But this is directly linked with the effectiveness of ideological work. One of the main figures in it is the propagandist. To a decisive extent, the strength of the impact of those ideas that he brings to the mass of soldiers on their consciousness depends on the depth of his knowledge, his ideological conviction, methodological mastery, ability to think and act in a new way, and party enthusiasm.

There are many staff propagandists in the military collectives of the district who fulfill their obligations with great responsibility and actively propagandize the decisions of the 27th Party Congress and subsequent Central Committee plenums and the documents dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the Great October. They give active help to the commanders in mobilizing personnel for a quality resolution of the tasks in military and political training. They include colonels A. Shirokov and V. Aleksandrov, majors V. Dubovenko and Kh. Shakhnazarov, and captains B. Lisitsyn and Yu. Starovoytov. They respond sensitively to the spiritual requirements of the soldiers and are permanently "charged" to seek new and effective forms and methods of influencing the consciousness of people ideologically. When propagandist Maj V. Malnach came to the formation, for example, Sunday political hours were introduced. What

are they? These are talks of about 1 hour in duration about problems of concern to personnel. Communist supervisors carry them out directly in the companies in the form of a lively discussion. Each participant can raise any question, enter into an argument, and freely state his own point of view. The soldiers came to love these conversations because of their democratic nature, openness and emotional quality. It is important to note something else: the military collectives began to experience fewer unjustified rumors and incorrect interpretations of different phenomena and events.

To a considerable extent, fruitful independent and organized training determines the success in the work of all the above-named propagandists. They are persistently expanding their professional horizon, are striving to take over all that is advanced in the practice of other propagandists, and are trying to extract the maximum benefit from assemblies, seminars, practical scientific conferences and instructor's methodological lessons.

Of course, by no means all propagandists possess in-depth ideological-theoretical and methodological training and professional competence. There are still those who were not able to give up the accustomed patterns and obsolete approaches to the work and reorganize themselves and who therefore are continuing to follow the old path worn down by years of service. And as a result, the process of renewing the content, forms and methods of ideological and educational work is proceeding with difficulty—with a squeak, as the say—in many military collectives. Formalism, clichés, lecturing and superficiality are being eliminated only slowly.

It still frequently happens that some propagandists try to avoid pointed questions because of a lack of knowledge, unclearness in their own position, and the inability to argue or defend their own point of view. I recall how uncomfortable Maj G. Gubernskiy felt when in the course of a conversation the soldiers asked him questions and he could not give a convincing answer to them. In addition, some of his opinions were quite incorrect.

The lack of knowledge, narrowness of views, and inability to construct a system of evidence on the basis of Marxist-Leninist methodology greatly undermines the authority of propagandists and, accordingly, reduces the effectiveness of their work.

All of this shows convincingly that true restructuring of ideological activity is unthinkable without further improvement of the training of propaganda personnel. It is proceeding for us in several basic directions: deepening of ideological-theoretical training, formation of new thinking, development of methodological and oratorical mastery, active propagandizing of the experience of the best ideological fighters, the strengthening of military-professional skills, and the creative development of the

forms, methods and content of ideological and educational measures. How successful is such an approach to training? What is new about it recently? Does all of it satisfy us?

I will say directly that we have not yet been able to restructure the training of propagandists completely and bring it into line with the requirements of the present day. Certain positive changes have been noted in this work, however. Take, for example, the planning meetings of the regular ideological workers of the units and formations carried out this year. Even in comparing the plans of these meetings with those that we had, let us say, a year or two ago, a significant difference is noted. Taking into account the desires of the propagandists, we increased the number of measures involving the improvement of the practical skills of ideological workers.

This is how we organized one of the meetings. With its participants, we carried out a practical scientific conference on the ways and means to activate the human factor for the purpose of raising combat readiness and strengthening military discipline and a methodological seminar, in the course of which propagandists discussed the forms and methods of work in raising the action of soldiers in political studies. The most experienced ideological workers, officers I. Zhdankin, V. Nemerzhitskiy and others, presented reports on different aspects of the practice of ideological and political education. We dedicated significantly more time to the exchange of experiences, giving people the extensive possibility to exchange opinions on the course of perestroika in the ideological area and to speak out openly on urgent issues.

At the meeting held in November of this year, questions linked with the tasks of ideological workers in propagandizing the jubilee documents on the 70th anniversary of the Great October, in the further fulfillment of the decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On Restructuring the System of the Political and Economic Training of Working People," and in preparing for the 19th All-Union Party Conference were examined in detail. Along with this, we sought to give a personal assessment of the style of the work of each propagandist, which, I will stress in particular, was not done before. In leaving the meeting, a person knows how his labor is evaluated and in which direction he must work in the future.

The political directorate and political offices of the formations have recently begun to practice more frequent group seminars of ideological workers in garrisons. Such seminars are held once every two months. In the course of these seminars, we orient propagandists in current burning questions of domestic and international life and we explain the most important party documents. We put special emphasis on the analysis of the practice of ideological work, which we study thoroughly on the eve of the seminar in the units and subdivisions of the garrison. We reveal the experience of the best, examine mistakes and give advice. The small size of the audience



makes it possible to organize the training of propagandists more specifically and to do a better job of considering the specific nature of the work of military collectives.

There are certain elements of perestroika in training but there are still more unresolved tasks. For example, we are doing a poor job of providing our ideological personnel with methods of individual work and the ability to reach each soldier. We talk a lot about the necessity of improving individual work but we give few specific recommendations and not much advice to people. As a result, even today some propagandists continue to act in the old way and emphasize mass measures, the infamous "gross-numbers approach." We are also concerned by the fact that individual propagandists have poor skills in driving military vehicles and the firing of standard weapons. It is clear that such ideological workers will not have authority in the military collectives. The improvement of the technical military training of propagandists depends to a considerable degree on the strictness of commanders and the organization of the training of commanders in the units. The political directorate began to put higher demands on the political sections, party committees and party bureaus of the units so that they will systematically control the technical military training of propagandists and their performance of socialist obligations in all disciplines.

The broadest part of the ideological aktiv—the leaders of the political studies groups—play a large role in the ideological and political education of soldiers. Their training in the formation where Lt Col P. Butenko is propagandist has been organized at a high ideological-theoretical and methodological level. Here seminars with group leaders are held productively. Strict control has been established over their attendance. The failure of an officer to attend the studies without a valid reason is viewed as a kind of extraordinary situation. As a rule, seminars are opened with instructional-methodological lectures on the subject of the forthcoming studies. They are read for a week and a half or 2 weeks before the beginning of its study. In the course of the lectures, not only is the content of the basic questions of the subject revealed but invariably advice is giving to the leaders of the methods groups: how to present material to listeners better and more intelligibly, how to link it with the work of the military collective, how to create problem situations, and what technical means of propaganda and visual aids should be utilized. At the seminars, in addition to the reading of instructive lectures and the discussion of the content and methods of the forthcoming studies, they regularly organize addresses on domestic and international subjects and on current questions in Marxist-Leninist theory and problems in military pedagogy and psychology as well as discussions of innovations in the political and military literature and newspapers and journals. This expands the horizon of nonstaff propagandists. A conference on methods is held once with them during the period of the studies.

In the unit where officer V. Kurinnyy serves, they effectively utilize open lessons to disseminate the experience of advanced nonstaff propagandists. They became a true school for propagandist mastery. The best methods specialists are entrusted with the carrying out of the lessons. The deputy unit commander in the political unit, the staff propagandist and party activists take part in the training. After the conclusion of the open lesson, it is analyzed and advice, wishes and critical comments are stated. In the course of the exchange of opinions, the group leaders work out common views on the methods. Such lessons are instructive and they give much to the nonstaff propagandists, especially the young ones.

The officers also had a high opinion of the model lesson that took place in the group of Maj V. Deshevyykh. The experienced methods specialist prepared well for it, skillfully raised problem questions, involved listeners in a discussion, and "directed" it knowledgeably. The lesson attracted not only students but also group leaders present there. The officers were able to compare their own methods with those of a colleague and were enriched by experience.

In the garrison where Lt Col A. Smalkov serves as well as in many others, it became the rule on the eve of the political studies to hold consultations for the group leaders in the reference and information center of the House of Officers. Here they receive answers to questions on the content and methods of the forthcoming studies.

Councils of propagandists are already taking their first steps. They include political workers, the most experienced members of the agitation and propaganda groups, and leaders of the political studies groups. The task of such councils includes the generalization and dissemination of the advanced experience of ideological work, aid to nonstaff propagandists in preparing for the studies, and the review of lectures, supporting summaries, and reports.

Certain elements of the first approach to the work also appear in the organizational side of training. For example, some of the nonstaff propagandists do not attend the instructive seminars for different valid reasons. The question arises: how can one help them fill the gaps in their knowledge that result from this? In a number of military collectives, they have begun to practice the tape recording of lectures on methods of instruction. By coming to the methods room, the officer can then listen to the lecture heard at the missed seminar. The benefit from this innovation is obvious.

One of the important directions of the work with the propaganda aktiv is the generalization and dissemination of advanced experience in ideological work. Unfortunately, the proper importance is not being given to this work everywhere. Perhaps every political section and most staff propagandists always have some materials entitled "Work Experience" at hand. But they often are

full of general phrases and therefore are of no value. Of what benefit and for whom, let us say, could be the experience of the independent work of nonstaff propagandist Lt Col V. Dreyling found in the methods room if it was prepared formally?: in the material written long ago, they changed one family name for another. This was precisely the course taken by former unit propagandist Maj A. Dorokhin.

The political directorate and political sections of the formations have recently begun to evaluate the content of materials on experience more strictly and to use different forms and means for its propaganda. For example, the article "Under the Shatalov Method" by Maj V. Makarov was published in the pages of the district newspaper VO SLAVU RODINY. The experience about which the officer writes gives convincing evidence of the acceptability of the methods of the Donetsk pedagogue in political training and is indisputably worthy of the most careful attention.

When they visit the troops, the officers of the political directorate strive to observe the beginnings of truly new and instructive things in the work of propagandists. Much of value was noted in the units of the air forces of the district in the organization of the training of the leaders of the groups for the Marxist-Leninist training of officers. Today this experience has been disseminated and the propagandists are familiar with it. So it is, by the way, with the work experience of Col S. Drozdov in raising the effectiveness of studies, with that of Lt Col M. Melnichenko in improving the ideological hardening of young officers, and with that of Lt Col F. Tarasevich in improving the quality of the political training of ensigns.

The short-term plans of the political directorate call for the dissemination of the interesting work experience gained in the unit where Maj N. Bystrov serves. Here they are striving to see to it that nonstaff propagandists have a solid mastery of the art of political agitation and that they study and apply the wartime work experience of officer political workers creatively.

What causes us the most concern today? Above all it is the low effectiveness of many seminars with leaders of political studies groups. Despite the requirement that they be held twice a month for 4 hours each time and that they be prepared carefully, this aim is often violated. And now in some places, they hold, in a manner of speaking, truncated seminars that are reduced to just one instructive lecture. There are cases in which these measures are not carried out. And if one adds to this the poor attendance of seminars, not exceeding 60 to 70 percent in some units, then it becomes clear how much propagandists are still not receiving and to what significant "gaps" in their ideological-theoretical and methodological knowledge this leads.

The quality of instructive lectures and reports is often still low. In the formation where political worker Col G. Borisov serves, the workers of the section for propaganda

and agitation of the political directorate analyzed their content. It turned out that more than half of the addresses were formal and enlightening in nature. The content of the teaching material on the subject to be studied soon was presented to the propagandists very hurriedly. Meanwhile, conversations with group leaders showed that almost one-fourth of them experience a lack of theoretical knowledge. More than half of the officers stated that there was inadequate mastery of methods. But, as we see, the seminar leaders sometimes ignore this fact.

The analysis carried out by the political directorate of the district showed, for example, that in many military collectives some nonstaff propagandists have no idea about how to carry out political studies using the story-conversation method. And as a result, they turn the story into a tedious reading of a prepared text, into a dictation. And instead of a lively discussion in which all the students and the propagandist himself, of course, are supposed to participate, the group has the usual lesson of the question-answer type.

In our view, we are not yet obtaining the necessary yield from the work of the methods rooms in the units. In some places, these rooms are being converted into something along the lines of library annexes and are opened once or twice a month during the days when seminars are held with the leaders of the political studies groups. But these rooms must be those methods centers of advanced experience where the nonstaff propagandist can not only fill his theoretical baggage but also arm himself with different forms and methods of work, exchange opinions with colleagues in an unconstrained atmosphere, argue, learn to defend his own point of view, polish his public-speaking skills, familiarize himself with the innovations of social and political culture, and meet interesting people.

A more and more acute question in recent years has been that of teaching the ideological aktiv the practice of work with soldiers having a poor command of the Russian language. The number of such soldiers reaches 30 to 40 percent in individual subdivisions. This circumstance is hardly considered in the process of carrying out political studies, however. And the same material is presented for those who know Russian well as for those who do not. And this is not just because propagandists do not want to give themselves any extra burdens. They simply have not been taught and have no experience in such work. We, of course, are taking definite steps to resolve this problem. We recommend that additional studies using a special textbook be organized for soldiers who do not speak good Russian and that the experience of advanced methods specialists be generalized and made available to the group leaders.

To a considerable degree, the high quality of theoretical and methodological training of propaganda personnel in a number of formations and units is explained by inadequate attention to this sector by commanders, political



offices, and party committees and bureaus. Very many of them are still being satisfied by apparent well-being in the work with the warriors of the ideological front. Meanwhile, it is enough to talk with group leaders to become convinced that it is still far from true well-being. In the unit where the officer V. Ognev serves, for example, the studies with nonstaff propagandists proceed without interruption. In conversations, however, more than half of the officers expressed dissatisfaction with their level, declaring that seminars are boring, uninteresting and yield little with respect to raising knowledge and mastery of methods.

What does this say? It says that the political offices and party committees are not scrutinizing the training of group leaders closely and are not controlling their quality strictly enough. It is extremely rare that the reports of seminar leaders are listened to in the political offices and party committees or that the ideological-theoretical and methodological level of measures aimed at improving the preparation of propagandists is analyzed. And these matters should also be discussed more often in the section for propaganda and agitation of the political directorate. It seems that it is essential for us to make it a rule to attend regularly the seminars held among troops. And not with the purpose of "inspecting," as was formerly the case, but to show in practice how an instructive lecture should be given, how to organize a discussion of the content and methods of studies, and how to carry out an open lesson in a group.

In my view, the district political directorate, political sections of formations, and party committees and bureaus of units along with commanders are not greatly concerned about encouraging the best propagandists through certificates and valuable gifts or about expressing gratitude to them for their conscientious work, which could have a substantial influence on the prestige of the ideological workers of this category and would give them new incentives in their difficult labor.

On the other hand, one cannot fail to see that some political offices and party organizations are still indulging those propagandists who are fulfilling their obligations in a slipshod manner and are not concerned about raising their own competence or about moral purity.

The improvement of the training of propaganda personnel is one of the most important links in the restructuring of ideological work. The renewal of its forms and methods, true party concern about quality and effectiveness, and indissoluble ties with life and military practice represent one of the true ways to raise the influence of the warriors of the ideological front on the consciousness of soldiers and therefore on the final results of military and political training and the strengthening of discipline.

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### New Training Year: Preparing for Defensive Tactics

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[Article by Col G. Miranovich and Col V. Zhitarenko under "Preparing for the New Training Year" rubric: "How Is the Defense Strong?: The Organizers of the Model Lesson Tried to Answer This Question"]

[Text] Let us make a reservation right away: much of what the participants in this lesson saw exceeded the scope of the usual notions about measures of a model character. Usually in studies of this kind they show what has already gone through the appropriate verification and does not produce any doubts. Here, however, there was something to doubt and think about at each training point. Thus, the model lesson became something like an experiment, in the process of which an intensive search was underway in the methods of instructing troops in defensive actions as well as in the very tactics of defensive combat.

Such a nature of the lesson was also conditioned by considerations of a methodological nature as well as the dictates of time. For it is no secret that in combat training, just as in other areas of troop activities, an active search is now under way for those forms and methods of work that would best consider the increased demands of the party on the armed forces and the fundamental positions of military doctrine. And, as you know, our doctrine views defense as the basic form of military action to repel aggression. How can one best instruct the troops under the new conditions, what should be avoided, and what should be utilized?

In conversing with the commander of the guard motorized rifle Tamanskaya Division imeni M.I. Kalinin, on the basis of which the lesson was prepared, and with the officers and soldiers of the subdivisions directly carrying out the order, we repeatedly heard the word "difficult." In general, there is nothing reprehensible in this. And for the military man accustomed to the hardships and deprivations of field campaigns, defensive combat, especially in the winter and in other difficult climatic and geographic conditions, is a severe test. In the case at hand, however, it is matter of difficulties of a different kind.

We will yet speak of some, in a manner of speaking, professional qualities essential for the soldier in defense, qualities that were manifested in the actions of personnel in this lesson and that are to be developed and improved. We would now like to direct our attention to something without which success in combat is unthinkable even when all the other factors determining the dependability of defense are present. They are such concepts generally well known to all of us as firmness of spirit, steadfastness, courage, the ability to maintain fighting activity under the most difficult and dangerous conditions, and readiness for a prolonged and often extreme exertion of

moral and physical strength. In this sense, defense puts the most severe demands of the individual. Thus, the increase in attention on defensive battle presupposes an improvement of the quality of the training and instruction process as a whole.

The past training year was a serious lesson in this respect for the soldiers of Tamanskaya Division. Many of them were examined in the final check precisely in defensive instructional combat. Not all of them were fully up to the task. Unfortunately, the same thing can also be said about the warriors of several other formations and units. But there is nothing surprising here. For some time now, our subject matter linked with the preparation of troops for defensive actions has been second-rate. Little attention was paid to it in the planning of combat training. And those studies and training in which the development of the elements of defense was planned were frequently carried out with indulgence. To a considerable extent, this, it must be assumed, also caused those difficulties linked with the preparation of the model lesson, about which we heard in the division staff and in the subdivisions. Too much was forgotten.

The organizers of the lesson attempted, of course, to take into account lessons linked with shortcomings in the preparation of personnel for defensive actions as well as the advanced experience that has already been gained in this matter in the process of perestroika.

Thus, the lesson showed that in a defense intended for the struggle against an active and technically well-equipped enemy—and we cannot count on a weak enemy—it is really not easy for all. We saw the hands of the guard grenadier Pvt O. Usov, a working lad from Norilsk, after he had equipped his firing position. They were the hands of a digger who had taken out more than one cubic meter of obstinate earth. They were the hands of a carpenter, because, having penetrated the frozen layer of soil, the soldier encountered a layer of sand and had to reinforce the walls of his trench with whatever was available. They were the hands of an artist, because the grenadier camouflaged his position—no one can object to that.... But in general, they were the hands of an ordinary working person of the defense that make it strong above everything else.

Not everything, of course, is done by hand in defense. If necessary, the people are helped out by powerful bulldozers, high-speed earth moving machines and excavators, crane trucks.... The process of the mechanization of engineering work will doubtless be intensified and improved. But they will not be able to get along without the hands of soldiers. Furthermore, the demands on the viability of defense are now such that we must know how to set it up in stone and in concrete. Where can people be trained for this if not in the lessons and exercises where the questions in the organization and waging of defensive combat are handled? Consequently, the percentage of such lessons and exercises in the overall system for the

training of personnel must be much higher than it is now. Fifty-fifty is perhaps the most advisable and fair ratio of time allocated to the preparation of offensive and defensive actions.

We can present an example for conclusiveness. The attention of the participants in the model lesson was attracted to the training point intended for the handling of questions having to do with the training of personnel for actions in defensive combat in the city. The representatives of the division spoke with pride about the fact that a record short time was spent on its equipping. And the facility is indeed impressive. Here, even in a cursory examination, it is not difficult to become convinced that a defense skillfully carried out in stone and concrete can be an insuperable obstacle in the way of the enemy. At the same time, you think that such was also the case during the years of the Great Patriotic War. However, in setting aside the subjects linked with the training of troops for defensive actions, we sometimes forgot about the experience gained through the blood and sweat of front line soldiers. If this did not happen, it may be that we would not now have to be in such a hurry to establish training spaces that have long been needed. We would like to reemphasize this in connection with the fact that now, when, in preparing for the 70th anniversary of the armed forces, we are taking an especially close look at our military history, every officer has the wonderful opportunity again and again to take a creative look at the experience of the front through the prism of the demands of contemporary military doctrine and to draw the practical conclusions for himself.

Obviously, it is also necessary for our military scientists and historians to look in more depth, from a professional military point of view, at several defensive operations of the Great Patriotic War. The scientific recommendations based on the creatively interpreted combat experience could be utilized both in the preparation of the appropriate manuals as well as in the practical work of commanders and staffs in the organization of the process of training and instruction and in the improvement of the material-technical base.

Let us return, however, to the soldier in the trenches. When we approached the guard Private Usov, whom we have already met, his labored hands with traces of ground-in earth clutched an assault rifle. The grenade launcher ready for use lay beside him on the parapet.

"Why does a grenadier need an assault rifle?" repeated Usov. "That was the order of the company commander and it will be handier with it if infantry comes without tanks...."

An assault rifle in the hands of a grenadier may be an unusual phenomenon for motorized rifle troops but it is by no means accidental in the lesson in question. Just as it was no accident, let us say, that a powerful, apparently real permanent emplacement with three embrasures appeared in the company under the command of guard

Sr Lt V. Reznikov. Its size was imposing but it subsequently turned out to be an ordinary hill. Just as the lack of conformity to the requirements of the military regulations in the positioning of several firing systems in the defensive region of the battalion under the command of guard Maj G. Stetsenko was no accident...

Much of what we saw in the positions of motorized rifle men, tankmen, artillerymen, and antiaircraft gunners was unusual because—as we heard—they do not merely sit in defense but they think in defense. By the way that guard Private Usov, his commanders and colleagues were thinking, it was clear that the time of perestroika is also having an impact on the psychology and thinking of people.

It would seem that everyone has known for a long time that defense is strong through activeness. It is also well known that the activeness of defense consists in the continuous defeat of the offensives forces by all means, the imposing of own's will on the enemy, the establishment of unfavorable battle conditions for him, and the carrying out of extensive maneuvering and counterattacks. After all, the final objective is to debilitate the enemy and utterly destroy him. But we so often see in exercises that some organize defense in the old way emphasizing frontal strikes or, blindly adhering to the established intervals and distances, they place military machines in such a way that they cannot fully use their firing and maneuvering possibilities. It seems that an important role is also played here by an approach to the evaluation of the actions of subdivisions in defense in which the main emphasis is not the striving to train people but the demand that the letter of some particular regulating document be observed at all costs.

And in the case at hand, not all were able to avoid routine in the formation of defense, the organization of a system of fire, and interaction. In particular, some antiaircraft weapons were vulnerable to the fire of the air "enemy" because of their linear disposition. Not all command and observation points were properly protected. The work of individual commanders in the directing of fire was limited to the single command "fire." Nevertheless, the emphasis of the organizers of the lesson on creativity, initiative and searching did play a positive role. This was also revealed in new means of using some types of weapons, about which was spoken above, as well as in the camouflaging of forces and weapons and in the engineering installation of positions.

What is a tank in defense? "Strength," a person with a little knowledge of military science will say. But strength can also be used in different ways. In the region of the position of the section headed by guard Sgt S. Zyukin, for example, we saw a tank representing a mobile permanent emplacement. The motorized riflemen helped the tankmen not only to conceal the combat vehicle dependably but also to guarantee it complete freedom for maneuvering.



In defense, especially when it is set up early, the commander has the possibility of looking after its high technical activeness. To do this, however, it is necessary to know how to manage his locality. Practice, including the lesson about which we are talking, shows that many commanders still have much to learn in this connection. Here is a typical episode. In the heat of battle, under the nose of the "enemy," as they say, the engineers of the defenders begin to lay a minefield. And this takes place in territory not occupied by the "enemy." One asks whether the commander organizing the defense could establish a line of engineering obstacles in advance, without subjecting people and equipment to danger?

Something similar is also sometimes observed in carrying out counterattacks. For some reason, those counter-attacking forget that they are operating in their own territory. And for this reason, no use is made of the defensive characteristics of the terrain and the shelters that they themselves prepared and equipment is used essentially as in offensive combat.

There was one other aspect in the lesson that we would like to delve into in more detail. That is the withdrawal from combat. When the situation for the defenders developed in such a way that the "enemy" was able to increase the pressure, even though he had suffered significant losses of men and equipment, the senior commander ordered the subdivision to withdraw from combat. This stage in the lesson showed especially clearly that in defense much depends upon the teamwork of the subdivisions, the discipline of personnel, and the ability of commanders to organize and maintain continuously the interaction of all forces and weapons. In the case at hand, in particular, guard Major Stetsenko had to have the ability to maintain in a difficult situation precise interaction with aircraft, artillery and tank subdivisions so as to stop the offensive forces for a time and to remove the main forces of the motorized rifle from under their strike power. Under cover of the detached subdivisions, artillery fire, obstacles and smoke, the battalion quickly withdrew from combat.

The participants in the model lesson received answers to many questions having to do with the organization and waging of defensive combat. But much remains to contemplate, analyze and systematize taking into account the specific conditions under which the tasks of the new training year have to be resolved.

That would seem to be an elementary question. There was a time, as you know, when voices were heard saying that in an attack the machine gunner is hindered by the mounts. That may be true in an attack. But can it be that in defense those same supports are needed for the assault rifle so that the fire is more effective? Perhaps it is also necessary to arm the grenadier with an assault rifle as was done in the model lesson? One should also think about the quality of the engineering equipment for the setting up of defensive positions and about other principles and means of digging those same emplacements,

trenches and command points, including in hard and frozen ground. Not just about handy but about listed means of reinforcing engineering structures set up in loose ground....

It is also necessary to think in accordance with the new possibilities and new requirements.

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### **Military Parity and the Principle of Reasonable Sufficiency**

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[Article by Col P. Skorodenko, doctor of historical sciences, professor: "Military Parity and the Principle of Reasonable Sufficiency"]

[Text] The second half of our century is justifiably characterized as the beginning of the nuclear-space age, which has led to an entirely new situation in the world, especially in the military field. The 20th Century gave mankind the energy of the atom. But, this great intellectual achievement may become for people a weapon of self-destruction. Through the fault of the aggressive imperialist circles, mountains of nuclear and other types of weapons have been stockpiled on earth, and nevertheless the arms race is not slackening, but gaining speed. Moreover, the current U. S. administration is undertaking feverish efforts to carry it into space.

The tremendous arsenals of nuclear missile weapons, and the further increase and improvement in the means of mass destruction, not only increase many times over the threat to the very existence of human civilization, but are even becoming essentially senseless. The reality is that today no state can ensure its own security through military and technical means, while ignoring the security of other countries.

The new situation in the world also requires new political thinking, which is still finding it difficult to make its way in international relations. The approach taken to the problems of war and peace, to military strength and its role in world politics, to the problems of disarmament, especially nuclear, and to the setting up of civilized international relations as a whole is becoming the criterion for the presence or absence of the new political thinking.

One of the clear manifestations of new political thinking is the concept of the 27th CPSU Congress on limiting military capability within the bounds of reasonable sufficiency. This is an innovative posing of the issue, which is of fundamental importance under the conditions of the unrestrained nuclear missile arms race. It opposes

the concept of the unlimited buildup of military arsenals, which is being stubbornly adhered to by the Washington administration and the ringleaders of the U. S. military-industrial complex.

Having put forth, at a Czechoslovakian-Soviet friendship meeting held on 10 April of this year, important new peace initiatives aimed at reducing military danger on the European continent and throughout the world, Comrade M. S. Gorbachev noted: "We see the process of reducing military confrontation in Europe as one of stages, while equality at the level of reasonable sufficiency is observed at each stage."

Reasonable sufficiency is in our view that minimal quantitative and qualitative level of military capability of a state that reliably guarantees its security and does not create a real military threat to other countries; i.e., provides mutual equal security. This principle is applicable also to the military coalitions of opposing social systems.

Correlating the levels of military capabilities of socialism and capitalism is a complex and multi-faceted phenomenon. Given the entire multi-level nature of this problem, under present conditions the relationship of the military capabilities of the USSR and U. S., and the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO, has acquired special importance for restraining the aggressive aspirations of imperialism.

The bounds of reasonable sufficiency of military capability are closely associated with doctrinal postulates of the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community on maintaining strategic military parity between the USSR and the U. S., and the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO, at ever lower levels, and on ensuring the equal security of the two sides.

Despite the important role of strategic military parity in restraining the aggressive designs of imperialism, it far from ensures reliable guarantees of equal and universal security. If parity during the course of the arms race imposed by the American side is established at higher and higher levels, it will lead merely to increased political tension, colossal economic outlays, and intensification of the threat of nuclear war that hangs over the world. True equal security in our age is guaranteed not by the highest possible, but by the lowest possible level of strategic balance, from which it is necessary to exclude completely nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction.

Characterizing the prospects in this field, Comrade M. S. Gorbachev, in a speech at the international forum, "For a Nuclear-Free World, For the Survival of Mankind," emphasized: "On the path to the historic goal—a demilitarized world—there will, of course, be stages. At each of these stages mutuality of interests, and equality at the level of reasonable sufficiency, with a continuous tendency toward reduction, must be observed."

The present situation requires that the Soviet Union maintain its defense capability at a level sufficient to ensure its own security and that of its friends and allies, and to rebuff reliably imperialist aggression. "...while the danger that imperialism will unleash aggressive wars and military conflicts exists," it is noted in the CPSU Program, "the party will pay unremitting attention to increasing the defense might of the USSR, and to strengthening its security and the readiness of the armed forces to defeat any aggressor." At the same time, our defense capability does not exceed a level that would give the capitalist countries bases to fear for their own security, or to justify a further increase in the arms race by them.

History irrefutably proved that, had the Soviet Union not raised its own military potential at all stages of the arms race unleashed by imperialism, to a level of sufficiency to repulse aggression, nothing else would have safeguarded the socialist community and all mankind against a new world war. It is precisely the defense capability of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty Organization as a whole that is the main dam that holds back the aggressive aspirations of imperialism.

It is well known that in the first post-war years imperialism unleashed the "cold war" against the socialist countries. To ensure its own superiority it unleashed an arms race of enormous proportions, and proceeded to knock together aggressive military alliances. The U. S. created and improved nuclear weapons for the battle against socialism.

The Soviet Union was faced with the need to react to the threat from the aggressive circles of the U. S. and its allies, and to take steps to maintain its military capability at the necessary level. We always remembered Lenin's instruction that an army that does not prepare to master all types of weapons, all means and techniques of combat that the enemy has or may have, is behaving senselessly and even criminally. "Not possessing all means of combat," stated V. I. Lenin, "we may suffer a tremendous, sometimes even a decisive, defeat..." ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Works], Vol 41, p 81).

The elimination of the U. S. monopoly on atomic weapons by the Soviet Union in 1949 was a practical realization of this behest of Lenin's. And in 1953 a test of a hydrogen bomb was carried out in the USSR. Simultaneously with the development and testing of nuclear munitions, a search was conducted for the most effective means of delivering them to the targets. In 1957 testing of an intercontinental ballistic missile took place in the USSR. Thus U. S. invulnerability to a retaliatory strike was eliminated.

It was the achievements of the Soviet Union in increasing its defense capability that forced the U. S. ruling circles to think seriously about the consequences of their planned aggression against the USSR and the other countries of the socialist community.



If the main stages of the arms race whipped up by the imperialists are traced, it becomes entirely clear that solely imperialism, especially American imperialism, was and remains at fault for the buildup of military arsenals. According to the calculations of a working group from the commission on the problems of peace and democratic movements, of the journal PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA, in the 40 postwar years the U. S. at least 90 times initiated the creation of new weapons systems for the purpose of achieving strategic military superiority, and thereby forced the Soviet Union to raise the level of sufficiency of its own defense capability.

Through the tremendous efforts of the CPSU and the workers of the Land of the Soviets, we succeeded in eliminating the U. S. superiority in nuclear weapons and delivery means, which they previously possessed, and achieved equality in the correlation of strategic military forces.

The achievement of rough strategic military parity between the USSR and U. S., and between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO, had and has truly historic significance. It significantly limited the aggressive capabilities of imperialist reaction, and has a restraining influence on the warmongers.

The Soviet achievement of strategic military equality with the U. S. is also the limit of sufficiency of our defense capability. The economic and scientific-technical capabilities of the USSR enabled her to build up this capability further, but our country limited itself to sufficiency for ensuring its own security and that of its friends and allies.

The Soviet Union spends on defense exactly what is necessary for the reliable armed defense of socialism, but no more. "The CPSU," it states in the Party Program, "will undertake every effort to ensure that the USSR armed forces are at a level that excludes strategic superiority by the forces of imperialism...."

Implementation of the policy of the 27th CPSU Congress for acceleration of the social and economic development of the country is of tremendous importance for solving this task. An increase in the tempo and scale of social production; a qualitative increase in economic capability; a decisive turn toward intensive economic methods; acceleration of scientific and technological progress, and linking its achievements integrally with the advantages of socialism, create qualitatively new capabilities as well for improving the material and technological base of the defense capability of the country and its Armed Forces.

The limit of sufficiency of military capability under the conditions of the parity that has taken shape can be maintained in three ways: first by preserving the existing level; second by reducing it through a step-by-step reduction in armed forces and armaments, so that at each stage the military capabilities of the sides are balanced;

and third, through raising the limit of sufficiency as a retaliatory measure for a buildup of military capability by the other side. Needless to say, we favor the second way.

It is entirely obvious that the limits of reasonable sufficiency of the military capability of the USSR and the Warsaw Treaty Organization depend on the position and actions of U. S. ruling circles and those of its partners in the imperialist blocs.

Political negotiations, and achievement of agreed solutions in this field, are a leading thrust in the activity of the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community, in the struggle to limit military capabilities of the countries in the opposing military coalitions within the bounds of reasonable sufficiency for defense. And all the international activity of the Warsaw Treaty Organization countries serves as a convincing confirmation of this. They purposefully and consistently fulfill the obligations they have taken on, to achieve acceptance, in coordination with other states that desire to operate in this manner, of effective measures for worldwide arms reduction, and the prohibition of atomic, nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction.

The significant historical experience of negotiations on the problems of restraining nuclear weapons in the 1960s, and especially in the first half of the 1970s, indicate that it is possible to solve these problems by political means. The series of treaties and agreements concluded serves as irrefutable evidence. Among them are the treaty on prohibiting testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, space, and under water (1963); the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (1968); the permanent treaty between the USSR and U. S. on limiting anti-ballistic missile defense systems, and interim agreement between the USSR and U. S. on certain measures in the field of limiting strategic offensive weapons (1972); the permanent Soviet-American agreement on preventing nuclear war (1973), and others.

Owing to the persistent efforts of the countries of the socialist community, in the 1960s and 1970s nine multilateral and 16 bilateral agreements, conventions and understandings on curbing the arms race were concluded.

These achievements could have been more significant had the U. S. and its NATO partners not rendered stubborn resistance. They not only create more and more obstacles in the path of disarmament, but also crank up a still more dangerous spiral in the arms race. The United States wrecked ratification of the SALT-II treaty and today has refused to observe its provisions. It is working toward breaking the ABM Treaty, and intends to carry the arms race into space. It is sabotaging in every possible way the achievement of agreements in the Vienna negotiations on mutual reduction of armed forces and weapons in Central Europe.

In recent years the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community have made extremely important constructive proposals, which present a balanced program for ensuring equal security and eliminating the threat of nuclear war. The foundation of such initiatives is the program to eliminate nuclear weapons on earth by the year 2000.

The 27th CPSU Congress put forth a broad program for a comprehensive system of international security. Its foundations are comprehensive in nature, and for the first time include all aspects of the modern concept of international security: military, political, economic and humanitarian. The Soviet concept of international security meets the fundamental aspirations of all peoples; it takes into account equally the interests of all states—socialist, capitalist, and those freed from the colonial yoke. A key provision of this program in the military field is a strictly controlled reduction in the level of military capabilities of states to the limits of reasonable sufficiency.

The Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik, held at the initiative of the USSR, at which our country came forth with a realistic program for a radical reduction in nuclear arsenals, will go down forever in the history of the struggle for a nuclear-free world. Had the U. S. responded to this initiative, a fundamental turn toward halting the arms race, disarmament, and the elimination of nuclear danger would have ensued, and the level of strategic military parity and the military capabilities of both countries would have sharply declined.

The program for large-scale reduction in armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe, approved by the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization countries in June 1986, represents an important contribution to the struggle to curb the arms race.

However, the U. S. Government did not respond with a single gesture of good will to any of these peace-loving foreign policy initiatives of the Soviet Union and its allies. To the contrary, the U. S. and its NATO partners attempt in every way to present the actions of the USSR aimed at reducing military danger and achieving agreements in a false light, and to arouse distrust in them. The American administration resorts to all manner of tricks simply to avoid positive steps in response.

The proposal put forth in a statement by M. S. Gorbachev on 28 February 1987 on solving the problem of intermediate range missiles in Europe, is a convincing new example of the constructive approach taken by the Soviet Union toward questions of nuclear disarmament. Its implementation will make it possible to free the continent of many hundreds of Soviet and American missiles and their nuclear warheads, and reduce the nuclear missile capability of both sides.

The Soviet Union and Warsaw Treaty Organization countries as a whole are prepared for honest and serious talks on all questions of limiting arms. There is no type of weapon that they would not be prepared to limit, reduce, remove from the arsenals and destroy forever, on the basis of agreement with other states, with observance of the principle of equality and equal security. "Our concept for creating a system of all-encompassing international security, and our other initiatives," stated Comrade M. S. Gorbachev, speaking to participants in the international forum, "For a Nuclear-Free World, For the Survival of Mankind," "all reflect the clear desire and readiness of the Soviet Union to give up its status as a nuclear power, and to reduce all other weapons to the minimum of reasonable sufficiency.

"The USSR does not demand for itself anything that it would wish to refuse to others, and does not claim a grain of greater security than, say, the U. S. However, the Soviet Union will not agree to a deficient status, or to discrimination."

As the leaders of the countries of the socialist community have repeatedly declared, no one should take our desire for an agreement on limiting and reducing arms as a sign of weakness. We will be able to make an appropriate response to any imperialist attempt to achieve military superiority over socialism.

The Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Treaty Organization countries take timely and effective adequate measures to restore military equality, when the U. S. and its Western European allies attempt to disrupt it, and change it to their advantage. But, such measures are forced, and are necessary only so that a potential aggressor comprehends the inevitability of a crushing retaliatory strike.

Blinded by hatred toward socialism, the political and military leadership of the U. S., even after parity has been established, does not cease attempts to achieve military superiority over the USSR. One of the most dangerous steps in this direction was the deployment of American intermediate range nuclear missile weapons in a number of Western European countries. This action was directed not only toward a quantitative disruption of military equality, but also to a qualitative disruption. It gave the North Atlantic bloc approximately a 50 percent superiority in nuclear weapons platforms, and a 2:1 superiority in nuclear warheads. The main purpose of the Pershing-II and cruise missiles is to make a first, "preemptive," strike against the Warsaw Treaty Organization countries.

The USSR, in agreement with its allies, undertook the necessary adequate retaliatory measures, which ensure the interests of security of the socialist states. The deployment on the territory of Czechoslovakia and the GDR of Soviet enhanced range operational-tactical missiles pursued only one goal: to preserve nuclear equality in Europe. The Soviet Union also took appropriate

retaliatory measures, having in mind U. S. territory. Thus strategic military equality was restored, but already at a higher level, and with a greater degree of military danger and instability. It goes without saying that the level of sufficiency of the defense capability of the Soviet Union also increased.

Massive deployment of cruise missiles with all types of basing also became a provocative act by the U. S. in its desire to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union. Along with the deployment of ground based cruise missiles in Western Europe, the Pentagon equipped its strategic bombers, as well as U. S. Navy surface ships and submarines, with long range nuclear missiles.

At that time the Soviet Union insisted on a mutual rejection of the creation of cruise missiles of any basing types. However, the Reagan Administration did nothing to preserve the moratorium established by the protocol to the SALT-II Agreement on ground and sea-based cruise missiles, and then, after the term of this protocol had formally run out, embarked upon an intensive program to equip the U. S. strategic arsenal with such missiles.

This forced the Soviet armed forces to begin to deploy long range cruise missiles in its strategic bombers and submarines. These measures corresponded in scale to the growing threat to the security of the USSR and the other countries of the socialist community. Thus, one more attempt by the United States to disrupt the existing military parity failed.

Recently, the question of preventing a race in nuclear and other types of weapons in space has become especially urgent, since the U. S. wants to achieve decisive strategic military superiority over the Soviet Union in this field. Reagan's "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) represents a no less, if not more, dangerous military-political provocation, than the deployment of American first strike missiles in Western Europe.

From the military standpoint, SDI is an integral part of U. S. nuclear strategy, a first strike strategy. The true meaning of such a plan is to achieve the capability to make a nuclear attack with impunity, and to create conditions for nuclear blackmail of the Soviet Union and other countries. Taking into account that American authorities stubbornly refused to pledge not to be first to use nuclear weapons, these intentions of theirs represent a real threat to peace. It is all the more dangerous that new types of weapons intended to carry out both anti-missile, and offensive tasks in space are already a reality. The United States has already actually begun preparations for "Star Wars."

However, the hopes of the overseas militarists to lay through space the path to strategic military superiority are illusory. The Soviet Union opposes the spread of the arms race into space so sharply, not because she is unable

to respond worthily to Washington's evil plans. If we are forced to do so, we will do everything, as we have done repeatedly in the past, so that the defense capability of the Soviet Union is sufficient to ensure our security, as well as the security of our friends.

This, however, does not mean that the Soviet Union will take the path of copying the American weapons systems. Soviet military-technical thinking is capable of seeking less costly and more effective ways and means of opposing the latest inventions of the Pentagon.

At the same time, we must not forget for a minute that, no matter how illusory Washington's calculations are about achieving military superiority, this makes them no less sinister. The implementation of plans for the militarization of space sharply intensifies the threat of a truly global, all-destroying military conflict.

As for the Western "proposals" to the USSR and the other countries of the socialist community, that they "give an example," and reject retaliatory measures or take unilateral steps toward disarmament and reduce the limit of military capability necessary for reliable defense, on this question the socialist countries take historical experience into account. The unacceptability of such, allow me to say "proposals," is confirmed by life. Thus, the U. S. not only did not follow the example of the USSR, which declared a unilateral moratorium on the deployment of intermediate range nuclear weapons in the European part of its country, but began to step up the deployment of its own nuclear missiles in a number of the countries of Western Europe. When the Soviet Union pledged not to be first to employ nuclear weapons, the United States and its allies also refused to follow this step. Our country introduced moratoriums on nuclear explosions, repeatedly extended them, and at this time the U. S. intensively continued nuclear tests.

Thus, unilateral disarmament of the socialist states would only facilitate the militaristic aspirations of imperialism to acquire unilateral military superiority, and would whet the appetite of the aggressor. Today Lenin's words sound topical as never before: "Only after the proletariat disarms the bourgeoisie can it, without betraying its world-historical mission, throw all weapons on the scrap heap, and the proletariat undoubtedly will do this, but only then, and under no circumstances before." ("Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy," Vol 30, p 136)

The Soviet Union, along with the other countries of the socialist community, is doing everything necessary to halt the dangerous slide toward thermonuclear war, and to create reliable guarantees of the defense of the gains of socialism and international security. Under present conditions solving this task is ensured to a significant degree by maintaining the strategic military parity that has been achieved, and by struggling consistently to reduce its level.



The military capabilities of the opposing sides are a concentrated expression of their socio-political, economic, scientific-technical and spiritual capabilities. It is important to take into account the purpose and qualitative features of each of these capabilities, which are determined by the fundamental contradictions of the two world social systems. Military force in the hands of imperialism, especially in the nuclear age, is a source of danger for all mankind. The military force of socialism is a means of restraining imperialist aggression, preventing nuclear war and preserving peace.

The Warsaw Treaty Organization countries have stated repeatedly with full responsibility that they never, under any circumstances, will begin military operations against any state, whether in Europe or in another area of the world, if they themselves do not become the object of

aggression. The proposals they advance stem from their consistent policy, aimed at eliminating the military threat and creating a stable and safe world, and from the defensive nature of their military doctrine, which provides for maintaining equality of military forces at the lowest possible level, and reducing military capabilities to the limits of reasonable sufficiency.

The CPSU and the fraternal parties of the other countries of the socialist community are doing everything necessary so that the defense of socialism is an insurmountable barrier in the way of the aggressive designs and military adventures of international imperialism, and an effective factor in maintaining security and preserving peace.

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**Pact Generals on New Warsaw Pact Doctrine**

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[Article: "Doctrine for the Defense of Peace and Socialism"; first three paragraphs are SOVETSKIY VOIN introduction]

[Text] The document "On the Military Doctrine of the States Participating in the Warsaw Pact" was adopted at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in Berlin. In giving extraordinarily great significance to this document, the CPSU Central Committee Politburo stated that it clearly expresses the defensive nature of the military strategy of socialism and serves in the development of dialogue between the Warsaw Pact and NATO.

Today, in the studio of SOVETSKIY VOIN, Army Gen Anatoliy Ivanovich GRIBKOV (USSR), Lt Gen Stancho MITEV (Bulgaria), Maj Gen Robert SELESH (Hungary), Maj Gen Guenter MENER (GDR), Div Gen Vatslav SHKLYARSKI (Poland), Maj Gen Dumitru Penesku (Romania) and Lt Gen Boguslav KUCHERA (CSSR) discuss the basic positions of this document.

Gennadiy Ivanovich GERASIMOV, chief of the information directorate of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, runs the studio of SOVETSKIY VOIN.

A.I. GRIBKOV: There is not a day that does not bring new evidence of the increased preparations for war of the imperialist reaction and its leader the United States. There are reports, let us say, about the regular military maneuvers, about the testing of a new aircraft, the launching of the next submarine, etc. They torpedoed the SALT I and SALT II agreements. Major groupings of forces have been moved right up to the borders of the socialist community along the entire perimeter. The arms arsenals are being replenished in many regions of the planet, especially in Europe. And the Americans are persistently striving to put weapons in space.

Old concepts for military actions against the Warsaw Pact member states are being refined and new ones developed. In America, for example, they have established a comprehensive plan for the unfolding of a "large" strategic war. In this war, it is planned to inflict nuclear strikes against 40,000 targets in socialist and developing countries. These ominous plans are supplemented by their NATO counterpart, which proposes the bombing of 18,000 to 25,000 facilities in the European part of the USSR as well as in the territory of other countries participating in the Warsaw Pact.

It would be fundamentally incorrect to assert that the measures in the military area being undertaken by the United States and its satellites were evoked by some malicious caprice or dangerous whim. They are the natural product of the military doctrines of "direct opposition" and "flexible response" adopted in the United States and NATO. And they, in turn, express the

political aims of the leading circles, which see military strength, military superiority and the admissibility of nuclear and conventional wars as the main means for achieving their imperial strivings.

This is opposed by the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact member states, which is set forth in the document adopted at the the Berlin (1987) meeting of the Political Consultative Committee. Defensive in its orientation and profoundly human in nature, it strengthens peace on earth and opens for humanity the way to a nuclear-free future without wars and weapons.

S. MITEV: I would like to add to what you have said the fact that the aggressive nature of the military doctrine of the United States is easily revealed. It contains the aim to achieve the "complete and incontestable superiority of the United States," to reestablish the leading role of America in the world," and "to counteract the USSR actively throughout the world and in all regions of it." This, in essence, is the main political content of precisely the American doctrine.

And the technical military side is illuminated on the basis of such logic. In this connection, I would distinguish what, in my view, are two basic positions of it. The first is that in a nuclear war the armed forces of the United States must be "in a position to eliminate the entire Soviet (and linked with the Soviet Union) military and political system." The second is that the United States plans to be the first to use nuclear weapons on a global scale as well as in a theater of military actions.

Furthermore, the so-called strategy of "nuclear deterrence" is directly linked with the doctrine of "direct opposition." The Americans and many other members of the North Atlantic bloc are proclaiming nuclear weapons to be the only means to guarantee international security. In reality, this only increases the risk of a nuclear catastrophe.

A.I. GRIBKOV: Today, of course, as never before, the threat to peace and to socialism is great. Therefore, the primary task is to turn the course of world events to the better and to ensure the dependable defense of the revolutionary achievements of the peoples of the fraternal countries of socialism. The Warsaw Pact is acting in precisely this direction. At the same time, one should remember that just in the last 2 years the Soviet Union presented more than 25 proposals for an improvement of the international climate, a lowering of the level of military confrontation of the sides, and the elimination of all nuclear arsenals on earth by the year 2000.

There were three conferences of the Political Consultative Committee and several meetings of the highest leaders of the fraternal parties and states. A special place among them belongs to the meeting in Warsaw in 1985, where they signed a protocol on a 20-year extension of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Aid and a subsequent prolongation for another 10 years.

V. SKLYARSKI: This event was not just an act of continuity in the policies of the fraternal countries. Its importance goes far beyond the framework of the Warsaw Pact. We showed the entire peace-loving public of the planet that only socialism is capable of diverting the danger of nuclear war that is hanging over it. At the same time, the world reaction was convinced that the Warsaw Pact dependably protects the socialist community against any armed attack. And the attempts of imperialists to weaken it or to impose their will on it are doomed to fail.

Our strength is in the unity and solidarity of all the states participating in the Warsaw Pact—unity of their ideas and actions and solidarity in defending socialist and therefore common human priorities.

B. KUCHERA: The essence of these priorities was revealed clearly and convincingly in the Berlin (1987) conference of the Political Consultative Committee. The most urgent questions of disarmament and detente, peace and security were raised and discussed there. The summary documents of the Political Consultative Committee generalize and specify the collective strategy and tactics of the allied states in the current stage of international development.

I will allow myself to recall briefly a number of key positions of these documents. They substantiate with new force the necessity of new political thinking and of a new approach to the questions of war and peace, disarmament and other global and regional problems. They confirm the striving of the fraternal states to prevent war and to exclude it from the life of humanity forever. They propose specific measures for disarmament and contain an appeal for the united efforts of all states and all peace-loving forces to strengthen trust in the relations among states, especially those belonging to different social systems, and their military-political alliances and to come to a correct understanding of each other's concern, objectives and intentions in the military area.

The document "On the Military Doctrine of the States Participating in the Warsaw Pact" adopted at the conference of the Political Consultative Committee has fundamental importance for the cause of peace on the entire planet as well as for the provision of the reliable security of the socialist community. For the first time in history, not only a defensive doctrine has been proclaimed but a doctrine directed against war.

A.I. GRIBKOV: I agree with you fully. The military doctrine of the fraternal countries confirms very convincingly that our states did not and do not have any other objective than the preservation and consolidation of universal peace and the provision of the security of their peoples. It sets forth the obligation of the Warsaw Pact member states not to start military actions against any state or alliance of states unless they themselves are

objects of an armed attack. They will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. They have no territorial claims against any state in Europe or outside of it.

They do not consider any state or people to be their enemy. On the contrary, the states of the Warsaw Pact are prepared to establish relations with all states without exception on the basis of their mutual interests of security and peaceful coexistence.

D. PENESKU: Yes, this is a doctrine of the preservation of peace on earth.

A.I. GRIBKOV: I want to continue my thought. It has now become possible to take practical steps in the area of nuclear disarmament and not to allow humanity to slide into a nuclear abyss. The preconditions exist—and Reykjavik showed this—for an agreement on a radical reduction of strategic offensive arms with a simultaneous strengthening of the working of the ABM Treaty. It is also realistic to achieve the complete banning of nuclear tests and the prevention of the militarization of space.

The position of the USSR in the negotiations with the United States on the elimination of medium-range and operational-tactical missiles in Europe is seen as a responsible approach. Thanks to the constructive proposals of the Soviet Union, a certain amount of progress has been achieved toward the very rapid resolution of this problem. To be sure, some in the West are not pleased with the prospects of a continent without missiles and without nuclear weapons and they are putting up different obstructions and obstacles on this path.

They proposed, for example, that we resign ourselves to the fact that the United States will keep 72 nuclear warheads for the West German Pershing-1A operational-tactical missiles. They are putting up other obstacles as well. And in this connection, considerable importance is being attached to the initiative of the USSR to destroy all of its medium-range missiles in the Asian part of the country as well under the condition, of course, that the United States will do the same. Operational-tactical missiles will also be eliminated. In other words, we put forward the concept of a "global zero option" equally needed for Europe and Asia.

B. KUCHERA: We should also pay attention to the fact that it would also be very important for the fate of Europe if the Government of the FRG would accept the proposal of the GDR and CSSR to begin negotiations on the establishment of a nuclear-free corridor in central Europe along the line separating the Warsaw Pact and NATO.

This would be an important step on the way to a demilitarized and lasting peace. For it is proposed that all nuclear weapons be removed on a mutual basis in a strip 300 km wide (150 km on each side). Unfortunately, they are in no hurry to give an answer in Bonn, although



it is urgently necessary. On the boundary where the two large military organizations meet, the people sense with particular acuteness the threat emanating from deadly arms. And they would like to rid themselves of it forever.

V. SHKLYARKI: Of course one must not delay. Europe cannot be the focus of a new war and disappear forever in its crater. The plan put forward by Poland for the reduction of arms and the raising of confidence in Europe, known as the "Jaruzelski Plan," is aimed at eliminating the danger. Its realization would be an important factor in the strengthening of peace and stability here.

D. PENESKU: Just as the realization of other proposals of the socialist countries. In particular, the initiatives of Romania and Bulgaria for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans.

Neither must one fail to talk about the willingness of the Warsaw Pact member states to show maximum restraint in relation to the development of their own military potentials, not to increase armed forces and conventional arms on a mutual basis, and to declare a moratorium of 1 to 2 years on the increase in military expenditures. We are certain that this would also be an important step toward a lasting peace and we appeal to all NATO countries to demonstrate the same approach.

A.I. GRIBKOV: I already talked about the situation in regard to the reduction of medium-range and operational-tactical missiles. Other questions in international security are also being resolved with difficulty.

R. SELESH: This is clearly seen in the approach of the West to the problem of conventional arms. A year ago in Budapest, the countries participating in the Warsaw Pact proposed a program for a 25-percent reduction of armed forces and conventional arms in Europe at the beginning of the 1990's. Instead of a specific solution to the problem, however, they are trying to impose on us a discussion of the supposed superiority of the Warsaw Pact over NATO in conventional arms, although it does not in fact exist.

A.I. GRIBKOV: The talk about "superiority" is based on preconceived approaches and the selectivity of assessments. There certainly is asymmetry in the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact and NATO due to historical, geographical and other factors. But if one evaluates the relationship of forces comprehensively, then it immediately becomes clear that there is an approximate equilibrium.

Thus, armies of almost equal size oppose one another in Europe. The member states of the Warsaw Pact are somewhat superior to the North Atlantic bloc in tanks but the latter has the advantage in antitank weapons and attack helicopters. We have somewhat of an advantage

in operational-tactical and tactical missiles that is compensated by the other side's advantage in strike aircraft. The number of artillery pieces and mortars is approximately equal. To be sure, NATO has considerably more warships and cutters.

S. MITEV: I think it is important to stress that the Warsaw Pact member states are prepared to discuss the existing imbalances and asymmetries with the NATO countries and to eliminate them on the basis of a reduction by the side that is ahead with the understanding that such reductions will lead to the establishment of lower and lower levels of parity. This will serve to strengthen security and will take away suspicions and mistrust.

D. PENESKU: The balance of power is obvious but its level is too high. Our states always proceed from the necessity of maintaining parity at the lowest level possible. And it is therefore no accident that the Berlin conference of the Political Consultative Committee affirmed the advisability of reducing the military potentials to the limits of adequacy necessary for defense.

The Budapest Proposal of 1986 also pursued this goal. As everyone knows, the NATO countries responded to it after half a year, whereby they kept silent about the essence of our initiative. But such a policy and such an approach to vital problems is not very popular now. Unofficial consultations are now taking place in Vienna between representatives of the Warsaw Pact member states and NATO, which are called upon to help develop a mandate for future negotiations. We give great importance to these consultations as a first step on the way to a reduction of armed forces and arms from the Atlantic to the Urals.

A.I. GRIBKOV: We are prepared to discuss other questions as well. For example, how to free Europe from chemical weapons. At the same time, we intend to rebuff most decisively everything that goes against the interests of detente and security and that contradicts the spirit and letter of the Helsinki Final Act. I have in mind the activities of revanchist forces in West Germany, which by no means help to diminish the tension between East and West.

V. SHKLYARSKI: The revival of revanchism has also increased the threat of a new war. We simply have no right to underestimate this circumstance. The lessons of the Nuremberg trial of Hitler's main war criminals teach that the ideas of revanchism played a major role in the aggressive policies of fascist Germany. This must not be repeated. The realities of present-day Europe are generally recognized and are not subject to revision. This is one of the compulsory conditions for peace on the continent.

G. MENDER: Yes, peace is a good thing and it can be said that it was gained mostly through the suffering of the peoples of our countries. This is their primary right,

which the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact member states are called upon to guarantee. They are supported by sufficient military readiness not to allow themselves to be caught by surprise. And in the event that they are nevertheless attacked, they will give a crushing rebuff to the aggressor.

Such is the doctrinal position, one of those that make up the technical military side of the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact. It determines the design and direction of the building and preparation of the armed forces. Their main task—for the first time in military history—is to prevent war.

It is already possible to say without hesitation that the content of the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact member states has become part of the military practice and structure of the allied armies as well as of the Joint Armed Forces.

B. KUCHERA: ...and is expressed in the specific practical work of personnel. In particular, questions in defensive planning and the training of administrative authorities and troops to repel a possible imperialist aggression and to carry out defensive operations and combat actions began to be resolved more objectively.

A.I. GRIBKOV: Correct. But I foresee a question of readers: is our position not passive in the face of an ever-increasing military threat?

I declare as responsibly as I can: no, it is not passive. The fraternal communist and worker parties and governments take full account of the complex international situation and the growing aggressiveness of reactionary imperialist forces. And the attention that they are paying to the defensive capability of the community and of each allied country individually fully corresponds to the level of military danger.

I will say something about the Soviet Armed Forces. The Communist Party takes a strict and demanding approach to the questions in the strengthening of their defensive power, military discipline, order and degree of organization. The results of the discussion of the circumstances of the violation of the air space of the USSR on 28 May of this year are evidence of this. The Politburo once again stressed the fundamental importance of the task of a decisive increase in the level of the combat readiness and discipline of the armed forces, of a skillful administration of forces, and of ensuring their constant ability to stop any attempts against the sovereignty of the Soviet State. This demand is a specific program of action for the armed defenders of our socialist Fatherland.

The process of further strengthening and development is taking place in the allied armies as well as in the Joint Armed Forces. They are being improved so that they will more fully meet defensive requirements and so that their combat readiness and capability are adequate to the threat from the United States and NATO.

R. SELESH: I must note that our defensive efforts in no way infringe upon the security of other peoples. On the contrary, the mighty Joint Armed Forces are a serious factor in the stability of the international situation and the preservation and consolidation of peace. The stronger they are and the higher their preparedness is, the less the imperialists will want to test the joint defense of the allied socialist states. We know from the past that the aggressor attacks when the forces opposing him are weakened or separated.

On this basis, measures are also being taken to improve the Joint Armed Forces. They are in strict accordance with the aims of the last congresses of our fraternal countries that have again confirmed: the further strengthening of the allied armies and their fighting community is an important and integral part of the work of the communist and worker parties of the Warsaw Pact member states.

V. SHKLYARSKI: Here I would single out three basic leading directions. The first I see in the in-depth and comprehensive coordination of the actions of the party and state leadership of our countries in the questions of military building and development and the raising of the combat readiness of the troops and fleets.

Technical military cooperation has special significance in the contemporary situation. It has a many-sided and planned nature. Its basis is the powerful military-economic and scientific potential of the fraternal countries.

And finally, the last. This is the achievement of a high quality of operational and combat readiness of the troops and forces of the fleets and staffs. They must be prepared at all times for rapid and effective actions to defend the achievements of socialism. The only correct and reliable way to do this is learn what is necessary in war.

G. MENDER: And here the joint exercises played and play a large role. Such exercises, let us say, as "Soyuz," "Shchit" and "Druzhba." In them, in an integrated manner, they work out actions under different conditions of the situation and questions in interaction, supply and administration. The joint exercises also help to strengthen the fighting friendship of the soldiers of the fraternal countries, which is tremendously important for victory over a powerful and technically equipped adversary.

A.I. GRIBKOV: Yes, the shoulder of a friend in combat, of a comrade in class and arms is a reliable and faithful shoulder. In one formation, from the Baltic to the Black Sea, the soldiers of the Warsaw Pact member states stand guard over the revolutionary achievements. The primary commandment of their daily studies and service is to keep their powder dry and to be constantly ready to repel imperialist aggression.

And I think that I will be expressing the general opinion not only of the participants in the conversation but also of all the soldiers of the allied armies if I say: the peoples of our countries can be certain about a peaceful tomorrow.

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**CSCE Delegates Briefed on Jakes Initiative**  
*AU020911 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech*  
27 Feb 88 p 1

[CTK report: "M. Jakes Proposal Presented at CSCE Meeting in Vienna; Zone of Trust Along the Warsaw Pact-NATO Line"]

[Text] Vienna—This Friday [26 February] Frantisek Dolezel, head of the CSSR delegation, acquainted the participants of the CSCE follow-up meeting in Vienna with the proposal submitted by Milos Jakes, CPCZ Central Committee general secretary, namely, to create a zone of trust, cooperation, and good-neighborly relations along the line of contact between Warsaw Pact and NATO states.

During the plenum, F. Dolezel briefed the delegates of participating countries on all the main points of the proposal, which was presented by Milos Jakes in his speech on the 40th anniversary of Victorious February. He cited in particular the passage saying that the CSSR is making extraordinary efforts to develop an all-around dialogue, and is striving (with the aim of expanding cooperation) to achieve a successful conclusion of the CSCE follow-up meeting.

The head of the Czechoslovak delegation then underscored the part of M. Jakes' statement, which states that Czechoslovakia wants all military, political, economic, ecological, and humanitarian issues to be approached comprehensively. He then submitted suggestions for reducing the military confrontation and consolidating trust in the countries lying along the border between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, as well as suggestions for broadening the political dialogue, comprehensively expanding cooperation, removing obstacles, and resolving existing problems.

F. Dolezel expressed the conviction that the new Czechoslovak initiative will substantially contribute toward improving the atmosphere in Europe. The countries along the line of contact between the Warsaw Pact and NATO could provide an example of how to implement the Helsinki process. The current international situation in East-West relations not only permits such a step, it even demands it. The Czechoslovak initiative can also contribute toward accomplishing the tasks of the CSCE follow-up meeting.

**CSSR Envoy Addresses Meeting**  
*AU081859 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech*  
5 Mar 88 p 1

[CTK report: "For Firm Foundations of Our European Home; Statement by Head of Czechoslovak Delegation at the Follow-up Meeting in Vienna"—dated 4 March]

[Text] Vienna—Frantisek Dolezel, who heads the Czechoslovak delegation, spoke on Friday [4 March] at the CSCE follow-up meeting in Vienna about the extraordinary significance of economic, scientific-technical, commercial, and ecological cooperation. He stressed that Czechoslovakia's constructive approach to these problems (called "the second basket" at the follow-up meeting) is testified to by the proposal to convene an economic forum in Prague.

The deliberations on other projects within the process of European security and cooperation must be approached in the spirit of cooperation, not confrontation, the head of the Czechoslovak delegation went on to say. It is impossible to approach decisionmaking from the position of force, since this corresponds neither to the spirit, nor to the letter of the CSCE Final Act. If our European home is to have firm foundations and if we want to provide it with further floors, everybody must do his share.

In connection with the problems of international trade, F. Dolezel pointed out the obstacles used by the Western countries to hamper the development of trade and international cooperation. He criticized the lists of commodities which the Western countries are forbidden to export to socialist countries (according to a decision of the so-called Coordinating Committee for East-West trade). He stated that nobody denies countries their right to protect the interests of their security. However, what the socialist countries condemn is the fact that the extensive bans are substantially restricting trade between the states.



### Increased Defensive Training Planned for 1988 Training Year

18010063 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
23 Dec 87 p 2

[Article by Lt Col V. Dresvyannikov, senior officer in the Combat Training Department of the Central Group of Forces, and Col P. Chernenko, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "Contrasts Among the Ranges—Preparing For the New Training Year: A KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Unannounced Inspection"]

[Text] The dependency of combat training quality and effectiveness upon the state of the training facilities is well known. This report on an unannounced inspection tells about what is being done to improve them in the forces and how the lessons derived from the past training year and the demands set for the training of the personnel are being taken into account in the process.

#### But the Problems Remain

[Text] Colonel A. Bersheda, training center chief, had something to show us. The main jobs have been completed at the moving-target gunnery ranges and other firing facilities, and the subunits who performed them are now preparing for the beginning of the training year in accordance with their own plans. The facilities are still not deserted, however. Specialists are adjusting the simulators and checking out the control panels and various other equipment. In short, the range facilities are going through a "running-in" process.

There were no breakdowns in the combat training of the motorized riflemen and the tankmen through the fault of the specialists at the training center. And there were no complaints from the trainees. This in no way means, however, that the past month has involved nothing more than "dusting off" the range equipment. Many difficult jobs have had to be performed.

The number of classes to prepare the troops for operating in a defense is to be increased in the new training year, for example. Clearly the development of the training facilities must conform to the combat training priorities and not fall behind the growing demands made of it. The work is being performed with this in mind. There are new training stations and facilities. The center will be built up and improved, of course. What has been accomplished is only the beginning.

Lessons from the past training year have to be taken into account. Previously, for example, the depth of the moving-target gunnery range for the infantry combat vehicles did not permit firing at maximum range. This naturally affected the fire training of the motorized riflemen. The moving-target gunnery range is now being improved. A group of fightingmen led by Guards Lieutenant V. Yazov is handling this. The work is being carried out strictly according to plan. All of the necessary material and equipment are available.

Yes, a well-conceived and modern approach is being taken to the improvement of facilities at the training center for the group of forces. But there are also numerous possibilities for accomplishing this in the units themselves. What is being done with them is another matter.

Outwardly, the tank firing facility and the troop firing range in the unit in which Lieutenant Colonel V. Zaytsev is responsible for them, for example, appear to be completely ready for the classes. This was confirmed in a report to higher headquarters. But when Private A. Safronov, operator of the unit firing range, started to show how the target field operates, not all of the equipment worked.

The fact that they hastened to pass of the desired for reality in the unit should be discussed separately. There is another question. If they have not yet entirely figured out why there are equipment failures today, where is the guarantee that this will not occur also in the future?

Unfortunately, those who are responsible for operations at the training center of formation "X" also lack the ability to derive the correct conclusions from failures. Some of its training complexes were out of order during the summer training period, and far from full use was made of the capabilities of other equipment at the range. For example, the tankmen had to train "by hand," so to speak, because the automatic loading unit was out of order. One can understand that it was difficult to eliminate these malfunctions while the classes were underway. Personnel have now been assigned to perform the jobs at the training center. What are they doing?

It turns out that the subordinates of Guards Senior Lieutenant A. Yermakov do not include specialists with the needed skills. As called for by the plan, the fightingmen are "fixing up" the training center grounds: sweeping the walks, painting borders, cleaning out ditches.... This sort of thing has to be done, of course. But what will it change basically? What will it do to enhance the training of those who will soon arrive for scheduled classes?

And what is holding up the resolution of similar problems in the tank regiment in which Guards Lieutenant Colonel A. Romantsov serves? Electrodes for welding cast iron were needed to repair one of the trainers. Guards Warrant Officer I. Golubnevskiy, chief of the firing facility, had to find the electrodes. And this could all have been seen to in advance....

The situation at the tank training ground is no better. One senses that no one has yet gotten around to doing any real work there. Damage to the contamination and maneuvering areas and the tank ditch has still not been repaired. There are no marker posts at many obstacles. In short, it seems very likely that the old "problems" of the formation training center will again make themselves felt in the new training year.

**Moscow MD's 10-Year Experiment To  
Computerize Voenkomat**

*18010061b Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
26 Dec 87 p 2*

[Report by Col V. Zhitarenko, KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent, Moscow Military District: "The Honor of the Position" Against the Truth: In Response to One Reply to the Editor"]

[Text] This matter goes back a long way. It began some 10 years ago. At that time the headquarters of the Moscow Military District received instructions from higher up to prepare and conduct an experiment in the use of electronic computers in the operations of military commissariats. The experiment would be the following: an electronic computer would be installed at the rayon military commissariat and the information processed with it would be transmitted to the oblast military commissariat, where it would be combined with information arriving from other rayon commissariats and sent to district headquarters. It was planned for the scientific research institute and the district computer center to help with the implementation of the useful plan.

Despite deficiencies in the computers provided and a lack of special programs for them, the results of the experiment were encouraging. People were confident that things would begin to move, that in time the manufacturing enterprise would provide the military commissariats with the required number of improved computers, that standard programs would be produced and that the district officers responsible for this would train the workers in the military commissariats to use the computers. However....

There have been many of these "however's." It took the manufacturing enterprise years to produce a computer model more or less satisfactory to the military commissariats. By the beginning of this year the aforementioned scientific research institute had still not produced a standard program for the computer. Instead of the planned adoption of the computers, there were new experiments differing little one from another. First in the Moscow City Military Commissariat, then another, then a third....

One wonders why the matter has not proceeded beyond experiments, beyond the simple statement of the fact that electronic computers are essential in the military commissariats today. Why are computers making their way there with such difficulty, and then only through the efforts of local enthusiasts?

A letter to the editors from Captain I. Zaslavskiy, mathematician and programmer, published in the 12 April issue of KRSNAYA ZVEZDA for this year, provided some explanation. It essentially stated that the needed and promising undertaking is being retarded through the fault of certain officials. The editors then received an

official response signed by Colonel V. Antonov, former chief of one of the headquarters directorates of the Moscow Military District (he now serves elsewhere), and Colonel V. Ilichev, in charge of introducing automatic control systems. The document stated that the authors had a different viewpoint, that there are no problems in this area, and the entire discussion dealt with inaccuracies detected in Zaslavskiy's letter by these comrades.

It was subsequently learned that Zaslavskiy was twice summoned for a talk with his superiors, after which they attempted to show that he did not write the letter to the editors at all, that they did not know who wrote it. And they—Colonels V. Antonov and V. Ilichev—"knowing the real state of affairs in the district military commissariats with respect to the use of electronic computers," do not feel that they bear any blame for the shortcomings.

A KRSNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent went to work to establish the truth and to find out what the actual situation was.

The first trip was made to the Kalinin Oblast Military Commissariat. Lieutenant Colonel V. Rashchupkin, deputy military commissar, explained that there were two electronic computers but that they had not yet been unpacked because they had only been received a few days before. The editors had reliable information that the district had not recently received any computers, however. To the reasonable question of where the computers had come from, Rashchupkin replied that they had been sent from Ivanovo. They had gathered dust for around a year in that military commissariat, but no one could be found who would place them into operation.

The second military commissariat visited was the one in Vladimir. It had once had three computers. Back in February one of them had been sent to Kursk, and the other two were to be sent there as well in accordance with a telegram from Colonel V. Antonov. The computers did not gain a foothold in the military commissariat, although Colonel V. Protzenko, deputy oblast military commissar, said that within a few months the computers might possibly have begun operating.

The third trip was to Gorkiy. Lieutenant Colonel S. Pyatayev, deputy chief of one of the departments in the oblast military commissariat, obviously a proponent of the new undertaking and skilled in the use of computers, demonstrated what he had accomplished and what programs had almost been worked out. Almost, because the computers are still not turning out a final product. Major General P. Yefimov, oblast military commissar, on the other hand, is far from optimistic. He feels that his subordinates have taken only the first timid steps toward the computerization of accounting. He complained that this important problem was not receiving the attention of higher authorities.

Incidentally, prior to the trip, Colonels V. Antonov and V. Ilichev asserted that computers were being adopted most successfully in the Gorkiy Oblast Military Commissariat. One other thing. According to information from the district headquarters, there are four electronic computers registered in Gorkiy (two of them were sent there from Kostroma, where they had been only "decorations" for a year). It turned out that the Gorkiy people had another three unlisted computers, however. Neither Colonel V. Antonov nor Colonel V. Ilichev knew anything about them, however....

These comrades have a lot of other worries, of course, and we are also aware that computerization is something new. One could not help being surprised at their attitude, however. Their exclusively positive statements certainly do not conform to the reality. The conclusion was that "until there are enough computers in the military commissariats, any sort of application would hardly be worthwhile."

The 20 computers installed in district military commissariats are indeed just a drop in the bucket compared with the number of computers needed to set up an automated system. It is also undeniable, however, that if nothing is undertaken, nothing will be the result. Why there are too few computers is one thing, but those 20 could have been used for testing certain components of a future system. In addition, one has to consider the fact that these electronic computers cost many thousands of rubles. More than a half-million rubles are tied up, but Colonel V. Ilichev reports:

"There are computers costing several million in the district computer center under my immediate charge...."

Something has to be said about the position taken by the senior chiefs. Specifically those who 10 years ago assigned the district the task of automating the work in the military commissariats but did not bother to check up on how the work was being performed. Lieutenant Colonel A. Nechayev from the headquarters over the directorate previously headed by Colonel V. Antonov is now responsible for allocating the needed number of electronic computers for the military commissariats. What has been said here demonstrates how he is handling the job. There are still no computers in the military commissariats.

Although Colonel V. Ilichev's immediate chiefs understand the problem far better, they are completely indifferent to it. They take to heart the concerns of the powerful computer centers but are not worried about the so-called personal computers in the military commissariats. And this is the result. In order to obtain at least some sort of know-how in the application of electronic computers in military commissariats, those in charge of the Gorkiy Oblast, Moscow City and other military commissariats send couriers to Kazan, Leningrad,

Rostov-on-Don, the Baltic area and other areas, where it is rumored that something has been achieved. But this is a primitive method. A centralized solution is far more effective.

One more interesting question. How is it that Captain I. Zaslavskiy, who wrote the aforementioned letter to the editors, together with Lieutenant Colonel V. Verigin, an officer with the district military communications service, were able within a short time to compile several programs for operating an electronic computer installed in the military communications service, while an entire scientific research institute has not been able over a period of several years to produce a single program for the computers installed in the military commissariats?

Colonel V. Ilichev has an answer to this question as well:

"These computers are no longer being produced. The scientific research institute has therefore also been put out of work in this area."

And that is supposed to be the end of it.

It is believed in the military commissariats that this is premature, however. Nothing is said about the main thing. When will they receive an adequate number of reliable computers, and when will standard programs be developed?

It was the cause which forced I. Zaslavskiy to turn to the editors. I believe that all of us should be guided by the cause and not by the "honor of the position" This is a demand of the times.

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**Making Use of Highly Educated Soldiers/Sailors**  
18010042j Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5  
Dec 87 p 2

[Article by Col M. Lishniy: "The Soldier With a Graduation Cap"]

[Text] The large antisubmarine warfare ship Komsomlets Ukrainy was preparing for a voyage. The final tests of the readiness of the apparatuses and personnel for combat watch were underway. And there was nothing surprising about the fact that on this day I met both officers from the force headquarters and Capt 1st Rank N. Kulikov, chief of the political department, on the ship. I was surprised by something else. He was involved with something seemingly not characteristic of a political officer. Along with the ship's deputy commander for political affairs, Capt Lt P. Antipin, he was analyzing the manning of the small units with specialists from among sailors and petty officers with higher and incomplete higher education.



"The combat information post is a reliable element," stated Antipin to the chief of the political department. Petty Officer 1st Class A. Mazay alone is valuable. But in the future it will be necessary here to strengthen the group of hydroacoustic specialists. I think we should seek a good specialist."

Something special should be said about Petty Officer 1st Class A. Mazay, petty officer of the combat information post team. He is a well known figure on the ship and in the force. Having obtained thorough and firm knowledge in one of the country's VUZs, after callup into the navy he passed the examination for first class in the shortest possible amount of time, and is recognized as the best shipboard specialist. He has taken part in several sea voyages, and if necessary can replace an officer.

"There are not so many sailors and petty officers with higher and incomplete higher education on the Komsomlets Ukrainy," states Capt 1st Rank Kulikov. "But, with able placement of these people they are a great force. And if you consider that during the time of their service they train at least one good specialist each, how our 'professional potential' grows!"

The political department chief stressed the word "grows," having in mind the immediate future. And I must explain to the reader that a significant increase in military and political training is already being received in this task force, as well as in the entire Black Sea Fleet. This is as a result of a fundamentally new approach to the use of the educational potential of the contingent called up into the fleet. How was it before? The "cream" was picked out from among the inductees. The best educated people were used to man headquarters, directorates and establishments, and the rest went to the ships. In the headquarters draftsmen and clerks with graduation caps sit at papers and man telephones, and on the ships sailors with more modest education toil at control panels, screens and the most complicated navigational and acoustical devices.

"Here we are breaking the old, obsolete approaches," continues Capt 1st Rank Kulikov. "Yesterday's 10th grade graduates now handle the duties of draftsman and headquarters clerk."

A special commission of officers from the fleet headquarters registers inductees with higher education and distributes them taking into account the military training needs of the ships and units. Priority is given to the most complex and crucial military specialties. In the force, and on the ships when necessary a still more specific adjustment is made. The sailor with a graduation cap (assignment strictly according to specialty remains an unshakable rule) is placed in the section where he is most needed at the moment.

"Let us say that BCh-5 [Department 5] and BCh-7 each already has one such specialist, but in BCh-7 he soon will be discharged into the reserves," stated the deputy

commander for political affairs of the BPK [large anti-submarine warfare ship] Azov. "This means that the new sailor with higher education must be sent there."

They also think about something else on the ships. The sailor with a graduation cap is not merely a man who is well trained professionally, but he is also a better developed member of the sailor's collective on the political and intellectual planes. He will help his coworker understand some complex training issue, and prepare for the political class.

The data indicate that instances of disciplinary infractions are significantly fewer in collectives where the majority of people have higher education. Among sailors and petty officers who have completed VUZs, the number of infractions is several times lower than the average statistical data. This is also natural.

Consequently, we rightfully consider the educational potential of our soldiers as state property. And if this is so, we must relate toward it in terms of the national interest, to improve the combat readiness of the army and navy.

Unfortunately, this problem is not being solved in a businesslike way yet in all military collectives. Units of the Guards Motorized Rifle Proletarian Moscow-Minsk Division, Baltic Military District, are still guided by old measures. I inquired in the political department and force headquarters how many of the soldiers and sergeants among the personnel had higher education. I asked how they were distributed across duty positions; how many of them were section and crew commanders, gunners and gunner-operators. The chief of the political department and chief of staff acknowledged frankly that no one had counted and analyzed this. Naturally, there could not even be a discussion about more effectively using the educational potential of the soldiers and sergeants with VUZ diplomas in the interest of the service. As it turned out, many of them settled in the headquarters (division and regiment). They were found in the jobs of the already mentioned draftsmen, clerks and supernumerary adjutants. Gds Private Ye. Soluyanov, a mechanical engineer, is assigned as a clerk, and Gds Private A. Mironenko, a future doctor, is working as a secretary. And it turned out that two men, Gds Sr Sgt M. Simtsov and Gds Sgt Yu. Volgin, were working as clerks when there was only one position, subordinate to Sr Lt N. Bystro, senior assistant chief of staff.

Even the chief of the political department did not hold back from taking into the political department a soldier called up from school. The approach is a simple one: Take the best for yourself.

Thus, there turned out to be seven soldiers with higher or incomplete higher education at the force headquarters. There were 14 in the subunits, directly subordinate to the force chief of staff. There were two or three in each regiment headquarters. On the other hand, there were

only a handful among the commanders of tanks and BMPs [infantry fighting vehicles], guns and mortars, gunners and gunner-operators, and driver-mechanics.

Is not this approach to cadres too wasteful?

"Yes," agrees Gds Col G. Polkovnikov, chief of the political department. And he promises that we will take up thoroughly questions of the more effective use of soldiers with higher education.

Much in the problem of raising the efficiency factor of the educational potential of young men called into the ranks of the Armed Forces also depends on the commanders and political officers of training subunits. Alas, in some of them a wholesale approach still predominates in determining who and what to teach. In one of the regiments of the already mentioned division the overwhelming majority of soldiers and sergeants with higher education came from a training subunit located on the territory of this same military district. And nearly half of the 30 VUZ graduates were taught specialties there that were very far removed from their institute or university specialty. Why? Did not an already existing profession and required military specialty coincide? In many cases they did coincide. People were simply distributed at random.

For example, Jr Sgt K. Kyumnik is a geodetic engineer by profession, and he was graduated from his training subunit as a BMP commander. And Private B. Aytbayev, a teacher by profession, here studied the specialty of topographic geodesist. He is serving in the same regiment with Jr Sgt Kyumnik. He knows that Kyumnik as a topographic geodesist is two heads above him, Aytbayev. It would have been better the other way around: Kyumnik as a topographic geodesist and he Aytbayev as a BMP commander. But that is what was ordered. In the training subunit Private S. Zharov, a physical education teacher, was trained on the specialty of radio-telegraph operator, and Private A. Aliyev, an electrical engineer who has long been familiar with radio-telegraph apparatuses, was assigned as a grenade launcher operator.

In the training subunits I heard from commanders and political officers that the military commissariats apportioned the inductees by specialty and that they were not at fault that everywhere you turn bakers are taught to stitch boots and shoemakers bake pies. Here is old thinking, a backward stereotype of action. The military commissariats assign inductees by specialty in any old way, and the training subunits follow it like a blind man follows a wall. And who intervenes to correct the error?

Apropos of this, military commissariats are a special subject. The registration of inductees, including those with higher education, by military specialties is done without taking into account their civilian professions especially often here. In one of the regiments in the division, out of 30 soldiers and sergeants with higher education, more than half earned a profession in a VUZ

that is very far from the specialty; that the military commissariat's office intended them to occupy. Inductee I. Khryashchikov, a graduate of the Leningrad State Institute of Culture and producer of cultural work among the masses, was sent by the Stuchkinskiy Rayon military commissariat, Latvian SSR to a training subunit to master the specialty of BMP commander; the same B. Aytbayev, a teacher with five years experience, was sent by the Leninskiy Rayon military commissariat in Omsk to a training subunit to master the profession of topographic geodesist; and geodetic engineer K. Kyumnik, a student at the Estonian Agricultural Academy, was also sent to learn the profession of BMP commander by the Tartu combined city military commissariat.

Adjustments were not made either in the training subunit or in the unit where they are already completing their service. The results of this approach are lamentable. First, the people do not contribute what they could to enhancing combat readiness. Second, tremendous forces and resources are spent to retrain them.

Could the educational potential of our soldiers be used with greater effectiveness everywhere? It could of course. This is all the more true in that experience already exists in Black Sea Fleet units, and other military collectives and military commissariats.

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#### **Lt Gen Justice Maksimov on Restructuring in Military-Legal Agencies**

18010042i Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Dec 87 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen Justice S. Maksimov, chief of the Directorate of Military Tribunals: "According to the Laws of Justice"]

[Text] Seventy years ago, on 5 December 1917 the Soviet of People's Commissars approved and V. I. Lenin signed a decree on justice. It was important for the establishment of new, truly democratic legal organs, and this date appropriately went down in history as the date of their origin.

Having arisen as a organ of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Soviet court was called upon to protect the gains of October and defend the interests of the socialist state and the rights and freedoms of its citizens.

By the time that the decree was adopted, revolutionary courts had already been created spontaneously in a number of places. They were called various things: people's courts; courts of social conscience; tribunals; public commissions, etc. In Petrograd the first judicial institutions began to function in Vyborgskiy Rayon literally two or three days after the October uprising. This initiative of the popular masses was ardently supported by V. I. Lenin.

The ideas of V. I. Lenin, that he had developed in a number of works written before the revolution, lay at the foundation of the decree about the court. He repeatedly emphasized that in any exploitive society the court, like the state, defends the interests of the ruling classes and is not a disinterested arbiter, as bourgeois jurists assert. Therefore, the opinion of the leader of the revolution was categorical: not to reform the bourgeois courts, but to "completely destroy them; to sweep them away to their foundation."

The democratic nature of the organization and activity of the proletarian courts became a most important feature. By a decree, for the first time in the country direct elections of courts were established and other progressive transformations were consolidated. They are not only of historical interest, but are topical also from the standpoint of the discussion that has developed recently about the further democratization of our justice. For example, already on the basis of the initial decree defenders were admitted to court from the stage of the preliminary investigation. "Citizens of both sexes who enjoy civil rights" could serve in their role. The problem of collegiality in the examination of suits was solved in an interesting way. Whereas, in local courts two regular jurors were included in the examination of a case, there were six people in the composition of tribunals, which resolved more important matters. And, in accordance with a VTsIK [All-Russian Central Executive Committee] decree of 17 March 1918, issued in development of the first decree on the court, the participation of 12 jurors was provided for in okrug people's courts. This, in particular, consolidated legislatively Lenin's thinking about broad participation of the popular masses in the practice of justice. According to the 7 March decree, regular lists of jurors for each session were compiled by allotment. This was a unique guarantee against the selection of "compliant" persons as jurors to take part in the court. The important role allotted to the people's jurors is also indicated by the fact that they had "the authority to reject for the entire period of the trial the chairman designated for the given session." Moreover, in making the decision the chairman enjoyed only the authority of a deliberative vote.

Based on Decree No 1 on the court, two types of judicial organs began to operate in the republics: local courts and revolutionary tribunals. The latter were established: "for the battle against counterrevolutionary forces..., and equally to resolve cases concerning the struggle against pillaging, predatoriness, sabotage and other abuses." But this does not mean that in all cases they employed harsh measures. In the activity of the Soviet courts their fundamental distinction from the Tsarist judicial organs, true humanism, appeared immediately.

The well-known American journalist, John Reed, who was present at the first judicial process of the Petrograd Revolutionary Tribunal on the case of Countess Panina,

wrote that the "Russian tribunal" had nothing in common with those tribunals at which judges had 'blood-stained sabers at their side,' and where on the street was a 'chomping guillotine.'" Many members of the bourgeois intelligentsia then came to the hall of the palace of the great prince to see how seven workers and soldiers, headed by I. N. Zhukov, would deal with the countess. And what did they see? At the legal session there reined an atmosphere of democracy and objectivity, and the sentence indicated an extremely mild attitude toward the wrecker, who removed 93,000 rubles from the till belonging to the people. The tribunal resolved: "1) to leave citizen Sofya Vladimirovna Panina in prison until the moment that all the money she had taken was returned to the till of the Commissariat of People's Education; 2) the revolutionary tribunal limits itself to giving citizen Panina a public reprimand."

A few days later the wreckers returned the money they had taken and Panina was freed.

The Soviet government established uniform principles of organization for all courts, including military.

In the extreme situation caused by the Civil War, the activity of the revolutionary military tribunals, created by the revolutionary military soviets of the fronts and armies, became widespread. Initially they were not a part of the People's Commissariat of Justice and were organizationally included in the military department. However, after the end of the war all judicial organs without exception, including the revolutionary military tribunals, entered the uniform legal system of the republic.

In subsequent years legislation about the legal organs continued to develop. The main principles of their activity were set down in the constitutions of the Soviet State.

However, it was not always possible immediately and everywhere to implement the democratic principles of socialist justice in practice, and subsequently ensure their continuous strengthening and development. There were numerous reasons for this, both objective and subjective. At first the Civil War interfered. The fierce attempts by foreign and domestic counterrevolution to stifle the gains of October forced us to go to a simplified legal procedure in the tribunals and to grant the authority to judge to the VChK [All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counterrevolution and Sabotage] organs. In the 1930s and 1940s Stalin's unlimited cult of personality had its effect. It was accompanied by curtailment of democratic principles and narrowing the system of procedural guarantees of justice. In those years many people who were guilty of nothing were subjected to extra-legal repressions, but many errors were also committed by the courts. "As was noted in a report at the ceremonial session dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, "it was a lesson for all generations."



Nonetheless, assessing today the path traversed by Soviet courts, one cannot help but note that they made a significant contribution to the cause of strengthening discipline and lawfulness in the country, and, by the measures inherent to them, ensured improvement of socialist social relations.

The activity of the courts does not boil down merely to the examination of criminal cases. A no less important task is protection of the property, working, housing and other rights of citizens, which, in accordance with the USSR Constitution, can be implemented through the courts. Citizens implement this right by making a statement of claim to the court. Every year substantially more such claims are examined than criminal cases. For example, in the last year and a half in the courts of the Russian Federation alone more than 11,000 workers and employees were restored at work with payment of compensation for time of forced absence in the amount of 2.3 million rubles. On 1 January of next year the "Law on the procedure for making complaints to the court about unlawful activities of officials that infringe upon the rights of citizens" goes into effect. It substantially expands the bases according to which citizens can appeal for protection of violated rights directly to the organs of justice.

The CPSU Central Committee Resolution, "On the further strengthening of socialist justice and law and order and increasing the protection of rights and lawful interests of citizens" defines the basic measures for restructuring the work of Soviet courts, the essence of which are to enhance their role in implementing a policy of accelerating the socio-economic development of the country and the democratization of all aspects of social life. This policy is inseparable from strengthening socialist legality and law and order, ensuring reliable protection of the constitutional rights and legitimate interests of Soviet citizens, and strictly observing the principles of social justice.

In restructuring the work of the courts an important role is allotted to improving legislation and publicizing various aspects of their activity. Competent commissions have been created and are functioning to prepare proposals of a legislative nature, directed at enhancing the authority of the courts and the role of the people's assessors and defenders. Measures will be taken to improve the legal procedural codes. M. S. Gorbachev, in his recently published book on restructuring and new thinking, noted that the goal of the legislative-legal work being carried out is to "increase the role of the court as the elective organ that stands closest to the population, and ensure the independence of the courts and strictest observance of democratic principles of legal procedure, objectivity, conscientiousness and glasnost."

The election of judges held in the country on 21 June of this year became an integral part of the process of restructuring. More than 12,000 people's judges were elected. High demands were placed on the candidates.

Not only professional knowledge was considered, but also such personal qualities as a developed sense of justice and heightened sense of responsibility for fulfilling one's duty.

The military tribunals, as an integral part of the state legal system, now solve tasks that are uniform for all courts. Their efforts are also directed at enhancing the effectiveness of justice and rendering more effective assistance to command and political organs in strengthening military discipline, preventing offenses, and eliminating the causes and conditions that facilitate them. As on all Soviet courts, important indoctrinary functions are given by law to the military tribunals. In carrying them out, public legal processes held in military units play a special role. Military personnel present at these processes receive object lessons in respect for law and are assured of the inevitability of punishment. Judges take part actively in the legal indoctrination of military personnel, and render legal and methodological assistance to comrades' courts.

As they improve legislation and the practice of justice, the CPSU and Soviet State display constant concern about strengthening the activity of Soviet courts, seeking to ensure that they become, in the words of V. I. Lenin, an ever more effective weapon of "education for discipline." Lenin's ideas, many of which were set down in the first decrees on the courts, even today in the period of revolutionary restructuring, serve as a reliable reference point on the path of further democratization of socialist justice.

9069

#### **Alternative Service for Religious Objectors Discussed, Rejected**

180100421 Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 22 Nov 87, p 3

[Article by G. Gukasov: "A Victim of the Jehovah's Witnesses?"]

[Text] In the last few days a single heavy feeling has not left me. No matter what I do: walk along the street and admire the bright colors of autumn, watch television, talk with friends, play with my two-year old daughter and answer her innumerable questions, and suddenly, just like a pin prick of a sharp game I remember: 19-year-old Viktor Bogdanovich Dubenskiy is deprived of all of this. He cannot, as he usually did, walk through the streets, in bloom with the last vivid colors of autumn, blending into the common stream of workers, and pass by the gate keeper at the gate keeper's office of the Yulemiste Affiliate of the Tallinn Bus Association who always smiled at him affably, open his locker with his own key and change into his light, modern worker's coveralls. He cannot examine his joiner's bench critically to see whether all the tools are in place, and open the hiding place where he put the spare parts that are in the

shortest supply in the evening. An automotive joiner 3d grade cannot do any real work without real tools and a good supply of wires, cables, resistors, anodes, and many other things.

He could not work otherwise. And now he does not have that joyful feeling of the end of the work day, and the anticipation of a free evening. He will not walk to Filtri Street, to the room that he is familiar with down to the spots on the wallpaper, where his wife Viktoriya and three-month old son Sergey always waited for him impatiently, especially now. Now he is denied this. And not for a day or two, but for 731 days, having begun his bitter count on 22 December. That is how long the people's court determined for him as punishment.

Our story has an ordinary beginning and an entirely natural end. The whole biography of Viktor Dubenskiy, as for any one his age, fits on a page of a school notebook. He was born in the village of Sokoluk, Kirgiz SSR, came to Estoniya in 1977 and lived in Koze, and completed eight grades of Vaydaskiy school. At 16 years of age he went to work, first as an assistant at the Yygeva Inter-Kolkhoz Construction Organization, then as an apprentice fitter at the Tallinn Bus Association. In its affiliate, Yulemiste, he rose quickly up the workers' ranks. In five months he was already a fitter 1st grade; after a year a 2d grade; and after another year a fitter 3d grade. About his social and production demeanor they don't say anything better than Ilmar Lang, the director of Yulemiste Affiliate said: "Reference. Viktor Dubenskiy arrived in January 1985 as an apprentice fitter in automotive repair and showed himself to be a responsive and disciplined worker. He showed interest in his selected specialty. His rate of work is very fast and the quality is good. He successfully combined work with study in secondary school. He is modest and self-controlled." I will say right away that every word here is true. Moreover, I heard many good words and high epithets from all those with whom I talked.

On 17 April of this year greetings from the Kharyuskiy Rayon military commissariat were in his mailbox, on the need for "Draftee V. Dubenskiy to go to pass the medical commission." He went. He appeared before the doctors. Height—178 centimeters. Weight—68 kilograms. In the draftee's card were written: surgeon—healthy; neuropathologist—healthy; therapist—healthy. The summary by the medical commission chairman: Fit. And suddenly this: "At the commission I stated," V. Dubenskiy will write later, "that I refused to serve in the army on the basis of my religious convictions, being a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses Community, which forbids taking up arms and learning to fight. At this time I do not change my convictions and also refuse army service, knowing that I will bear criminal punishment for this." The officers of the military commissariat immediately went to work with Viktor. They explained, questioned him, and tried to convince him. They brought up examples, citing history. Russian and world history. Civilian and religious. They recalled the Jesuits and the crusaders, sectarians of all shades and stripes.

"To the military commissariat from V. V. Kuzerinaya, teacher at Evening School No 8. I know Dubenskiy as a completely Soviet man, and a capable and serious graduate of the school where I work. His refusal to serve in the army was more likely dictated by a son's duty to his parents. He loves his parents very much and is afraid to bring them unpleasantness. When now the question has been raised about his own family and his responsibility for his own child, perhaps his position will change. I am a member of the VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League], and a non-believer. I ask you to give me some time, and hope that I will be able to convince him."

They heeded the request of his wife and gave him a six month deferment from callup. Then everything was repeated all over again. The officers of the military commissariat no longer referred to all kinds of historical precedents. They tried to find a way out of the situation, but no matter what they said, there sat before them a boy, and many of them had their own sons.

"Think," they said to Viktor, "two years in prison is a minimum. Exactly the same as in the army. And say that you serve in the mess hall, in today's peacetime army you won't have a rifle in your hands for your whole time of service."

"I cannot take an oath," asserted Dubenskiy stubbornly. "We must not make any oaths." It was an impasse. It means that he can give an oath to Jehovah, but not to his homeland! Religion, the officers marveled.

"First you go through the course for the young soldier," they had still not lost hope of tearing the lad away from his religious environment, "and there already you will decide everything for yourself. Such brave soldiers have already come from members of your sect."

"I will not become one."

V. Dubenskiy firmly held his ground: any punishment, only not the army. His responsibility to his just-created family and his growing son could not dispel his religious intoxication. His relatives, mother and father, and non-relatives, but fellow believers, his spiritual brothers and sisters, were in court. They were of different ages, but all seemed to have the same face: closed lips, eyes with the look of suffering, exactly like icons, heavy arms set on their knees. And their only parting words to their son and brother: Pray. And the only solace: We will pray for you! And when yet another of many brilliant references was read in court, this time from evening school, then public defender (??) B. Poopu spoke and asked in the name of the collective of the Yulemiste Affiliate that V. Dubenskiy be sent to serve his sentence to his home automotive garage, a kind of chain began to form. Outstanding working and school references, a public defender from his labor collective, the suffering faces of his brothers and sisters in Jehovah, his parents, who had

condemned their son with a single word. And the atmosphere of the court itself, the dry words of the report, the complete lack of repentance on the part of the convicted person, to the contrary his resigned acceptance of his punishment as something irreversible, and the face of V. Dubenskiy, who received the crown of thorns as though from the hands of the creator of everything in existence, and prepared from this hour to bear it to the end. It was the solemn face of a man prepared to suffer for his faith, who had finally obtained that opportunity.

I thought, perhaps something is not right? Perhaps the law is too strict in its approach to a person in a religious fuddle? Perhaps, we could really leave his God with him, and create in our army some administrative teams where such young people could serve their term of service without weapons and without taking the oath. Yes, the Fundamental Law, the constitution of our country, in no way persecutes freedom of conscience and religion. All of these thoughts spun round in the very air of the discussion with many people of the tragic fate of Viktor Dubenskiy.

"You did not note one interesting detail," said M. I. Dimov, a worker in the republic prosecutor's office, a rifle platoon commander in the war, who many years later was chairman of the military tribunal. "It has become for us some sort of a norm of life to grant first to one, and then to another group of the population, certain benefits, advantages and privileges. Both in trivial, and non-trivial matters. The benefit of priority in stores and everyday service enterprises, for housing, for tickets on airplanes and trains, and many other things. Some are open, and others are through concealed channels. Imagine for a minute that we also create benefits for callup into the army based on religious convictions. I am sure that tomorrow there will appear another dozen fully justified desires of certain groups and categories of the population, who would not have any objection to being freed from callup or to serving where it is a bit easier. No, for us, for males, this is not simply an obligation, but a sacred duty, and in its irreproachable fulfillment is the highest justice."

The representative of the soviet for religious affairs in the ESSR gave me a little information.

"We have no limitations on freedom of conscience and religion," stated Leopold Piyp. "At the time of registration of any religious community they only sign a commitment to observe all the laws of the Soviet state, which is entirely natural in any country. Jehovah's Witnesses here are not registered, and we know well the reason for their illegal existence. Their activity is inspired by a foreign center, and in many ways is not in conformity with Soviet laws.

Jehovah did not prohibit V. Dubenskiy from studying in Soviet school and answering his lessons in history and literature. He did not forbid Dubenskiy from telling about the feats of the heroes of the Civil and Patriotic

Wars and receiving an "A" for his excellent knowledge of the material. But, back in Sokaluk it prohibited him from wearing the Pioneer tie. God allowed Viktor to engage in automotive repair, allowed him to fall in love with his wife and to produce a son, but he forbids him from defending his work and his love! Is this not the epitome of lying and hypocrisy! I understand that the behavior of the military commissariat workers, the public defenders, the schools, and many of my co-discussants is based on compassion. Just a few years ago a man who refused to serve in the army would have been sentenced not only by a court, but the military commissariat would deal with him no less harshly. And his colleagues at work "would not err," and would send to the court a true public prosecutor, and not a "defender." I understand that at this time a tempestuous reassessment of values is going on in society, and that that which yesterday seemed unshakable, today already raises doubts, and tomorrow will come crashing down from its granite pedestal. But there are things about which they do not joke. And first among these is defense of the socialist fatherland.

If it were otherwise, if it were with benefits, and according to convictions, think what would happen to us, to us all. And not only in the terrible hour of testing. There is something here that our readers would no doubt agree with me on. In the dock along with Viktor Dubenskiy were clearly not enough of those who fixed this criminal thought in his head. There were not enough parents, and his brothers and sisters in the Jehovah's Witnesses sect. And in fairness all the demands should start with them.

9069

**Hazing of Draftees Calls for Glasnost**  
*18010042k Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 25 Nov 87 p 1*

[Article by D. Muratov: "I Would be Glad to Serve..."]

[Text] Remember? The callup center. The smell of the station and the disinfectant. Then the troop train. "To the cars!" And the departing draftees do not wave their caps, first, because it is prohibited, and second, because somehow it is awkward to remove it from a shaved head. And in the evening talks with the sergeant on the unused platform about how it would be "there."

"Do they give leave?"

"If you are lucky."

"Bunk beds?"

"Single."

"What about the food?"

"The usual."



And in the end, the main question.

"And your 'old men'... are they ok?"

*For a long time we kept quiet about this "military secret" that everyone knew about. We were quiet, thinking that we had to be for the benefit of the cause, for the defense of the country. But, in response to a small letter by a fellow who wrote against the humiliating procedures in his unit (see KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 21 August 1987), the newspaper received letters. People were afraid that Viktor would not be believed, and that his opinion would be considered "personal," and they tried to convince us that he had written the truth. "I also encountered this..." and I had..." "yes, this happens..."*

Yes, it does. This deviation does exist; in common parlance it is called "dedovshchina" [literally purge or rampage of the "old men;" refers to hazing of new draftees by soldiers in the fourth six-months of service]. There are "cherpaki" ["buckets"], "dukhi" ["spirits"], and "stariki" ["old men"] and there are conflicts among them, officially called non-regulation relationships.

"I just arrived, and they forced me to wash their under-collars and shine their boots and badges."

"They got my comrade up at night and forced him to tell stories to the 'old men' until morning..."

Humiliation.

We are talking about a contemporary phenomenon. And it lives not only in the army. In a technical school dormitory, some office or, say, a corrective labor colony, privileges and local "castes" exist. Of course, in each case the privileges differ—everyday services in one case, bureaucratic in another, criminal in a third. But the important thing is not the differences in their nature, but the similarity of their roots. They are formed in an identical way, through infringing upon someone's rights. Understandably, the "caste" itself will not give up, and will defend its privileges and zones of influence zealously and fiercely, defending for itself the opportunity to live better than others. The openness of the army "dedovshchina," which is under the protection of the traffic control points, makes it possible to look at the phenomenon in an uncamouflaged form. Yes, I understand that the fall callup is going on at this time. I know that, perhaps, this discussion is not timely. But I remember too well the breadcutter (there is such a job in the soldiers' mess hall) from my own unit who threw loaves of bread into the face of an inexperienced lad, and the mothers' letters on the editors' desk demanding: Do not stop what you have begun, so that our children can serve calmly. So, we will continue. And as our first order of business let us explain out of what kind of dough these very "old men" come, and what they think about themselves.

**Guardhouse.** The yard is 10 by 10 meters; enclosed by a concrete fence. In a small annex of the guards facility are two rooms, for privates and sergeants. In the corridor are trestle-cots like those at the beach, which someone named "helicopters." It is retreat. The "helicopters" are scattered about the floor. The soldiers fall on them without undressing. They cover themselves with their greatcoats. Only at roll call does it become clear who ended up here and for what.

"I was arrested by the unit commander for systematic disruption of the daily routine."

"I for deviation from my duties while on mess detail."

It seemed that these were not the soldiers that the editors had sent me here to "sit" with. They are disciplinary infractions. But the secret is in the wording. Later in short conversations (What time was there for long ones? We are working, "concrete-border-asphalt."), a thing or two became clear.

The military construction worker, who had served 18 months (an "old man," that is), "disrupted the daily routine" since he knew that a young fellow in his first period of service would not dare to disobey him and would carry bricks for him.

Another, who had served a year (a "cherpak"), was smoking at the "discotheque." The sink in the soldiers' mess hall is jokingly called a discotheque, and it is actually similar: You have to wash hundreds of "records" (plates). This is hard work. And he gave his part to a new soldier.

Now those who ended up in the guardhouse look despondent. In previously unsettled circumstances their arrogance flew away in an instant, their eyes jump about and they are ready to go crazy at the slightest thing. They are now just as confused as those whom they tried to humiliate. I repeat, just as confused. There is nothing special about them. And a year or a year and a half ago their parents prayed that their son would not meet up with riff-raff along the way. Then their parents could not even think that the mothers of the new conscripts with fear their children.

*And themselves they repeat the well-known refrain: "We did it, now let the others..." "Yes, we maintain order in the army..."*

Well, despite their denseness, these arguments should be examined more closely.

It is true that the senior soldiers are the bulwark of the commanders. We note, a reliable and necessary bulwark. The senior soldiers (this is also true) maintain order, discipline and the military classroom. But we are talking about the methods by which this is sometimes achieved.

And if, for some careerist officer, any means of "hitting the target" are good, the "dedovshchina" becomes his ally. It is, if you wish, advantageous to him.

"Just so there is order in the company; the rest does not concern me." What does not concern him? It "does not concern" him who will stand duty details, scrub floors, clean weapons and clear snow from the assigned territory, etc. And invisible redistribution of duties occurs. The senior soldiers make their albums about their service and watch television, and the "junior" soldiers carry out the work for them. But, this coexistence cannot be peaceful. You see, it is necessary to intimidate, apply pressure and suppress. Non-regulation means of influence do their deeds. Fear of them engenders servility, and a readiness not to serve, but to be a servant—acquire the knack of a lackey, just don't get on the wrong side of the old timers. And a question arises: Strictly speaking, why is order "at any price" advantageous to the commander? In some subunits, and this is no secret, until now people were prepared to assess the state of the military collective solely by outward signs. By the way, this is also the source of dozens of anecdotes that are not complimentary to the army about fur trees dug up for the time of a commission visit, spray-painted grass, etc. Pretense is portrayed as the end result, and dictates the unscrupulousness of the means. And, if the inspectors did not take merely uniform haircuts to be collectivism and military comradeship, possibly one of the reasons for the "dedovshchina" would disappear of its own accord.

Now let us discuss one more stereotype. "We had our turn, now let the others..." Here is what is interesting about this: Why do the new soldiers themselves share in it and why are they not surprised? Why are they so willing to subordinate themselves and accept the rules of the game that are foisted on them? Could it be simply that they don't know any other rules?

*And here we will talk about...glasnost. Knowledge about the army of our draftees begins with the common expression: "There they will make a man out of you," and ends, as is correctly noted in many letters, with the transmission "I serve the Soviet Union," most often avoiding the dark sides of army life. Stories from former servicemen fill the gap. Some have said precisely: "Get ready for the first six months. They will drive you. Be patient, later you will get your turn."*

Submission to this information, and the intention to structure the model of one's behavior in accordance with it, is one more of the reasons for the "dedovshchina."

Glasnost can also root it out, through an open, nonbureaucratic discussion of the problems of military collectives. It will not undermine combat readiness. And there will be confidence that no one will show up and be able to get even on the sly. It is high time to have a discussion

about democratization of some aspects of army life. Since the caste system, window-dressing and resignation will not be trampled down and extinguished in any other way.

Here is a fact that seemingly is not related to our topic.

*Not so long ago in "N" unit Maj Yu. Bochkarev, deputy for political affairs, ordered the komsomol members to give a recommendation for the admittance of serviceman Nadzhafarov as a party candidate member, without having held any komsomol meeting at all! He himself composed the extract from the minutes. And he had it rewritten completely. And what happened? He ordered it and it was rewritten. High-handedness at the "high" level results inevitably in imitation at the "low level." Such ordering about of the komsomol meeting and the komsomol organization makes it absolutely helpless and incapable of defending its interests. We are speaking about the process of democratization, which is gathering strength, and about competitiveness in promotion to komsomol work, and the komsomol committee secretaries of major subunits in general are essentially not elected! That is, the ritual of elections itself exists. But there are no choices. Since an officer or warrant officer can occupy the position of komsomol committee secretary.*

Needless to say, it is silly to dispute the principle of one-man command in the army. But, is it correct to ignore democratic norms? Without the process of democratization, and outside of glasnost, the disciplinary measures undertaken by commanders and political officers will not work. The fear will not disappear, but will be cultivated in other, more refined forms.

Yes, all of this is true. And here is the snag. Neither democracy, nor glasnost will be introduced immediately, by fiat, and the will not be checked by an inspection parade. Time is needed for this, time which does not exist. Because the fall callup is already on the way and it recalls these hurried conductors and wonders how it will be met at the KPP [control and check point]. How will it be met?

"We are serving in the Ukraine. In our company are 16 men from the same callup group. And we give you our word that we will not for any reason taunt the young fellows who will soon arrive in the company. We will see that no harm comes to them. They will feel like people."

That is the decision. The most normal decision. To break off the nonsense and derision on one's self. Everything is simple. "He did not pick up the tune in time?" Hold on. Look. On the photograph in the new service records these lads have a confident appearance. They, with their competent looks, are needed by us all.

### **Current Benefits for Dependents**

18010061a Moscow *EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA*  
in Russian No 50 Dec 87 p 12

[Report under the rubric "The Information Desk":  
"Benefits For Families of Fightingmen"]

[Text] The regular call-up of citizens for active military duty takes place each year during the period October-December. Questions also arise at that time about benefits for the families of those drafted into the Armed Forces of the USSR. This information is provided by a department of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

The Law of the USSR on Universal Military Duty states that the councils of ministers of Union and autonomous republics and the executive committees of the soviets of people's deputies are required to take care of the needs of the families of those drafted for active military duty no later than 1 month after they apply. This includes job-placement for the wives of men drafted into the service, and placing their children into available kindergartens and nurseries within the same period of time, regardless of the departmental affiliation of the children's facilities.

For the children of soldiers, seamen, first-term NCOs and petty officers, their wives are paid financial aid in the amount of 35 rubles per month per child. Aid is also paid for the children of military construction workers, cadets and students (receiving cadet pay rates) at military educational institutions who are first-term servicemen, civilian youth or students at warrant-officer schools. The rayon (or city) military commissariat at the place of residence of the serviceman's family is informed that the aid has been approved.

When the average combined income per member of a serviceman's family does not exceed 50 rubles per month—75 rubles per month in areas of the Far East, Siberia and the nation's northern regions—aid to children is also paid in the amount of 12 rubles per month per child up to the age of 8 years. It is paid at the place of employment or training of the children's mother. If she is not employed and is not in training, it is paid by social security agencies.

Wives of first-term servicemen receive aid under special terms for looking after a sick child.

First-term servicemen retain the housing area which they occupied prior to being drafted, and they (and their family members) may not be removed from waiting lists for housing.

Families of soldiers, seamen, first-term NCOs and petty officers having no members with independent earnings pay for housing at the minimum rental rate established by present laws. If the family has excess housing area as a result of the induction, it is paid for at a single rate.

The wives of first-term servicemen are exempted from the taxes on bachelors, single persons and citizens of the USSR with small families. They retain this benefit also when the serviceman is at a medical facility or on leave for reasons of health, and for a period of up to 1 year from the date of discharge when the serviceman is discharged from the military service for reasons of health.

Soldiers, seamen, first-term NCOs and petty officers and their family members are exempted from the payment of building and land taxes. Letters addressed to first-term servicemen at their duty station are sent at no cost.

Certification for family benefits is issued to servicemen (for forwarding to their homes) by the military units (or installations) within a month after they enter the military service. Within a week after their names have been listed on a unit roster, servicemen with children are also issued certification entitling their wives to receive aid to children.

Families of cadets at military educational institutions and military construction workers enjoy the same benefits as the families of soldiers, seamen, first-term NCOs and petty officers.

11499

### **Col Gen Babyev on Afghan Veterans' Benefits**

18010042h Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* in Russian  
28 Nov 87 p 6

[Interview of Col Gen V. Babyev: "Benefits to Servicemen Fulfilling Their International Duty"]

[Text] The editors of *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* receive many letters whose authors are interested in benefits for servicemen fulfilling their international duty. In this regard our correspondent requested that Col Gen V. Babyev, chief of the Central Financial Directorate, USSR Ministry of Defense, answer the readers' questions.

*As is known, for a number of servicemen military service is associated with fulfilling their international duty. Many readers are interested in whether any benefits are provided for these servicemen?*

The service of servicemen fulfilling their international duty frequently takes place under difficult conditions, in a number of instances associated with risk to life. For courage and heroism demonstrated in fulfilling their international duty, many of these soldiers receive state awards. Along with this, taking into account the particularities of their service, by resolutions of the USSR Government and orders of the USSR Ministry of Defense, a number of benefits and advantages have been established for them and their families. Appropriate benefits are granted to these servicemen, both during their service and after their discharge into the reserves or retirement.



*What specific advantages do servicemen who have fulfilled their international duty enjoy during their period of active military service?*

First it is necessary to note that the time servicemen spend fulfilling their international duty and participating in combat operations is counted toward years of service for pension purposes on advantageous terms — one month of service for three months pension credit.

Officers, warrant officers and extended service enlisted personnel are granted scheduled leaves of 45 days, not counting the time required to travel to and from their place of leave. Servicemen who have distinguished themselves in combat operations may be presented for the awarding of their next rank ahead of schedule.

Priority housing is provided for servicemen who have returned to the territory of their country, and those who have distinguished themselves in combat operations may be enrolled on a non-competitive basis for study at military educational institutions.

Servicemen who have been wounded, shell shocked or mutilated in combat operations, or while carrying out other military duties while fulfilling their international duty are paid one time allowances in the established amount. When these servicemen receive serious wounds, shell shock or mutilations, after their recovery in hospitals they are sent to sanatoriums or rest houses for one month without charge for the accommodations. Moreover, service personnel who have been wounded, shell shocked or mutilated are given a 50 percent reduction in the cost of a railroad trip once per year (round trip), and in areas not having rail transport, they are granted water, air or inter-city automobile transportation.

*What benefits are granted to military personnel who have fulfilled their international duty after their discharge from active military service?*

Military personnel who have fulfilled their international duty, after they are discharged from active military service, are given the right to priority housing accommodations, and those who are considered Group 1 invalids as a result of wounds, shell shock, mutilation or illnesses obtained in combat operations or when fulfilling other military duties, are provided housing out of turn. With the appropriate medical statements, invalids from this group enjoy the right to receive prosthetic devices out of turn, and a Zaporozhets automobile with hand controls.

Military personnel who have fulfilled their international duty, after their discharge into the reserves or retirement, are granted the right to receive an interest-free loan for construction of individual residential housing, in an amount up to 3,000 rubles, to be paid off over a 10 year period beginning the fifth year after the completion of construction of the house. They are granted the right to enter higher and secondary specialized educational institutions on a non-competitive basis, to use their

scheduled annual vacation at a time convenient to them, and to receive a supplemental vacation of up to two weeks per year, without reducing their pay. And they have priority rights to obtain accommodations in sanatoriums, dispensaries and rest houses at their place of work, as well as to be received into gardening groups (cooperatives).

Military personnel who have been wounded, shell shocked or mutilated while fulfilling their international duty, during their period in the reserves or retirement retain the right to receive a 50 percent reduction in the cost of a rail ticket once annually (round trip), and in areas without rail transport, a water, air or intercity automobile transport ticket.

In accordance with a USSR Government resolution, local soviet organs must pay constant attention to the needs and requests of servicemen who have fulfilled their international duty and been discharged from active military service, and to the families of deceased servicemen.

*And what is provided for military personnel who have fulfilled their international duty and become invalids?*

Military personnel who have become invalids as a result of wounds, shell shock, mutilation or illnesses received while fulfilling their international duty are granted benefits established for invalids of the Patriotic War.

*Have any additional benefits been established for the families of military personnel killed while fulfilling their international duty?*

Yes, they have. The parents, wives and minor children of military personnel who were killed or died as a result of wounds, shell shock, mutilation or illnesses received in combat operations, or while carrying out other military obligations while fulfilling their international duty are paid one-time allowances in the established amount.

Advantageous terms for designation and payment of pensions on the occasion of the loss of the breadwinner have been provided for the families of military personnel who have died while fulfilling their international duty. In particular, non-abled-bodied parents and wives of these military personnel are given pensions for the loss of the breadwinner, regardless of whether they are in a dependent status. Wives receive pensions at age 50. Children of deceased military personnel who are attending school are paid pensions until they complete secondary or higher educational institutions, but not after they reach 23 years of age.

The families of deceased military personnel who require better living conditions are provided housing on a priority basis. Housing space occupied by the families of deceased servicemen who receive a pension for the loss of the breadwinner are paid at 50 percent of the normal rent, and excess housing space up to 15 square meters is

paid at the normal rent. A 50 percent reduction in utilities payments is also given. Benefits for payment of housing space and utilities are granted to pensioned wives and parents of deceased military personnel, regardless of the type of pension they receive.

Tombstones are erected on the graves of military personnel and other citizens who were killed or died as a result of wounds, shell shock or mutilations received while fulfilling their international duty, at the expense of the state.

*Are any benefits provided for workers and employees fulfilling their international duty?*

These workers and employees, if they are wounded, shell shocked or mutilated, are paid the appropriate onetime allowance, and in the case of their death, a onetime allowance is paid to their family.

*And the final question: On the basis of what documents are the appropriate benefits granted to military personnel who have fulfilled the international duty and their families?*

The document that confirms the right to benefits established for military personnel who have fulfilled their international duty is the attestation on the right to benefits. For granting the benefit of paying for passage by rail or other types of transport to military personnel who were wounded, shell shocked or mutilated while fulfilling their international duty, along with the attestation on the right to benefits, coupons for acquiring transportation tickets at a 50 percent reduction are turned in.

The benefits established for war invalids are granted to military personnel who have become invalids as a result of wounds, shell shock, mutilations or illnesses received in combat operations or while fulfilling other military service duties, based on the invalid's attestation on his right to benefits and coupons for acquiring transportation tickets under advantageous terms, which are provided by the organs that assigned the pensions.

The established benefits are granted to the families of deceased servicemen on the basis of certificates issued by the organs that assigned the pensions.

9069

**Obituary: Lt Gen M. G. Fomichev**  
18010042b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
21 Nov 87 p 6

[Article: "M. G. Fomichev"]

[Text] Retired Lt Gen Fomichev, Mikhail Georgiyevich, twice Hero of the Soviet Union, has died following a serious illness.

All of his conscious life M. G. Fomichev devoted to selfless service of the socialist homeland, the Soviet people, and the cause of the Communist Party, in the ranks of which he entered in 1939.

M. G. Fomichev was born on 8 October 1911 in the village of Sloboda, Belevskiy Rayon, Tula Oblast, into the family of a poor peasant. Having completed the Orel Armored School, the RKKA [Workers' and Peasants' Red Army] Motorization and Mechanization Academy, and the Military Academy of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff imeni K. Ye. Voroshilov, he devoted 40 years of his life to the cause of defending our homeland, and went from cadet to lieutenant general. He participated in the Great Patriotic War from 1941 through 1945. He served in responsible positions in troop units and in the main inspectorate, USSR Ministry of Defense.

In all areas of service entrusted to him, M. G. Fomichev displayed exceptional diligence and energy, and high competence and principles in accomplishing the assigned tasks.

The Communist Party and Soviet Government greatly appreciated the services of M. G. Fomichev. He was awarded two Gold Star medals, the Order of Lenin, two Orders of the Red Banner, the Order of Suvorov Second Degree, Order of Kutuzov Second Degree, Order of the Patriotic War First Degree, three Orders of the Red Star, and many medals. The bright memory of Mikhail Georgiyevich Fomichev, loyal son of the Communist Party and Soviet people, will remain forever in our hearts.

D. T. Yazov, S. F. Akhromeyev, V. G. Kulikov, P. G. Lushev, A. D. Lizichev, Ye. F. Ivanovskiy, M. I. Sorokin, D. S. Sukhorukov, O. F. Kulishev, S. A. Stychinskiy, M. M. Sotskov, S. I. Klyapin, Ye. V. Kalashnikov, I. Ye. Buravkov, V. K. Korobov.

9069

**Obituary: Gen Army V. A. Belikov**  
18010042a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
15 Nov 87 p 3

[Unsigned Article: "General Army Belikov, Valeriy Aleksandrovich"]

[Text] The USSR Armed Forces have suffered a serious loss. On 12 November 1987 Army Gen Belikov, Valeriy Aleksandrovich, commander-in-chief, Group of Soviet Forces Germany, CPSU Central Committee candidate member and USSR Supreme Soviet deputy, died suddenly. He devoted his entire conscious life to selfless service of the socialist homeland and the Communist Party, a member of which he became in 1949.

V. A. Belikov was born in 1925 in Morozovska, Rostov Oblast. After completing secondary school, in July 1942 he was called up into the ranks of the Soviet Army. He participated actively in the Great Patriotic War.

After the war he completed the Military Academy of Armored Forces, and then the Military Academy of the Armed Forces General Staff. He subsequently occupied a number of command positions. He commanded a regiment, a large unit and a formation. He was 1st deputy commander of a military district, and commander of the North Caucasus and Carpathian military districts. Since 1986 he was commander-in-chief of Group of Soviet Forces Germany.

V. A. Belikov was distinguished by his thorough knowledge of the theory and practice of troop training and indoctrination, his closeness to people and his high sense of responsibility for the work entrusted to him. He worked a great deal to improve the military and political training of the personnel, and displayed initiative, firmness and persistence in achieving his assigned goal.

V. A. Belikov combined the fulfillment of his official duties with active participation in social and political life. He was elected a delegate to the 26th and 27th CPSU congresses, and a deputy of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The Communist Party and Soviet Government greatly appreciated the services of V. A. Belikov to the homeland. He was awarded two Orders of Lenin, the Order of the October Revolution, the Order of the Patriotic War First Degree, the order "For Service to the Homeland in the USSR Armed Forces" Third Degree, and many medals.

The vivid memory of Valeriy Aleksandrovich Belikov, loyal son of the Communist Party and the Soviet people, will be forever preserved in our hearts.

M. S. Gorbachev, V. I. Vorotnikov, A. A. Gromyko, L. N. Zaykov, Ye. K. Ligachev, V. P. Nikonov, N. I. Ryzhkov, N. N. Slyunkov, M. S. Solomentsev, V. M. Chebrikov, E. A. Shevardnadze, V. V. Shcherbitskiy, A. N. Yakovlev, P. N. Demichev, V. I. Dolgikh, Yu. F. Solovyev, N. V. Talyzin, D. T. Yazov, A. P. Biryukova, A. F. Dobrynin, A. I. Lukyanov, V. A. Medvedev, G. P. Razumovskiy, I. V. Kapitonov, S. F. Akhromeyev, V. G. Kulikov, P. G. Lushev, A. D. Lizichev, N. I. Savinkin, Yu. P. Maksimov, Ye. F. Ivanovskiy, I. M. Tretyak, A. N. Yefimov, V. N. Chernavin, M. I. Sorokin, S. K. Kurkotkin, V. M. Shabanov, N. F. Shestopalov, V. L. Govorov, D. S. Sukhorukov, A. I. Sorokin, V. S. Nechayev, D. A. Volkogonov, N. V. Ogarkov, A. S. Zheltov, B. P. Utkin, M. N. Tereshchenko, N. A. Moiseyev, I. V. Fuzhenko, A. K. Fedorov, V. V. Skokov, Ye. N. Makhov, L. S. Shustko, G. M. Donskoy.

9069



**Air Force 1988 Socialist Competition Challenge**  
*18010075 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian*  
27 Dec 87 p 1

[Report: "Appeal From the Personnel of a Bomber Regiment to Fightingmen of the Air Force"]

[Text] Military Comrades!

Fulfilling their constitutional duty to defend the homeland's air borders, the personnel of our unit, like all fighting men in the Armed Forces of the USSR, actively support with their military work the Communist Party of the Soviet Union's strategic course of accelerating the nation's social and economic development, renewing and democratizing all aspects of the Soviet society's life.

Regimental personnel achieved good results in the combat and political training last year. We understand, however, that what was achieved is not the limit. Profoundly accepting the CPSU Central Committee's great demands of the Armed Forces in the continuing, complex military-political situation, the military airmen are filled with resolve to respond with determined military labor to the concern of the party and the people for the Air Force and to make their contribution to the fulfillment of the historic decisions coming out of the 27th party congress.

After assessing what has been achieved and carefully identifying our possibilities and reserves, we accept the following commitments:

—to tirelessly develop a communist world outlook in the servicemen, blue- and white-collar workers, to see that they take an active stance in the restructuring, to continue the in-depth study of Lenin's ideological and theoretical legacy and the heroic history of our socialist homeland; to develop in the servicemen a class approach for assessing the military-political situation in the world, and an understanding of the vital need for constant vigilance and combat readiness; to increase the publicizing of the glorious heroic traditions of the Soviet Army and Navy and the Soviet way of life; to strengthen friendship among fightingmen of various nationalities; to develop a sense of collectivism, to strive actively to see that communist moral standards and morality are strictly observed;

—to proceed in the combat and political training from the need to accomplish two interrelated tasks—to achieve a higher level of combat readiness in the regiment for operating in any air or ground situation and to stimulate the human factor by democratizing the public life of the military collectives; to reduce the amount of time required to put the subunits into a state of combat readiness by 2 percent by the 70th anniversary of the Armed Forces and by at least 8 percent by the end of the year by thoroughly studying and mastering the aircraft

and missile equipment and by improving the organization of the military work, the day-to-day training level of the flight crews, technical groups and teams;

—to struggle for the title of excellent regiment and to earn ratings of "good" or "excellent" for all of the tactical flight exercises and drills; to have first-class commanders and navigators on every combat aircraft by the end of the year, and to have all of the other crew members completely prepared for combat action;

—to increase the combat activeness and the tactical skill of the flight crews, to take fuller advantage of the capabilities of the aircraft systems, the navigation and control systems, to improve combat techniques, to prevent simplifications and indulgences and to persistently enhance the flight methods of the commanders and instructors; to have an average rating of at least 4.6 in piloting techniques, air navigation and the main types of combat application; to have two air squadrons achieve the excellent rating and to have 12 percent of the crews achieve the sharpshooter rating by the opening of the 19th All-Union party conference; to have 46 percent of the personnel achieve the excellent title in the combat and political training by the end of the year;

—to have the engineering and technical personnel continue to master the aircraft equipment and weapons and maintain them in a state of constant combat readiness, repair and dependability for the successful performance of the flight training missions; to have 65 percent of the technicians and mechanics with higher ratings, 65 percent excellent technical groups and 40 percent excellent aircraft in the final phase of the training year;

—to have a solid knowledge of and strictly observe the laws governing flight work and the regulations governing the maintenance and servicing of the aviation equipment, and to ensure good organization and regularity in the flight work and flight safety on this basis; to have no preconditions for accidents in the air through the fault of the personnel;

—to constantly improve the training facilities and to set up a center for relieving mental stress in the regiment; to engage in the active dissemination of technical military information, rationalization and inventions work, to disseminate the know-how of the masters of military affairs more actively and to make at least 40 rationalization proposals;

—to strictly practice conservation and make thrifty use of supplies; to reduce wear on ground support equipment by 5 percent for each hour of flight time;

—to improve the mass cultural and sports work, to strengthen ourselves physically and develop stamina and endurance; to have at least 70 percent of the personnel become rated sportsmen and VSK [All-Union Sports Complex] badge-holders by the end of the year;

—to see that the military post, the airfield and service facilities are maintained in exemplary order; to have every serviceman work at least 30 hours during the year at social, cultural or personal service facilities.

The regimental Communists commit themselves to be in the vanguard in the restructuring, to be its initiators and organizers, to set an example of unity of words and deeds. Every second Communist will be outstanding in the combat and political training by the end of the year.

Moving toward the 70th anniversary of the Komsomol, the regimental Komsomol organizations commit themselves to have 46 percent of their membership outstanding in the combat and political training. The unit Komsomol members call upon all Komsomol members to step up the campaign to establish a climate of friendship and military comradeship in the collectives.

As we accept these large commitments, we appeal to all the military airmen to support our initiative, to engage actively in the socialist competition and launch a campaign for the successful fulfillment of 27th CPSU Congress decisions and the tasks set by the USSR Minister of Defense for 1988, and to make a significant contribution to a fitting reception for the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference.

11499

**Lt Gen Kostin on Changed 'Psychology' in Moscow Air Defense District**

18010058b Moscow AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA in Russian No 21, 1987 (signed to press 26 Oct 87) pp 2-3

[Interview with Lt Gen A. Kostin, member of the military council and chief of the political directorate of the Moscow Air Defense District, by Maj A. Burtsev; time and place not specified; first paragraph is AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA introduction]

[Text] Serious shortcomings in the organization of service and in combat training in individual units and subdivisions were revealed at the meeting of the party aktiv of the Moscow Air Defense District held in June of this year. How do things stand today? Our correspondent talked about this with Lt Gen A. Kostin, member of the military council and chief of the political directorate of the Moscow Air Defense District.

[Question] Aleksey Yakovlevich, obviously the critical conversation at the meeting of the party aktiv and the problems revealed by those speaking forced the leading personnel to reexamine their work in detail and to draw the proper conclusions....

[Answer] Of course, for that, let us say, stern assessment given by the Politburo at the meeting on 30 May 1987 to the actions of the air defense troops in connection with

the violation of our air space by the West German aircraft involved the leading personnel above all. It is no secret that some officers of this link showed poor management and indecision.

Today the district management has been supplemented by new personnel. We hope that the influx of fresh forces will also normalize the atmosphere in the district, especially since there is a program for action—the demands of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and the decisions of the party aktiv, which for us are a unique reference point in the restructuring of our party and, if you wish, a true lesson in democracy. What was talked about in the party aktiv did not leave anyone indifferent. The district newspaper with the report on it was literally in great demand, passed from one person to another, and read "until it had holes in it." There were also cases in which it was altogether impossible to find it in the subdivisions. I admit that when such signals appeared, the thought crept in: possibly they are "hiding" the newspapers purposely so that the personnel will not see them? But it was all simpler than that: they "hid" them so that they would always have this newspaper at hand as the unique program for their work.

[Question] You meet a lot of people and talk with them. How, in your view, did the personnel receive the perhaps impartial but on the other hand honest and truthful analysis of shortcomings?

[Answer] I will not take it upon myself to speak for everyone individually but I will not be in error if I say that the overwhelming majority interpreted these shortcomings as their own miscalculations and the open conversation about them as an impulse (and a powerful one at that!) for their elimination and the raising of vigilance and combat readiness. There was no delight in the revealed shortcomings and no malicious "rubbing of hands" that someone got it.... There were appearances at party and Komsomol meetings, where several officers were sharply criticized for omissions in service but all of this took place on a healthy party basis.

I recently visited the flare signalers and I talked with many people. And here is what is significant: the load on personnel has recently increased several times over because of the more precise organization of combat training and the intensification of the educational process. There have been cases in which people have literally fallen over from fatigue but there was not a single complainer and not a single person who "broke down." One of the flare signalers said approximately the following: "If it is our fault, we correct it. And above all it is necessary to free ourselves from complacency: we have gotten accustomed to the thought that Moscow is far from the border and that no extraordinary events were taking place and now some have started to take their military duty lightly. But today it is necessary not only to locate a mark on the screen, not only to see the aircraft behind it, but to learn to discern what maneuver that aircraft may undertake...."

The example of the communist Sergeant Molchanov is better than any words. He was offered leave home as an incentive but he declined to accept it, saying that now is not the time.

[Question] You mentioned the name of Sergeant Molchanov and I recalled his fervent and excited speech at the meeting of the party aktiv, where he truthfully spoke of serious omissions in the organization of combat training. Let us be frank: Just a while back such a speech would have been impossible and people like Molchanov were considered bothersome. But today precisely such people are in the vanguard of perestroika. Do you think that they are now getting the support of commanders and political education workers? Is this becoming a characteristic feature in the interrelationships between commanders and subordinates?

[Answer] Unfortunately, there are still few such examples. Let us not dodge the issue but say directly: who can dare to speak the unpleasant and "bothersome" truth? In most cases, only a desperate and bold person. There are many reasons for this: the adherence of some leaders to the defective method of administration by mere decree, the inability (and sometimes unwillingness) to listen to the opinions of others, a morbid attitude toward criticism of themselves, the weak action of the subordinates, and the inability to fight—yes, to fight—for their own position! So that we still have to raise this layer and there is enough work for all: from the military council to the aktiv of the company or battery.

I will not be in error, however, if I say that the activity of rank and file personnel has recently increased noticeably.

[Question] How was this expressed specifically?

[Answer] Well, let us take the proposals that were recently received from Sgt P. Brov, Jr Sgt A. Sheremet, and privates Yu. Strelchenko, Ya. Kostyuk and V. Cherkasskiy. What are they proposing? For example, the discussion of the system of dismissal to the reserves at the meeting of the Komsomol committee and bureau and the reporting of their considerations to the command. There is a proposal to improve the preparedness of operators through the utilization of active forms of instruction: tactical battles, mobile units, and the like. Many suggestions are coming in on raising the efficiency of socialist competition and freeing it from over-organization and formalism. In particular, it is proposed that the fulfillment of the undertaken socialist obligations be summarized at the monthly meetings of the Komsomol committee and bureau and, in accordance with the results, that the command be petitioned to encourage particular Komsomol members. This will help make a more objective evaluation in revealing the winners. It is also proposed that the prestige of the specialist be raised substantially and that everyone know the masters in their own work: in the unit as well as in the district.

It should be emphasized that the very appearance of these suggestions reflects, in my opinion, the important process of breaking down the former psychology. People are tired of being dependent on others and of the lack of responsibility, the fact that someone else is thinking for them. They do not want to be "little screws," they want equal responsibility for combat readiness. And you know what the main thing is—people are not only making suggestions but, without waiting for instructions from above, are themselves experimenting. And this is an extremely important sign of the times that inspires confidence and optimism.

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#### Shortage of Airfield Aviation Mechanics

18010058a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
11 Dec 87 p 2

[Article by Lt Col S. Levitskiy under "Problem Requires a Solution" rubric: "Sought...an Aviation Mechanic"]

[Text] With whomever of our front aces I have had the occasion to converse, they invariably recalled their fighting friends—junior aviation specialists, dependable working people in war, including "their own" mechanic with priceless hands.

We speak about this with Maj V. Neklyudov, military aviator first class and holder of two Red Banner orders.

"I know, I read about it," he said and continued as if it were something painful. "Things are different now. A pilot sometimes does not even know the mechanic whom the documents assign to his aircraft. I served in several military districts and in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany and fulfilled my international duty in Afghanistan. The problem is the same everywhere: aviation mechanics are needed for work on equipment and at the airfield. But they are most often busy doing clerical and administrative work."

I had many similar conversations at different military airfields in the country. The mail from readers of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA gives alarming signals to the effect that the duties of aviation mechanics—sergeants and soldiers—are more and more often becoming a burden on the shoulders of technicians—officers and ensigns—and that the so-called crews of the aircraft or helicopter, including the ground staff, exist on paper only.

To some extent, an answer to the question of why this problem arose was also heard in the letters from readers. Pfc M. Gumirov, an aircraft mechanic from the Baltic Military District, related that during the time of his training he was poorly prepared in the school for junior aviation specialists (ShMAS) and therefore could not work on the most complex up-to-date technology in his regiment and spent almost half a year being retrained.



They then began to train him as a future sergeant. He had no time at all left for full-blooded work as a mechanic and junior commander.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA published this letter on 9 September ("Service During Trips"). Soon the editor's office received an answer from Maj Gen of Aviation L. Orlov, deputy chief of the main staff of the air forces. The letter reported that the program for the training of junior aviation specialists was confirmed by the deputy commander in chief of the air forces for VUZ's. The technology is continually becoming more complicated, however, and the process of the renewal of the academic base of the schools has not always kept up. They have taken the course of improving the quality of the manning of the ShMAS's with temporary personnel—students and pupils of rural vocational and technical schools. As time goes on, they can assimilate technology that they did not study in the schools for junior aviation specialists. Possibilities are being sought for the improvement of the training of aviation mechanics and the units have strengthened the control of this.

As we see, much in the letter sounded quite indefinite. What school is he talking about? Did it lag behind contemporary technology or is it still behind today? If it lagged behind in the past, what has been done to eliminate the backwardness? Why do the graduates of ShMAS's have to be retrained for different technology? By the way, this is the system for training mechanics not only in the air forces but also in the aviation of the air defense and the navy.

Let us try, as they say, to follow the course of the rise of the problem. Let us begin with the recruitment of the students of the ShMAS's. In response to the question of how it is done in the kray, for example, Lt Col G. Kuzurmanov, section chief of the Krasnoyarsk Kray Military Commissariat, said right out: the soul of the workers of the military commissariats aches not for the provision of the army and navy with specific specialists but for the overall number of people suitable under particular "parameters" to man the commands "of the branches and arms of service." For this reason, the efforts of many organizations, in particular the DOSAAF, and even the organizations of the military commissariats themselves, to train specialists for the armed forces in some particular profile are frequently brought to nothing.

And the mail from readers has illuminated this problem. More and more often, young soldiers are turning to the editor's office who dreamed of service in aviation and prepared themselves for it but were channeled by the military commissariats into being tankmen, artillerymen and so on. We published one such letter on 10 January ("Not in His Speciality"). Guard Pvt A. Shangin from Kiev Military District reported with bitterness that the plant rayon military commissariat of the city of Minsk called up him and his classmates in the Minsk Aviation

Technical School for Civilian Aviation for service as flare signalers, even though in the system of nontroop training they were being trained as mechanics for the air forces.

Col G. Chebotarev, then acting military commissar of the Belorussian SSR, responded to the newspaper article. The response to the editor's office stated that the officers of the rayon military commissariat who made the mistake in the call-up were given strict instructions. But there was no report that the soldiers were transferred from their place of service to aviation. And the main thing is that it is not known whether or not the problem has been resolved and whether such things will happen again in the future.

Colonel Chebotarev answered the question honestly: there are no such guarantees. For example, the existing resources and the duties of Belorussian Military District do not allow the call-up of a practically trained aviation mechanic to serve in this speciality. Colonel Chebotarev explained that conscripts with higher practical and physical qualities are selected for rocket and border troops and the navy, whereas youths with lower demands on them are called up for the air forces in limited numbers.

I do not know how to comment on this phenomenon. It turns out that by someone's light hand the safety of flights in the armed forces is knowingly threatened, for everyone knows that today mechanics are being entrusted with the most complex and expensive equipment and the lives of the crews.

The editor's office is continuing to receive letters like the one mentioned above. "When we, students at the Vyborskoye Aviation Technical School for Civil Aviation (Leningrad Oblast) were called up to the armed forces," reports Pvt R. Khaliyev from Ural Military District, "the school command assured us that our speciality will be particularly useful in the army. And this is understandable. There is no need to train us in the ShMAS's or to spend time and money on instruction. Lieutenant Colonel Divnogortsev in the city military commissariat told us that of course he is sending us to aviation. But we ended up in a tank unit. We thought that an annoying mistake had been made and we appealed to the command to correct it. Political education worker Lieutenant Colonel Ryazanov then explained that there is a surplus of mechanics in aviation even without us.... What can you do, one does not choose where and in what capacity to serve the Motherland. We understand this very well. But we happened to meet some officer helicopter pilots and told them about our fate. They were surprised to find out that we are tankmen: we are looking everywhere for such specialists and we cannot find them, they said. So it turns out that our knowledge is needed in the army after all?

So you see what kind of costs are associated with the "selection" of conscripts for service in aviation. We will say right out that this approach is not good management.

By sending youths to the ShMAS's under the notorious "gross-numbers approach," rejects become part of the system. Just recently unnecessarily long journeys to the schools of Siberian Military District were made by privates A. Zinchenko (Pervomayskiy Rayon Military Commissariat of the city of Kurgan), V. Dubskiy (Artemovskiy Rayon Military Commissariat of Primorskiy Kray), Sh. Ikromov from Samarkand Oblast in Uzbekistan.... The list can be continued. Upon arriving at the school, these soldiers were immediately found to be unsuitable for training as aviation mechanics. They were, of course, sent from the ShMAS to other places. But the vacancies remained and this means that there will be a shortage of specialists at the airfields.

And by no means everything is going smoothly in the organization of the educational process in the ShMAS's. The facts indicate that the educational-material base of the schools chronically lags behind the requirements of the day, practice and life and "does not always keep pace with it," as Maj Gen of Aviation L. Orlov reported to the editor's office. Thus, in the ShMAS of the Moscow Air Defense District, they are training mechanics for the servicing of equipment that is no longer in the units. In the ShMAS of the Siberian Military District, I saw study equipment on radio tubes—a kind of museum rarity. Again, the list can be continued.... Here there is no use talking about the view of educational institutions on tomorrow, on the future of aviation technology.

Lt Col V. Konstantinov, chief of the political section of the ShMAS of Siberian Military District, spoke with concern about some sore points of the school. The proper attention is not being paid either to the educational-material base or to the social and welfare conditions of the permanent staff. There is practically no information from the troops on the quality of the training of mechanics. The training of many students for service in the army is extremely poor and therefore the educational process is often interrupted. And although specialists in the profile of this school are also trained in the DOSAAF organizations, the school has neither ties nor interaction with the DOSAAF.

I include the provision of qualified personnel among the unresolved questions of the school for junior aviation specialists. It would be logical to suppose that future mechanics are trained by practical officers who have undergone combat hardening at airfields. Alas, however, very many grew out of lieutenants and cadets without leaving the school pre-nises. Today the command teaching staffs are replenished through graduates of military schools. To be sure, there is an exception: they sent Cpt N. Lyashenko here from the forces of Moscow Military District. But it turned out that the officer did not serve well in his old place and was considered backward. So there they decided: let him teach others.

The sore points of the schools show up, of course, in the decline in the quality of the instruction of mechanics. And for this reason, they do not hesitate to assign poorly trained specialists in the units not in accordance with their specialty, saying that they have to be retrained anyway. Just to ensure service in the work details, they assign the performance of different tasks far removed from the servicing of materiel. At the same time, commanders, every second remembering the safety of flights, try to keep some mechanics away from the aircraft or helicopter, assembly or apparatus. In the N aviation unit of Carpathian Military District, they "found" a quite unique application for extremely scarce specialists. Cpt I. Kuznetsov writes to the editor's office. For a year now, the mechanics Pfc S. Palyan and Pvt K. Borovskiy have been busy playing on the local plant soccer team "Tsukrovik." Their commander Lt Col V. Baranovskiy thinks that there may even be some benefit: the plant management promised a metal net for the needs of the technical operations unit....

All those with whom I spoke about the problem were divided in their opinions in approximately two equal groups. Some think that the ShMAS's are no longer necessary and that the high level of education of the contemporary soldier makes it possible to train the mechanics directly in the units and even in the subdivisions. Others are in favor of schools for aviation mechanics—not schools that are lagging behind the technology as is the case today but ones that are at the cutting edge of it. And a stricter selection is necessary. Many specialists need to be taught locally more quickly and with better quality.

By the way, I was witness to precisely such a process in Siberian Military District. Thus, the students called up from the aviation technical schools for civil aviation are already sent to the troops after little more than half of their training time. The department for the study of airfield illumination engineering was closed for lack of need and the equipment has been put in storage. (For some reason, they do not decide to abandon obsolete equipment completely and classrooms in extreme short supply remain empty). There is a new experience in the air defense forces: in the ShMAS headed by Col V. Vekhov, students leave in the last few months of their instruction for practical training in the regiments on the materiel that they will prepare for flight. They are examined right there.

In short, there are questions and clear practical responses are needed. And those to whom this important work has been entrusted must provide those answers.

### Navy's 1988 Socialist Competition Challenge

18010072 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
29 Dec 87 p 1

[Report: "Appeal From the Crew of the Nuclear-Powered Submarine 'Minskiy Komsomolets' to Navy Personnel"]

[Text] Military comrades and friends! We are nearing an important event in the history of our homeland and in the nation's social and political life, the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference. The coming year will be an important stage in the realization of decisions coming out of the 27th CPSU Congress and in the accomplishment of the tasks involved in the second and crucial phase of the restructuring.

Like all of the Soviet people and fighting men in the army and navy, we North Sea submariners fervently approve and unanimously support the CPSU's foreign and domestic policy and the party's course of acceleration and restructuring, of strengthening the nation's economic and defense capability and further consolidating the gains of socialism. We have accepted as a militant and specific program of action the recommendations and instructions set forth by Comrade M.S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, during his visit to Murmansk Oblast and the Northern Fleet. Entering into the socialist competition, we commit ourselves to intensively accelerate the pace of our work, to develop glasnost and initiative, creativity and comradesly mutual assistance, to bring those who are behind up to the level of those out front and to make the work specific and efficient.

Having studied our achievements and our capabilities, we call upon all personnel of the Navy to enter into socialist competition with the slogan "Selfless Military Labor, Exemplary Service and Great Discipline Are Our Contribution to the Homeland's Defense," and we accept the following commitments:

—to study, work and live in the Leninist manner, the Communist manner; to see that every fightingman thoroughly understands the party's program objectives and tasks, the ways to achieve them, and his place in the strengthening of combat readiness and the restructuring process;

—to stand alert duty with vigilance and great dependability; to perform the firing exercises with only good or excellent ratings and at maximum range; to earn the prize of the Commander in Chief of the Navy for best missile launching;

—to reduce the standard time for putting the weapons and equipment into a state of combat readiness by 8 percent and the time required for classifying surface targets by 14-16 percent, underwater targets by 4-6 percent, by the end of the year;

—to improve the tactical, special and general training in every way, taking advantage of every mile at sea for this purpose;

—to have 67 percent of the officers and 76 percent of the warrant officers become highly rated specialists and every third one a master of military affairs;

—to strengthen in every way the prestige of the title of excellent trainee in the combat training, highly rated specialist, best specialists on the ship and outstanding subunits, to extensively publicize the experience of the socialist competition winners.

We will have on the ship at the end of the year:

—48 percent of the personnel outstanding in the combat and political training; 50 percent excellent divisions and services, half of them for two or more training periods; 75 percent excellent groups, crews, compartments and battle stations; and five subunits and 11 crew specialists commit themselves to earn the title of best in the formation.

We shall constantly maintain a climate of moral purity and mutual demandingness in the collective and intolerance of infractions of regulation order.

The crew commits itself to earn the great title of excellent ship by the 70th anniversary of the Lenin Komsomol;

—to persistently study the Marxist-Leninist ideological legacy, materials of the 27th party congress and subsequent plenums of the CPSU Central Committee and the principles of the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact states; to improve the quality and the effectiveness of the political training; to have 75 percent of the groups earn and confirm the excellent title;

—to have the ship's Communists in the vanguard of the socialist competition, the restructuring campaign and the establishment of a demanding and exacting climate in the collective.

The Komsomol members on the nuclear-powered submarine will set a good example in the fulfillment of 20th Komsomol Congress decisions and the competition for a worthy reception for the 70th anniversary of the Lenin Komsomol. Every Komsomol member will raise his skills rating by one level or master a related specialty. We will launch a movement by the innovators in Komsomol affairs with the title "The Military Labor and Valor of the Young Fightingmen—Into the Restructuring."

We shall sacredly value the honor and dignity of the Soviet seaman, naval friendship and military comradeship, and strive to have a crew of high naval caliber.

We shall look after the weapons and combat equipment, use supplies and the technical capacities of the machinery and equipment competently and thriftily and launch



an extensive campaign of publicizing technical military knowledge. We shall cut consumption of all types of fuel to 3 percent below the established consumption norms during the year. We shall submit 54 rationalization proposals and adopt 20 of them.

We shall pay increased attention to the physical conditioning of the personnel and develop stamina and endurance; have 80 percent of the personnel rated sportsmen and 78 percent of them VSK [All-Union Sports Complex] badge-holders by the end of the year. We are entering into the competitive review for crew with best personal facilities for the personnel.

Comrades!

We appeal to personnel of the Navy to enter actively into the socialist competition for the continuing fulfillment of 27th CPSU Congress decisions and to greet the 70th anniversary of the Armed Forces of the USSR and the 19th All-Union conference of our Communist Party with selfless military work, with new successes in the combat and political training and with the exemplary accomplishment of the assigned missions.

11499

#### **Stealth Techniques for Naval Vessels Discussed**

18010044 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
27 Oct 87 p 2

[Article by Capt 1st Rank Ye. Bogdanov, senior officer of the Department of Combat Training of the Baltic Fleet: "The Commander and Modern Combat. The Stealth Ship"]

[Text] Last summer the naval forces of the U.S., Canada, Japan, Australia and Great Britain conducted the large-scale "Rimpac-86" exercise. As the Associated Press Agency reported at that time, the American aircraft carrier "Ranger," operating on the "blue" side, succeeded in "losing itself" for a full 2 weeks in the endless expanse of the Pacific Ocean. Despite aggressive searches with the employment of the newest reconnaissance systems, including satellite systems, the opposing side was unable to pinpoint the location of the gigantic floating airfield. An Associated Press correspondent declared, not without enthusiasm, that U.S. aircraft carriers "have acquired a magical transformation ability—they have learned to conceal themselves from tracking systems..."

What is this? A propaganda move intended to impress the whole world with the "magical invulnerability" of one of the components of the U.S. strategic forces? It cannot be excluded. After the conclusion of "Rimpac-87," the newspaper THE NEW YORK TIMES emphasized that the "disappearance" of the "Ranger" during the exercise was not an accident, but the result of a planned system of measures conducted by the Pentagon to increase the effectiveness of aircraft carrier forces. As

for the latter deduction, it is absolutely true. Foreign specialists note that tactical deception [takticheskaya maskirovka] during combat operations at sea under modern conditions takes on paramount importance. It is considered to be a necessary condition for achieving the objectives facing a single ship or a group of ships.

Surface ships, endowed with a whole series of operational and tactical features, also have a vulnerable side, let us say, by comparison with submarines: inadequate operational concealment [skrytnost]. Therefore, special deception efforts are being taken to increase the undetectability [maskirovka] of ships at sea.

During the second world war, tasks were usually assigned to achieve the maximum possible reduction in a ship's signature and to make delivery of weapons by the opposing side difficult. A number of cases are known in which, with the aid of tactical deception, it was possible over short periods to achieve complete concealment from the enemy about the composition of forces, their intentions and their method of operations.

At first glance, many methods that were employed more than 40 years ago to ensure the concealment of combat operations of surface ships can seem archaic. Indeed, since that time technical reconnaissance systems have come a long way in their development. In recent decades, the proportion of measures targeted against electronic intelligence systems has increased sharply in tactical deception abroad. Moreover, the significance of camouflage against optical systems of observation has been retained completely.

According to foreign press reports, deception of this kind is obtained by the skillful use of meteorological conditions, in particular, cloud cover for concealment against observation by aircraft and reconnaissance satellites. At night, a capital ship can camouflage itself using the signal lights of a tanker or other auxiliary vessel. Fog is extremely effective in concealing ships... Foreign specialists assume that in a war in which conventional combat systems are employed traditional camouflage will continue to play its previous great significance.

But, of course, continuous improvement in reconnaissance also entails the further development of deception whose systems and capabilities every naval officer has to understand well and be able to use in practice. Especially a ship commander. The closing training year provides rich material for analysis and comprehension of the activity of commanders, staffs and command and control organs in improving the tactics of fleet forces operations. But this improvement is impossible without a very earnest treatment of the deception problem.

This can be demonstrated convincingly by the tactical performance test exercise of two division ships, one of which was commanded by then officer I. Polevov (he is now assigned to another billet). The significant feature: the opposing forces were unequal, inasmuch as the

radars on the division ships commanded by officer Polevov were inferior in their tactical and technical characteristics to the more modern radars of the "enemy." But the outcome of the training battle was not determined by the technical superiority of one of the parties, but by the carefully considered tactical plan by which the other side was guided. Skillfully employing part of his forces to deceive the "enemy," the division commander in a condition of total radio silence took up an advantageous position with his main forces and delivered a surprise strike against the "enemy" unit, which decided the outcome of the battle.

Of course, the question naturally arises in this connection: how come the opposing side let itself be deceived so easily? Unfortunately, regular relaxation of demands and simplification in combat training, which are inherent in some units, develop an incorrect stereotype in tactical thinking. Ensuring maximum concealment of friendly forces and creating interferences against "enemy" observation are not a matter of particular concern for some commanders.

The modern ship is equipped with a large number of electronic devices. According to foreign press materials, its cost constitutes 30-45 percent of the total cost of a ship. Moreover, this share is continuously increasing. Being the main means, and in a majority of cases the only means of command and control of forces at sea, radio communications significantly decrease the concealment of their operations. Of course, in each specific case, one must proceed strictly from what is most important in a given situation: maintaining security or uninterrupted command and control of forces. If preference is given to only one, the commander can endanger the execution of his mission.

Today, it must be asserted with uneasiness: the arming of ships with modern means of very high frequency (UKV) [VHF] communications has led to the fact that many commanders and watch officers have refused to use simple and the most secure systems of signals communications: the blinker, flag semaphore and the signal code. Of course, it is much simpler to pick up the telephone, transmit a signal, and get an immediate answer. But the intensity of use of VHF communications is also a signature. Last year, for example, in a two-sided exercise the "northerners" acquired valuable information specifically from the character of the changes in intensity of VHF work at the base of the "southerners."

Why are not the little multi-colored flags flying over the head of the signalman? It appears that the following fact gives an eloquent answer to this and other questions of a similar kind. In the course of certification of commanders and chiefs of staff of task forces and ship commanders, there are quite a few admirals and officers who display poor knowledge of the combat maneuver signal code and signal execution. This results in a lowering of demands on subordinates and an underestimate of suitable communications systems.

Discipline in the use of electronic systems and highly special training of personnel who service and maintain these systems is of great importance to ship concealment.

A group of ships was assigned the task of stealthily moving out into an area and delivering a missile strike on a division of "enemy" ships. During passage, a radio message was received addressed to the flagship. Watch telegrapher Seaman V. Novoselov took the radio message, which was very garbled because of jamming conditions, and, without reporting to the command, began to make queries for clarification. As a result, the group of ships was detected by "enemy" communications intelligence.

There is a great temptation to explain everything that happened only by the willfulness of the seaman. But the real reasons for what happened are much more serious. They reside in the inadequate attention of the organizers of the training battle to tactical deception. And the people who even indirectly influenced ship concealment were left unbriefed on the very highest need for vigilance.

Reflecting on the problems of concealment, I exchanged views more than once with fleet officers. They expressed quite a few interesting judgments. For example, stormy weather and nighttime are the best conditions for concealed operations. Meanwhile, individual commanders of task forces prefer calm and daytime for combat training. Unquestionably, no one can remove responsibility for security measures from them; however, what is necessary in war is what really has to be studied.

This kind of observation is also correct: the psychology of commanders of all ranks has to be changed on the question of the security [skrytnost] of using a ship's electronic systems, the communications systems. Even in a daily situation it is necessary for the commander to show concern about being on the air a minimal time and not turning a ship into a radio beacon.

It is impossible also not to agree with a wish addressed to military science: its reaction to the appearance of new reconnaissance systems must be much quicker. Commanders must constantly arm themselves with modern methods of resolving tasks of ship deception, scientifically based and practically tested. And this is what becomes ever more apparent today: some guidance documents on the question under discussion already need to be reviewed and brought into accord with current requirements.

13052

#### **Rear Admiral Zubkov Responds to Complaints About Specialists**

18010216 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
8 Jan 88 p 1

[Article by Rear Admiral R. Zubkov, candidate of military sciences: "Restructuring: A Shipboard Link—An Impartial Person. Why the Work of A Flag Specialist Is Not Always Effective"]

[Text] The flag specialist was nicknamed "a partial person" not by mean tongues, but without any malicious intent by his own naval colleagues. And for a definite reason. This is the rather unusual term used to lodge complaints against the style of work of representatives of the category of staff officers in question. And although the expression seems ironic, the problems that underlie it are rather serious. Here is a specific example.

...The pre-cruise check, which was being conducted by flag specialists, was completed literally just before putting out to sea. The list of noted demerits which could not be corrected, of course, because there was no opportunity in the time remaining, was handed over to Capt 2d Rank P. Kotelnikov. The most reasonable thing to do would be to postpone the cruise... But the commander of the task force decided otherwise: departure would not be postponed, and deficiencies would be dealt with at sea. And, most likely, had this story not taken a rather unexpected turn, no one would have had any particular complaints about flag specialists. But the fact is that because of inadequate qualitative preparation this boat was forced to return to base ahead of schedule. It was then that the flag specialists were "remembered." In this case complaints were made about flag specialists to the effect that they only ran a check on the ship but rarely helped. But are they the only ones who are to blame for this? . . . It seems that here everything depended not on the whim of staff representatives but on the system of crew training.

Of course, after what happened, inspecting the work of the crew of this submarine was intensified. And what is inspection and how is it implemented? For the present, no other method exists except by means of these very same checks. Consequently, the intensity of inspection—a large number of checks—is quite often a compulsory measure. The crew simply has to earn trust.

Now about the necessary practical help for crews on the part of flag specialists. All of this is determined by the duties of the flag specialist set forth in naval ship regulations. It should follow that we should talk in the first place about fulfilling the requirements of guidance documents. But, first, a flag specialist could turn out to be a careless person, a consideration which cannot be ignored. Second, he may have difficulties of a professional nature as well (not everyone can "remold" himself right away from commander of a combat unit into a staff officer). And, finally, quite often a situation develops in a unit or in a task force where the flag specialist simply does not have the opportunity to perform his duties in a qualitative way. There is any number of such examples.

Whoever is familiar with the duties of flag specialists knows that they perform several duties on a staff simultaneously: they are the senior specialists in their fields; they are charged with the responsibility of operations officers of the command post team of a unit or task force; and, well, the fact that they are simply staff officers also has a not insignificant meaning. For these duties are not

as simple as they seem to the uninitiated. One also cannot remain silent about the so-called administrative workload. Unfortunately, it continues to take up a substantial part of service time. Perhaps even an unjustifiably large part.

Consequently, the style of work of flag specialists on ships in many ways depends on the staff situation, and on the precision with which the very complex staff mechanism functions. If the leadership capably examines problems of combat readiness methodically, taking this to mean along with operational-tactical and administrative questions, also questions of all specialties without exception, there should be fewer complications. Together with this, there should be concern that each flag specialist becomes an operator with a broad field of specialties. This facilitates the distribution of internal staff duties in a balanced way, and it makes it possible for everyone to concentrate more effort on shipboard problems. And this is the direct responsibility of the commander of a task force.

The style of work of the chief of staff of a task force also plays an important role. It is he who in the main determines the "orientation" of staff officers. And if in the final analysis the evaluation of work is carried out not according to pieces of paper but according to specific results, then it is extremely difficult, you will agree, to maintain an indifferent attitude.

In the case of the submarine of Capt 2d Rank P. Kotelnikov, the problem of the authority of flag specialists is also being looked into. Judging by the number and substance of the demerits, the finding on the quality of crew preparation for the cruise was professional. Nevertheless, the commander of the task force considered it possible to disregard them. Apparently, something compelled the flagship to make such a decision. But as a result it not only did not ensure execution of the combat training plan, but it also incorrectly guided the commander of the ship in question, as well as other commanders.

That is, the senior chief himself confirmed that the opinion of the flag specialists can be discounted on occasion. After all is said and done, it is not at all surprising that flag specialists at times simply cannot eliminate demerits in subordinate combat units on their own authority. In turn, ship commanders, who in the logic of things should also be the first to be interested in this, do not always give them assistance.

Now a distinct trend is taking shape: some crews, in order to conceal deviations from established procedures, are even trying to accept combat training tasks from subunits without a staff representative, which conflicts with guidance documents. But when a failure occurs, putting the blame on flag specialists can be expected, as a rule.



It is a strange attitude. But if it is looked at more closely, it becomes clear that this is a sure method, a kind of move by which some ship commanders are trying to shift responsibility for failure to fulfill their responsibilities to the shoulders of flag specialists.

However, this is quite understandable. It is known that a ship commander is a central figure in the navy who enjoys special respect. But at times respect for them is treated in a one-sided way, which complicates the relationship between ship commanders and flag specialists. And right here it should be pointed out that flag specialists are officers of a higher staff.

The current condition itself, and perhaps the existence of the institution of flag specialists of task forces as well, it appears to me, is also somewhat of an example of imbalance. It seems that it does not respond to today's level of technical equipping of the navy and the essence of its activity. Thus, for example, staff specialists are responsible for the technical combat readiness of weapons and equipment on task force ships according to their own specialties and for the special training of personnel who service and maintain weapons and equipment. They are severely questioned on malfunctions, even in those cases when they are not to blame for them. Complaints are also made in large volume against staff specialists for poor training of ship personnel, even though pertinent fleet training institutions are responsible for this to a significantly greater degree. The desire of flag specialists to help crews in eliminating malfunctions encounters, on the one hand, a lack of repair facilities subordinate to them and, on the other hand, their own subordination interferes with those chiefs under whose jurisdiction the facilities fall. The efforts of flag specialists to raise the level of personnel training by way of intensive training sessions and drills are also sometimes made difficult by a whole series of objective conditions (simultaneous presence at base of only a part of the ships of the task force; diversity of tasks performed by the ships, unequal initial level of training of specialists, etc.).

Quite often complaints are made about flag specialists to the effect that they do not notice anything except "their own" weapons and "their own" technical systems on ships. But in fact an initiative-taking and creative approach to the performance of duties presupposes close cooperation with all the services of a ship.

Experience shows that greater success is achieved by the flag specialist who not only assumes the role of "impartial inspector," but who delves deeply into the reasons for the successes and failures of "his own" combat unit, who helps the commander of the combat unit in setting the right relationships with subordinates, who organizes coordination with other subunits, and who assists the watch officers of the ship in becoming proficient in their specialty. Undoubtedly, the flag specialist as a staff

officer does not have the right to be apathetic about any infractions of regulation requirements. In a word, he must be really sincerely interested in the success of the entire crew.

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize once more the thought that the problems of flag specialists are problems of the effective functioning of the staffs of ship task forces as a whole. And the resolution of these problems requires serious scientific analysis, clear-cut substantiation and a modern approach.

13052

### Naval Training Deputy Chief Responds to Critique of Exercise

#### Critique of Exercise

18010220 [Editorial Report] Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK in Russian No 10, October 1987 carries on pp 31-34 a 2,000 word article by Captain 1st Rank N. Gavrilenko titled "But if the Battle Were Real..." discussing a recent training exercise conducted by the Soviet Navy. The author points out that one of the ship captains was cited for "insufficiently active conduct of reconnaissance in the forward zone of anti-aircraft defense." Other commanders were criticized because "in the dynamic circumstances of battle they failed to demonstrate the art of cooperation, the ability to accurately and competently gather, generalize, analyze, and disseminate information about the enemy in a timely fashion."

The author goes on to cite the staff which was not able to "present the crews with an accurate and clear assignment" nor to "exhibit the necessary persistence in the organization of effective control over the ships' specialists at every level of the exercise." The author then draws the conclusion that "narrowness and isolation of the officer exclusively in the circle of problems facing his own crew or his own subelement, do not produce positive results."

The author also includes a paragraph on insufficient and improper use of ship computers: "A real battle is full of unforeseen, irregular situations for which it is impossible to fully prepare beforehand. And here automation, the various computers, can and must render great assistance to the individual. Therefore it is very important to achieve a level of harmonious cooperation between the commander and automation, a rational distribution of functions between them. Unfortunately, as was indicated at the review of the exercise, certain officers, not knowing how to optimally operate computer technology, preserve old methods of work. In our age of quickly changing circumstances in the course of battle, this will lead to a delay in the preparation of data for the use of weapons. The complexity of today's technology and the need for spacial conceptions of the real circumstances of battle become for some commanders a sort of psychological barrier." COPYRIGHT: "Morskoy sbornik", 1987.

**First Deputy Chief for Training Comments**  
18010220b Moscow *MORSKOY SBORNIK* in Russian  
No 10, Oct 87 p 34

["Commentary by Vice Admiral V. Zub, First Deputy Chief for Combat Training of the Navy"]

[Text] First of all I would like to say that the presence at the exercise of the Commander in Chief of the Navy lent a special significance to the event. His direction, recommendations, remarks, and advice both during the course of the exercise and at the review session were a genuine school for the commanders and staff officers of all ranks.

I got to see all of the main stages of the exercise. All the omissions and shortcomings of the various commanders were well known to us. Although they had no effect on the general results, to ignore such "trivialities" especially today when the party demands the most critical approach to the evaluation of one's work is impermissible. In our opinion, an analysis of the mistakes forces us to examine certain truths which we thought were long known, in a more persistent fashion. It forces us to compare each action with the demands of a real battle.

Take for example preparation for the exercise. In fact, at times it is surrounded by so much noisy "busyness" that willy-nilly the question arises: what is the ship preparing for, an exercise or...a parade?

An exercise which is carefully prepared and conducted in complex and dynamic circumstances will become a genuine school of professional awakening for commanders, staffs and all participants. The entire complex of military training problems is responsible for developing among the officers flexible, tactical thinking, courage and initiative in the choice of the most effective means of destroying a strong, clever, and treacherous, technically equipped opponent.

Staff officers solve complex problems of planning and organizing combat operations and of ensuring continuous direction of the forces. They must be able to prepare for the commander, in the shortest amount of time, all of the necessary proposals and documents for the direction of combat. They must be able to regulate the continuous flow of information regarding the enemy and his forces and guarantee the dependable functioning of the lines of communication in the quickly changing circumstances. All of this demands from staff officers drive, preservation of staff culture in their work, precision, organization and self discipline and the knowledgeable use of modern means of the automation of command. At the exercise which comrade N. Gavrilenko is describing the following command staff officers fully demonstrated these qualities: captains first rank V. Aleksin, V. Vazhimov, and I. Kulinich, Colonel L. Dzyuba, Captain 2nd Rank V. Kurienko, Lieutenant Colonel V. Gol'tsev, and others. They provided a worthy example to their subordinates at all levels, especially in the heat of battle. Unfortunately, sometimes in the tactical exercises the staff demonstrated this activity only until the commander's decision was worked out in the battle. From the very beginning the drive and consequently, the effectiveness of the staff work at times dropped off significantly.

I would also like to say a few words about the umpires. Their task, to ensure instruction, to guard against conventionality and oversimplification, and to help the commanders of the ships and subdivisions to teach their own staffs what is absolutely necessary in war. This is exactly how Rear Admiral E. Skvortsov, and captains 1st rank A. Zaporozhchenko and V. Chernykh understood their roles. Each of them has under his belt solid naval service experience, rewarded with high state honors. Their direction, advice, and observations were received unquestioningly, which helped to create an atmosphere of good will and mutual understanding between the officers and the staff. It is this which in spite of the individual omissions on certain ships, allowed the successful fulfillment of all of the assigned tasks. COPY-RIGHT: "Morskoy sbornik", 1987.

**Missile TEL's Being Converted to Civilian Cranes**

18010309 [Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1530 GMT on 17 March 1988 broadcast a video report of new cranes being produced at the "Imeni Yanvarского Vosstaniya" Production Association in

Odessa. The cranes incorporate the chassis used for missiles now being withdrawn from Europe. The broadcast shows the undercarriages with cranes mounted on top.

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**Lt Gen N. Bondarchuk Interview on Lessons From Chernobyl**

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[Interview by V. Mironov with Lt Gen N. Bondarchuk, chief of staff of the Ukrainian Civil Defense: "Strict Accounting"; the first three italicized paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text] *Chernobyl...in the hearts of the Soviet people this word still rings an alarm. A 30-km zone of pain and grief is marked by a black spot on the motherland's map. It was a serious testing for the efficiency of the party, soviet and economic bodies under extreme conditions and provided an uncompromising testing of the CD [Civil Defense] staffs, services and formations.*

What conclusions have been drawn by the CD workers from this bitter experience? How do they view their activities under such conditions and their readiness for a severe testing?

The Chief of Staff of the Ukrainian CD, Lt Gen N. Bondarchuk, answers these and other questions posed by our correspondent V. Mironov.

[Question] Nikolay Stepanovich [Bondarchuk] the recently concluded court trial for the main persons guilty of the accident at the Chernobyl AES [nuclear power plant] became a major lesson and a severe warning against negligence, lack of discipline and an irresponsible attitude toward the performing of official duties, in essence, at any post. A lack of reciprocal exactingness, the court pointed out, and a lack of principles led to a situation where among the leadership of the AES and a portion of the specialists, an atmosphere of permissiveness, indifference and laxness prevailed. All of this contributed to the rise and development of the emergency situation and caused the bad and indecisive actions by the personnel under emergency conditions. What role, in your view, was played here by the CD chief at the AES, V. Bryukhanov?

[Answer] Having learned of what had happened, the AES director should have immediately taken measures to contain the disaster and put into effect the plan for protecting the personnel and the public against radioactive irradiation. But the CD chief lost his head, he showed indecisiveness and did not issue orders for the centralized alerting of the plant's officials. The AES leadership had no desire to verify what had occurred and in the hope that possibly everything would get by, was criminally slow. In fearing to admit the scope of what had happened, they committed their next crime and refrained from providing any information outside the plant and in the reports to superior bodies intentionally downplayed the data on the radiation levels. For this reason the start of the evacuation of personnel from the danger zone was somewhat delayed.

In the event of an emergency at the AES, the duty officer had a magnetic tape with a recording of an announcement to the public on the rules of conduct and protective measures. It should have been immediately broadcast. But, alas, this was not done.

[Question] How did the republic CD staff view its actions?

[Answer] At first glance, we were in the clear. We warned whom we should, we pointed out and demanded. But such a style of work did not stand the test. We should have given more attention not to directive work but to organizational and worked strictly for the fulfillment of the requirements of the documents as well as our own recommendations and advice. Why were the leaders of the AES and a number of the CD bodies of various levels unprepared both psychologically and practically to act under emergency conditions and did not have firm skills in carrying out the protective measures? In answering the given question, we should assume a portion of the blame for this as we did not work with sufficient effectiveness.

The reason for the emergency at the plant has been cited in the interposing of a significant number of improbable deviations in its work. The reason for the indecisive and incorrect actions by the officials also lies in the piling up of anomalies, and now in the activities of the CD bodies and these were not improbable but completely specific. These were: the training of the CD leadership with a concession to its official authority and business and indulgences, as well as the simplified formal working through of many practical questions and the timid, unpersuasive reports to the leadership on urgent problems. In summing up, it can be said that certain workers both from our staff as well as, I think, from others, in hoping that the problem would pass them by, showed indifference and even laxness. Of course, there were training procedural assemblies, drills and exercises. But often merely for the sake of dressed-up reports forwarded to us. And we accepted this sham.

The CD courses were also faulty. Thorough knowledge was not provided for all the questions and did not help develop firm practical skills in the students. There were instances when officials under various pretexts did not report to the exercises. These instances were not publicized. Nor were they assessed properly by the immediate leaders. Hence the inability of individual CD officials and chiefs to quickly and completely assess the situation, take intelligent decisions and confidently control their subordinate.

[Question] The emergency was a severe testing for the training of the paramilitary formations with their unjustified slowness and unsteady actions. Nor was the public prepared for such a trial. Obviously here, too, we can see symptoms of the same disease which you mentioned.

[Answer] Precisely so. The inability of the fighters in the formations to carry out the set task at times was influenced by the fact that the exercises for them were predominantly theoretical, without trips to the training centers and compounds. Only there is it possible to create a situation close to the real and develop the required skills in the men. In visiting in the field, the staff workers repeatedly pointed to the shortcomings in the training of the CD forces but the elimination of these, as a rule, was farmed out to subordinates and in the rush time was rarely found for repeat inspections.

It must be admitted at present that in a number of towns and villages the propagandizing of CD had been neglected and training for the public was carried out poorly. This led to a situation where the people did not know the rules of conduct under the conditions of radioactive fallout, the procedures in evacuation, the methods of antiradiation protection, the safekeeping of water and food products.

[Question] Complaints have been repeatedly voiced about the equipping of the formations....

[Answer] This is certainly an objective difficulty. But if the staffs had shown more initiative and tenacity, there would have been noticeably fewer complaints. For example, take radiation reconnaissance. As a whole, the involved forces carried out their task. Here we are not trying to conceal behind the safe outcome the errors, problems and difficulties which preceded it. If we are to be completely frank, it must be said that reconnaissance and the assessing of the situation—and everything should have started with this once the news came of the emergency—were at first forgotten by many, including the firemen, the police and even some leaders of the radiation safety service and the radiation reconnaissance teams at the AES. As a result, on the territory of the AES and outside it, radiation reconnaissance was organized only with the arrival of the CD units in the disaster area.

In the first hours of the emergency, it was clear that the scouts needed highly sensitive instruments, they did not have communications equipment and were not supplied with transport. There was even a lack of ordinary instruments and there was no power for them. If these were available, it turned out that the dosimetric scouts had poor practical skills in handling the instruments. And to be perfectly honest, far from every worker of the CD staff, including the republic, could operate a DP-5 or knew what was a roentgen, a rad, a bar, and what were the tolerable radiation doses.

Generally speaking, many lacked competence. At times, we simply do not have the moral right to blame the workers and their leaders for this, as there were instances when even experienced workers from the CD staffs were not an example of high professionalism.

[Question] The work of eliminating the consequences of the disaster provided a practical opportunity to test the feasibility of the protective measures. Did everything pass this test?

[Answer] Of course, it is impossible to forecast everything precisely, down to the last detail. The actual situation always makes corrections even in the best plans. However, many of the problems posed by life could have been foreseen and understood. As much as we clarified and adjusted evacuation plans, very many questions remained overlooked. If one were to speak briefly and most generally, in wartime the plan is to evacuate people from the cities into the countryside. This is mere routine and a stereotype and the authors of the previous plan were held captive by it. Attention was not paid to the essential difference in evacuating the public from areas having nuclear power plants and chemically dangerous installations (in the event of their destruction). They did not consider that the rise of extensive zones of contamination could necessitate the evacuation of the rural inhabitants. The CD plans which were worked out did not clearly reflect the questions of determining the dispersion areas, supporting the evacuation, safeguarding the housing abandoned by the residents as well as the personal property of the citizens or providing transport to evacuate livestock. They had to quickly seek a solution. Special teams were organized and these sacrificed and buried animals and poultry left on contaminated territory.

Of course, the new plan was not ideal. The hurry could be felt. The evacuation was to be along territorial lines and transport would be provided right to the house. This would supposedly shorten the time. But in this manner the specialists of the AES as well as from other facilities would be scattered, as they say, all over the place. This would complicate the work at the plant. The medical support plans were more realistic although there were oversights: they did not consider the particular features of the radiation situation in an emergency at an AES, the organizational forms for medical aid to the public were not completely thought out, and there was no provision for iodine prophylaxis and antiradiation agents.

The local inhabitant did not make cotton-gauze bandages and were not trained in this. Nor were there enough shelters.

[Question] In summing up what has been said, Nikolay Stepanovich, could it be concluded that there would have been fewer problems and difficulties if the CD bodies had been better prepared to carry out the suddenly arising tasks? Such a bitter lesson as Chernobyl should not occur in vain. But will a partial assessing of one's blame and an honest, self-critical view by the collective of its mistakes and shortcomings be a guarantee that the move to positive changes is irreversible?

[Answer] Possibly this conclusion, at first glance, is too simple. After the emergency we have rethought a great deal. Much has already been done. But, as they say, there is still much to be done. We are perfectly aware that the elimination of the shortcomings requires a fundamental change in old habits and the mastery of an advanced style of activity. This is the main condition for increasing the readiness of republic Civil Defense.

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**Col Gen Bezotosov: Defensive Doctrine—Four Priorities for Civil Defense**  
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[Article by Col Gen A. Bezotosov, Chief of Staff of USSR Civil Defense, under the rubric "Civil Defense": "Soviet Military Doctrine and Urgent Civil Defense Problems"]

[Text] Soviet military doctrine is based on the unshakable foundation of Lenin's teachings on the defense of the socialist homeland and is exclusively defensive. In addition, the program for the organizational development of the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact nations is based on the principle of defense adequacy. In other words, the quantity and quality of the weapons are strictly commensurate with the level of the military threat and with the nature and intensity of imperialism's military preparations. They are limited to what is essential to ensure the security of the socialist nations and the decisive rebuffing of aggressors.

The allied socialist states have announced to the entire world that they will never under any circumstances be the first to begin military operations against any state or alliance of states whatsoever unless they themselves are the target of an armed attack and that they will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. Ruling circles of the USA and NATO do not reject the possibility of being the first to use nuclear weapons, however, or of increasing the arms race in an attempt to achieve military superiority.

Taking this into account, the CPSU is making every effort to see that our defense capability is at a level which rules out strategic superiority for the forces of imperialism and is capable of reliably protecting the peaceful labor and the peaceful life of the people.

V.I. Lenin's words to the effect that wars are now conducted by peoples, by the entire nation, are valid in the contemporary situation as never before. It is therefore essential to properly prepare not just the Armed Forces but the entire economy, as well as the population and the nation's territory. Lack of preparedness on the part of any of these components can seriously affect the state's defense capability.

This has been confirmed also by peacetime experience. The struggle with natural disasters and large industrial accidents, including the accident at the Chernobyl AES, is forcing us to assess anew the importance and the necessity of civil defense measures. It should be pointed out that this kind of assessment is not being made in our nation alone. The attitude toward civil defense in the USA has changed drastically during the past 2 years. A 7-year program has been worked out for its development at a cost of 4.2 billion dollars, as well as evacuation plans. The U.S. has begun building shelters at enterprises, primarily those of the military-industrial complex.

Do we have the right to fall behind our likely enemies, thereby giving them the advantage? No, of course not. This is why the role and the importance of USSR Civil Defense are increasing drastically. In a future war, should the imperialists succeed in unleashing one, the employment of modern weapons would entail enormous losses of the population and the formation of considerable areas of contamination, destruction, catastrophic flooding and massive fires. In addition, secondary areas of contamination would probably occur in cities with a chemical danger and at national economic facilities which use powerful toxic substances in their production processes. Any city or facility could be subjected to an enemy strike. And we should not close our eyes to the fact that the aggressor's actions would be primarily on a global scale. This means that we must have effective measures to protect our population throughout the nation's territory, particularly at large administrative and political centers and industrial areas.

It is absolutely clear, however, that the situation will not be the same everywhere. We need to take a realistic approach for determining the expediency of specific civil defense measures based on an in-depth and thorough assessment of the enemy's capabilities and taking into account the economic and defensive importance of areas, cities and national economic facilities. It is not difficult to imagine that the threat of destruction will be greater for large cities than for medium-sized and small ones or rural populated areas. It is therefore essential to differentiate with respect both to the scale and the time required for taking protective steps and to the methods to be used. They must be reliable and diversified, particularly in those cities and at those national economic facilities which are most likely to be threatened by an enemy attack. For the others the main danger will be from radioactive contamination and from the use of chemical and biological weapons. And so, it is most important to have protection against these.

We can see that modern warfare is making it necessary to universally implement a system of protective measures. We cannot seriously count on achieving significant success in protecting the population and the national economy, for example, by focusing entirely on the period immediately preceding an enemy attack. It could be unexpected. Only the advance and systematic implementation of the basic range of civil defense measures and



the establishment of proper reserves of group and individual protective equipment will make it possible to accomplish these tasks with adequate effectiveness.

It would be appropriate to recall the words of M.V. Frunze, who stated back in the mid-'20s that "in any new undertaking—economic, cultural or other—one should always ask how the results of the given undertaking will coincide with the need to protect the nation. Would it not be possible, without detriment to peacetime needs, to do things so that certain military objectives could also be achieved"? It is particularly important to formulate the matter this way today, when protective measures are assuming enormous scope. They can be successfully carried out and need to be carried out not in isolation but in close union with the fulfillment of national economic plans. It is primarily the state control agencies which have the crucial role in organizing and implementing them.

In accordance with existing practices, civil defense calls for an all-around system of measures, the totality of which provides a certain guarantee that the population will be protected and the viability of the economy ensured in time of war. They can hypothetically be reduced to four groups corresponding to the substance of the main civil defense missions.

The first group includes measures having to do with the immediate protection of the population against modern weapons: the construction of shelters and covers, the provision of personal protective equipment and evacuation to safe zones. People are the most valuable thing for our socialist state, and the preservation of their lives is the most important objective of our military doctrine and the most humane mission of USSR Civil Defense. Success in accomplishing all of the other missions, those pertaining both to civil defense and to protection of the homeland in general, depends upon its successful accomplishment.

The next group is made up of measures to enhance the functional stability of the economy, which will make it possible to reduce possible damage to the national economy from the enemy's employment of modern weapons and to satisfy the needs of the Armed Forces and the population more fully. This calls for the timely dispersal of the nation's production forces, the organization of a smooth conversion of national economic sectors and facilities to a wartime footing and backup production of the most important products. Protecting production personnel, technical documents, unique equipment, raw materials and finished products and providing for the uninterrupted operation of transport, communications and power engineering also belong in this group. A number of other tasks will also unquestionably arise, which will have to be performed competently under difficult conditions, primarily by the planning agencies, ministries, departments and chiefs of civil defense for national economic facilities themselves.

The third group includes steps to prepare the personnel and equipment to mop up after an enemy attack and to perform rescue and emergency restoration work at sites of destruction, in areas of catastrophic flooding, during natural disasters and large accidents. Civil defense forces reconnoiter sites of destruction, find victims and give them emergency aid, combat fires, localize and mop up after accidents at facilities, in municipal communications and power engineering systems, and decontaminate grounds, buildings, equipment, footwear and other clothing, food and water supplies.

Finally, a fourth group includes the overseeing of protective measures. The work of the civil defense chiefs and control agencies must focus on preparations for and the prompt and complete implementation of measures to protect the population and the national economy, on the successful performance of rescue work and, depending upon the situation, on the shifting of personnel to the most seriously threatened or dangerous areas.

In order to successfully accomplish these tasks while military operations are under way, it is necessary to prepare the personnel and equipment and to organize their skillful use in advance. We should also establish strict responsibility for all of the territorial and branch control agencies for the implementation of the civil defense measures and work out scientifically based recommendations for improving forms and methods of control, communication and warning. In the contemporary situation, in which the enemy's capabilities for making a surprise attack on cities and national economic facilities have grown immeasurably, a reliable and timely warning system is the very foundation of effectiveness for the nation's entire Civil Defense. I believe that the extensive adoption of automatic control systems in civil defense will also help to solve the problem.

Civil defense is developed on the basis of the conclusions and recommendations of military science and the summarization and creative application of the combat experience of the Armed Forces, MPVO [local air defense], state and management control agencies. Thorough elaboration of the theoretical and practical principles for preparing for and implementing it in modern warfare will unquestionably contribute to the successful implementation of the protective measures.

Postwar experience has confirmed the conclusion that successful civil defense operations today are inconceivable without active participation by the population and without the leadership and assistance of military agencies. It receives daily attention from the leadership of the USSR Ministry of Defense, the district and fleet military councils, the commanders, the political organs and staffs. Close cooperation between the USSR Armed Forces and Civil Defense has become a solid tradition. It could not be otherwise, since in a war the Armed Forces will not only repel the enemy's attack but also provide all-around assistance in the implementation of civil defense measures.

We should not forget that civil defense performs important tasks, practicing its functions in extreme peacetime situations. Accidents at nuclear power plants, on the railroad and at enterprises which use SDYaV [extremely toxic substances], and natural disasters result not only in material losses but also in losses of human life. A study of their effects has shown that the leaders of many soviet and management agencies charged with organizing civil defense have not fully acknowledged their personal responsibility for the status and readiness of civil defense in their assigned sections, that they demonstrate complacency, lack of concern and discipline, and underestimate the degree of danger. We have still not eliminated significant shortcomings in the training of and the outfitting of non-military formations, and too little is being done to prepare the population in the practical steps to be taken in emergencies.

Experience has also shown that we need to intensify the development in the formation members and in the entire population of those good moral-political and psychological qualities so essential for steadfastly and courageously withstanding the hardships and deprivations which can arise not just in wartime but also during natural disasters and large accidents in peacetime.

The civil defense system must be constantly prepared to protect people and ensure their safety in any emergency situation. And everyone must take an active part in civil defense measures in order for it to truly be this way, to be truly possible. Party, soviet, trade union and Komsomol organizations and the labor collectives must therefore focus on seeing to it that every Soviet citizen is clearly aware of his responsibility for the fate of the homeland and is prepared to protect both it and himself.

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### **Col Gen Ryakhov Sharply Critical of Leadership Training**

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[Article, published under the heading "Civil Defense: The Restructuring depends Upon Each of Us," by Col Gen A. Ryakhov, deputy chief of USSR Civil Defense: "To Set To Work"; the first italicized paragraph is an editorial comment]

[Text] *During the year of the 70th anniversary of Great October, intense work has continued in all elements of Civil Defense and aimed at carrying out the tasks stemming from the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the subsequent plenums of the CPSU Central Committee in the area of strengthening the nation's defense capability. The most characteristic attributes of last year were a further activation of restructuring in the training system and concern for improving the quality of preparing the public to defend themselves against modern weapons.*

In analyzing the results, it can be said with certainty that there are definite advances. This can be seen from the energetic actions of the formations and the population to eliminate the consequences of the flooding and avalanches in the Transcaucasian republics, in combating snow drifting in a number of the Ukrainian oblasts and forest fires in Krasnoyarsk Kray and Amur Oblast.

Many leaders, in conducting the exercises, boldly combine CD [Civil Defense] measures with the carrying out of national economic tasks. For example, on the Reshayushchiy Sovkhoz in Borovichskiy Rayon of Novgorod Oblast, in the course of the exercises they made the livestock farms and water supply sources airtight, they prepared feed and built antiradiation shelters of the "hut" type.

High readiness for action under difficult conditions has been demonstrated by the collective of the Apviya Plant (Kaunas). A thoughtful and responsible attitude to the questions of protecting the personnel and production has been shown at the Borovichpolimer mash Plant (Novgorod Oblast), the Pishmash Production Association (Kirovograd), the slaughterhouse (Ulan-Ude), at the Leningrad State Cultural Institute imeni N.K. Krupskaya, the Leningrad Construction Engineer Institute, the Moscow Cooperative Technica School and the Tallinn Secondary School No. 536.

But, in judging the training for CD as a whole, it must be recognized that as yet there still has been no fundamental change and there still are a number of bottlenecks and unsettled questions. One can feel the inertia of many leaders and production commanders, their incompetence and low sense of responsibility in performing functional duties, a misunderstanding of the importance of the early and effective preparation of the facilities and the personnel for defense against weapons of mass destruction, the consequences of natural disasters and production emergencies. There still are instances when the CD chiefs and the main specialists do not conduct exercises with their subordinates, they shift this to minor officials and do not study themselves.

Thus, in Irkutsk Oblast, just in January and March of this year, some 150 leaders refused to train in the courses. And it is precisely these "refusers," as practice confirms, who have poorly organized the training of the CD forces, the workers and white collar personnel. At the Tushinskiy Reinforced Concrete Parts Plant (Moscow), where V. Mitin is director and CD chief, training for the leadership is conducted sporadically and on a low level. As a result the CD readiness of all the collective is poor.

An analogous situation can be observed at the Severobaykalsk Station in the Buryat ASSR (CD chief, S. Shatokhin), and at the Put Ilich Kolkhoz in Irkutsk Oblast (CD chief, A. Ment). The command and leadership of these facilities know their functional duties poorly, they are unable to organize the carrying out of

practical measures with the subordinate formations and are unable to carry out even elementary calculations to ensure the CD measures in the course of exercises.

Irregularity of the exercises and drills is probably the main shortcoming in the training of the formations. Often the commanders, in undergoing training in the CD courses, do not instruct their subordinates. The exercises, if they are conducted, are of a theoretical nature, without considering the special features of production. The lack of practical exercises leads to a situation where the personnel is unable to erect even the simplest protective structures and provide self-help and mutual aid such as the fiberglass plant, the Elkon Production Association (Novgorod) or the Kommunaras Plant (Vilnius) or use the individual medical protection equipment.

There are no plans for making the formations ready at the Medpribor (Moscow) and Azot (Novgorod) Production Associations. Hence they have not even thought about this.

Formal instruction of the employees and kolkhoz members at a number of places leads to a situation where they do not even have the minimum knowledge and necessary skills. The employees of even such large enterprises as the Leningrad Izhorskiy Plant, the Production Association imeni Zhdanov, the Nevskiy Plant and the Production Association imeni Lenin, are unable to use the individual protective equipment. At the Moscow installations such as the pharmaceutical factory and the Repair-Construction Administration No. 1, training has not even been planned for the employees.

Unfortunately, also on a low level has been the instruction of the public not engaged in the production and service spheres. The situation must be fundamentally changed and there must be firm knowledge on the part of each individual of the procedure for receiving the CD warning signals and the actions under them, the locations of shelters, the protective equipment issuing points and the evacuation assembly points. It would also be advisable to recommend the organizing of independent study of the aids and various instructions by the public and have regular listening (viewing) of radio and TV broadcasts on CD. The employees of the housing operation bodies should be concerned so that the people could obtain the necessary consultations at their residents and view special-subject films.

Life urgently demands a decisive rise in the quality of CD instruction. The point of the restructuring is precisely this as it assumes a search for the most effective ways and methods for carrying out the set tasks. Everyone who is responsible for training should realize that the restructuring involves not individual questions of instruction but rather the entire sphere of activity. In breaking the existing stereotype of thought, it is essential to work out a new, more responsible approach to the question. All of us together and each individual, as the party demands, should set to work.

An increased training level of the paramilitary formations and the population to act confidently in eliminating the consequences of natural disasters, emergencies and catastrophes as well as in the event of an enemy attack is the main concern of the CD bodies. The successful carrying out of this task depends largely upon the stance of the chiefs of the CD staffs, the courses and services and they should work implacably against manifestations of formalism, complacency, deceit, eradicate various weaknesses and simplifications in training and create conditions for the complete and high quality carrying out of the training plans.

Planning is the organizing principle for the entire training process. And this means not merely measures but rather the results expected from them and the means for achieving them. Precisely such a focus should run as a constant theme through all the work of the leadership, the staffs and the courses which are the direct organizers of instruction.

Particular attention must be given to improving the quality of the comprehensive exercises and site drills which are the main form of CD training for the labor collectives as a whole. Their leaders must show greater creativity in establishing a complicated tactical background and should conduct measures so that the trainees feel both the tenseness of the situation as well as the need to show initiative and resourcefulness. In defining the subjects of the exercises and drills, without fail it is essential to provide for the working through of such questions as warning, the conducting of reconnaissance, dosimetric monitoring, the defense against radioactive fallout, decontamination of the territory, buildings and equipment, medical processing, and evacuation from possible disaster areas. And this must be done not abstractly, but rather with careful consideration of local conditions and production features. We can see this from the severe consequences arising from the disaster at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant.

Beginning with the new year, the site drills will be conducted by the same schedule as the integrated exercises. This will make it possible for the workers of the CD staffs and courses not only to provide more effective aid to the leaders of the facilities, but also improve the quality of the training questions being worked out and keep the execution of the designated measures under unflinching supervision.

In the general education schools and secondary schools, the site drills will be held annually on the CD days. There is no need to emphasize that the leading role in establishing an atmosphere of high responsibility will be played by the administration, the formation commanders and the immediate organizers of the training. For this reason, in training them, it is essential to focus attention on the ability to correctly assess the existing situation, to promptly take sound decisions and provide clear instructions.



An essential feature in training the leadership at the facilities during the new training year is the granting of greater independence to them in choosing the training subjects. This will make it possible to avoid duplication in the course training program, make more rational use of training time, and give basic attention to studying precisely those questions which reflect the specific features of the given type of production and local conditions. In line with this the senior CD chiefs and staffs which organize the training for the leadership and command personnel should select the forms and methods of training which would fully conform to present-day requirements.

Among the numerous professional qualities essential for each production commander, competence and procedural skills are indispensable. There is the general truth that in order to teach something to others it is essential to have a good knowledge of the question. For this reason the tried method of pedagogics "do as I do" has not only not lost its role in the training of the personnel but has assumed even greater importance and both as an example set by the commander and a factor for visibility in training. It is the duty and matter of honor for each formation commander to have a perfect mastery of the instruments and equipment and be able to perform any procedure or standard in an exemplary manner.

Practice and yet again practice, be this exercises or special tactical training, this is the basis for training the men of the formations. Here special attention must be given to those questions which increase the readiness of the formations to carry out unexpectedly arising tasks in peacetime and for coordinated actions in eliminating the consequences of natural disasters which are most probable for the given area. Precisely for these purposes the CD chiefs have been given the right, proceeding from the production features and the degree of mastering previously studied questions, to determine independently the theme of the exercises for the personnel of the formations within the limits of 5 hours of the total amount of training time. Every effort must be made so that the training of the formations is carried out in a situation which would exclude any elements of disorganization or the irrational use of training time and materiel.

To constantly study what is required under the difficult conditions of wartime or peacetime in carrying out rescue and emergency reconstruction work (SNAVR) this is the demand of today. One of the indicators for the successful execution of the training tasks would be to shorten the time required to bring the formations, regulation equipment and supplies to a state of readiness. Here an important support would be the organizing of a competition or the early fulfillment of the standards.

To give the training a dynamicness and true pressure means to ensure the achieving of a higher level of preparation for the leaders, the commanders and the formations as a whole. Here an important role is given to the CD courses. The new, higher demands on the level

and quality of training for the students dictate the necessity of strengthening the pace of restructuring and correctly placing the accents in the training and indoctrination. Certainly, the quality of this work largely determines the actual benefit for the students carrying out the acquired knowledge and skills. Naturally, this increases the demands placed on the professional qualities of the instructors and the vocational training leaders. To be constantly up on events, to master the most recent achievements in the theory and practice of Civil Defense and to widely use the experience existing in the republic, kray, oblast or rayon in directing the CD measures in eliminating the consequences of natural disasters or production emergencies—this is the duty of each of them. One must decisively put an end to formalism in educational procedures, actively search for new, more effective forms of instruction, more widely introduce group exercises and professional games, in every possible way support the process of saturating the training classrooms with teaching equipment and skillfully employ these. We must more boldly invite workers from the local party and soviet bodies and the leading national economic specialists to conduct exercises in the courses.

A creative search and professional approach to carrying out the requirements of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers in the restructuring of higher and specialized secondary education in the nation will help to improve the training of the student youth in the CD area. We must prevent instances which were encountered in the Kiev State Cultural Institute imeni A.Ye. Korneychuk. Here training and procedural work in the CD area was neglected and a significant portion of the students showed unsatisfactory knowledge and poor skills.

A new CD program is to be introduced for the students in the senior grades of general education schools and vocational-technical schools in the areas which have or in the spring of 1988 will have defense sports health camps for the youth. A particular feature of it will be that the instruction of it will be linked to the CD measures carried out at the base, sponsoring facility so that the students in practice will perform the standards of defense against modern weapons.

The restructuring in instruction, in being aimed at accelerating and improving its quality, is inseparably linked to a further improvement in the training equipment, the providing of modern facilities and their able use. This should contribute in a maximum degree to the practical focus of instruction with an eye to local conditions. In working out the annual and long-range plans for establishing such facilities, the CD staffs and courses and the facilities must ensure their fulfillment. The review competitions being organized in the rayons (cities) for the best training facilities of the installations can help solve this problem.

The propagandizing of CD must be viewed through the prism of improving the quality of instruction for the population. It will become much more effective if consideration is given to the local conditions and production

features. Wider use must be made of the possibilities of the mass information media, the cultural facilities and films.

The task of restructuring and accelerating in CD training is a complicated but feasible one. For this each of us should set to work and realize clearly that the achieving of qualitatively new, practical results at present is impossible without a creative search, without an all-out effort, without resourcefulness and professionalism.

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**Role of Chemical Industry in Civil Defense**  
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[Article by Lt Gen M. Maksimov under the rubric "For Those Who Perform the Training": "One of Chemistry's 'Jobs'"]

[Text] Our nation has a highly developed chemical industry, which produces practically all of the different chemical products known. It has become one of the leading and most dynamic sectors of the Soviet economy and an extremely important factor in technical progress and the intensification of public production. The nation's further "chemicalization" will contribute to a considerable improvement of the people's welfare and to the enhancement of our homeland's defense capability.

What is chemistry's place with respect to civil defense tasks?

It provides civil defense with all of the basic means of protection against nuclear, chemical, biological and incendiary weapons.

Large panels, modules and finished assemblies of concrete and reinforced concrete, items made of fiberboard, plastic, industrial glass and so forth, for example, are extensively used in the construction of protective facilities. Experience has shown that an average of 3-4 tons of construction materials are used for each square meter of protective space, and the chemists are therefore faced with the task of developing new and lighter structures. Within the next few years it is planned to considerably increase the output of cement, ordinary and hollow brick, and ceramic items, as well as modules and panels made of porous and slag concrete, fibrolite, gas-ash-silicate and other light-weight materials.

Foam-glass modules, for example, not only last longer than brick but are 10 times lighter. This material has good insulating qualities, absorbs sound well, does not rot and can be worked by machine.

One plant in Poland has come up with an extremely interesting item, construction panels of...water. Water is forced between two glass walls fastened together with rubber. The panels are transparent, permit light to pass through easily and have a simple heating system. The temperature is regulated by means of a small thermostat.

Synthetic materials are extensively used in the construction of rapidly erected protective structures. A model of a self-erecting structure of cloth impregnated with a special resin has been demonstrated in the U.S. It is delivered to the installation site as a kit, where it is filled with air and assumes the required shape. A gas which is then emitted has a catalytic effect on the resin, and it becomes solid and strong in 2 hours.

The specialists are familiar with a miracle fabric: an extremely thin layer of aluminum not exceeding a few millimicrons is sprayed onto lavsan, capron or synthetic silk. The invisible film reflects infrared rays and provides reliable protection from heat and cold.

In addition, a nonflammable fabric which retains its fire-resistant qualities even after multiple washings has been produced. It has a base of polyvinyl alcohol treated with phosphorous compounds. It becomes incandescent but does not melt at a temperature of 1,200 degrees C.

The use of synthetic materials will make it possible in the future to create a so-called anti-nuclear suit, which will weaken light and radioactive radiation to some degree.

Relatively recently a dust-repelling paint was produced, which retains electric charges. Not a single speck of dust will adhere to a surface covered with this paint. This apparently applies also to aerosols of toxic substances.

Surface-active substances (PAV) are now widely used as radioactive and CW decontamination, disinfecting and fire-extinguishing powders and solutions. Modern surface-active substances are the basis of formulas for liquid and powder detergents. They make it possible to decontaminate surfaces with the solution at a low temperature (25-30 degrees C.). Surface-active substances are fairly good fire-extinguishing and foaming Agents. A polyethylene fire-extinguishing solution extinguishes a fire 25 times as rapidly as water, for example.

The most commonly used surface-active substance is sulfanole (NP-1). It is an extremely harsh detergent, however, and is difficult to neutralize in units for purifying waste water. New and milder surface-active substances are now being synthesized. They are easily broken down by the action of microorganisms and they clean well. The production of sulfanate (a mixture of sulphonated hydrocarbons), a detergent, has now been started in the USSR.

Meters and indicators which also employ various chemical processes (measurement of light in a specific medium, and others) are used for detecting and measuring radioactive radiation and for detecting chemical and bacterial contamination.

A production process not involving people is the technology of the future. A chemical reactor, for example, for working raw materials can be set up underground, which produces areas of pulverized material with a nuclear blast. The necessary reactants can be fed to the underground apparatus and salt solutions, combustible gases and so forth, can be removed through drill holes. In the future it will be possible to extract non-ferrous metals in this way.

Scientists at the Earth Physics Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences recommend building underground storage facilities for gas and oil under salt domes. A nuclear charge equal to 25 kilotons of TNT can be exploded at a depth of 600 meters, creating a sphere 70 meters in diameter and with a capacity of 160,000 cubic meters in a salt stratum. Calculations show that underground storage facilities created by means of a nuclear blast would be 6 times cheaper than surface tanks for liquified gas.

Civil defense organizes and conducts rescue and emergency restoration work at sites of destruction in the case of enemy attacks, natural disasters, industrial accidents and catastrophes. The civil defense medical service has a large role in the implementation of the measures. It too is provided with all the necessary medicines and supplies mainly by the chemical industry.

It presently produces more than 3,000 items just from polymeric substances. Macromolecular compounds are used for producing prostheses, adhesive tape which replaces sutures in operations, and protective SBV-M tape, which holds up for 7-8 days and makes it possible to monitor the healing of sutures. Synthetic glues are used for fractures and for closing breaks in blood vessels. BF-6 glue, for example, is used instead of bandages to protect small cuts from infection.

Antidotes to toxic substances and antiradiation preparations have been developed, which make the organism considerably more resistant to affection. When Novocain, insulin and penicillin are dissolved in polyvinylpyrrolidone (PVP), for example, the effect of these medicines is prolonged considerably: from 3-4 hours to several days in the case of Novocain, for example.

The chemical industry provides medical workers also with all types of bandaging materials: gauze made of specially treated cellulose stops bleeding; a fabric made of synthetic fibers does not stick to the surface of a wound, absorbs medicine well and does not lose these properties when sterilized in an autoclave; and a bandage impregnated with silver salts has a healing effect on wounds. A special, inflatable pack is used in the case of

fractures, which protects the wound site well. Medicines like Aminazin are used for relieving panic in people at sites of destruction or in large protective facilities. All of these new things will make it considerably easier to perform rescue work at sites of destruction and will help to save many lives.

Protecting plants, the harvest, the soil and so forth, from nuclear and biological weapons is one of the numerous duties of the chemical industry which serves civil defense.

In the case of global radioactive contamination the main source of radiation danger would be the soil, which would contain long-lived radioactive isotopes (strontium 90 and cesium 137). Agrochemical measures are extensively used for reducing their buildup in crops. The liming of the soil makes it possible to reduce the strontium 90 content in the plants 2- to 5-fold, for example. The movement of strontium 90 from the soil into plants can even be reduced by applying organic (peat and humus) and mineral fertilizers.

Nitrogen fertilizer should be used in amounts which produce the largest increases in yield under the specific soil and climatic conditions, for example, while phosphorous and potassium fertilizers should be applied in amounts somewhat exceeding the needs of the plants. In this case the nutrients can become a factor reducing the level of contamination of the crop. Potassium fertilizer retards the buildup of cesium 137 in the crop both from the soil into the plants and through the leaves. The application of specific amounts of fertilizer can reduce the content of strontium 90 5- to 10-fold; cesium 137 3- to 10-fold.

Increasing the yield also makes it possible to reduce the degree of contamination of the crop with radioactive products of fission (the content of strontium per unit of weight is diluted, as it were).

It is calculated that almost one fifth of the entire world agricultural output is destroyed annually by various plant pests and diseases. In addition to this, there are 500 million weed seeds with a germination life of up to 10-13 years in each hectare of the plowed layer of soil. Up to 2 quintals of grain per hectare is lost annually just from toxic plants and weeds. This is why more than 800 inorganic and organic compounds (various herbicides) have been provided for the chemical protection of plants during past five-year periods.

Herbicides are also regarded as a variety of chemical weapons in the foreign military literature, however. On the one hand, they provide inestimable assistance to agriculture, while on the other (by considerably increasing the amounts applied), they can become a means of destroying plants. The barbarous destruction of plant life during the U.S. aggression in South Vietnam is an example of this.



There is great potential for the development of chemistry, specifically the chemical industry. In October of last year our party and government approved the Comprehensive Program For the Application of Chemicals in the USSR National Economy For the Period Extending to

the Year 2000, which is an indication of the great importance attached to this branch of science and technology today.

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**Ministry Reviews Military Construction Performance for 1987**

18010226 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
11 February 1988 p 1

[Unattributed item: "Shock Work for the Five-Year Plan: In the Ministry of Defense and the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy"]

[Text] Having begun the socialist competition for 1987, the military construction workers, production enterprise workers, design research organization workers, and workers from the apartment management organs and offices of the USSR Ministry of Defense have instituted party regulations concerning the transfer to new conditions of management, decreases in project construction time, an increase in the productivity of labor on the basis of the introduction of new scientific-technical developments, the improvement of the quality of production, economization of materials and energy resources, and the strengthening of discipline at all levels.

The 1987 state plan for capital construction was fulfilled for the introduction of general area of living space and in other areas of the social sphere, and also regarding the volume of installation-construction work. The planned growth in the productivity of labor was attained. Defense Ministry design organizations handled their plan assignments regarding the provision of military construction with design-estimate documentation.

In the past year, the collectives of the Carpathian and North Caucasus military district construction administrations, as well as the collectives in the organizations directed by comrades M. Gromenko, A. Bitjukov, V. Dukhin, V. Dovbnya, F. Kapura, L. Lapshin, V. Mikhaylov, Yu. Nenakhov, L. Khizhnyak, and those in the enterprises headed by comrades V. Nazarenko, I. Mikhailov, and B. Flerov achieved high production indicators.

Among the design research organizations, the collectives directed by comrades S. Voinov, V. Kolesnikov, S. Kozhurin, and P. Pospelov were pronounced winners of the socialist competition in their respective subgroups.

The best indicators among the apartment-management organizations and associations were achieved by the collectives run by comrades G. Zhegin and V. Ponomarev.

At the same time, the tempo of restructuring in capital construction is not meeting current demands. A significant part of the organizations did not fulfill their plans for the introduction into operation of productive objectives and sites of a social or cultural-welfare designation, or for a whole series of other indicators.

The builders of the Far Eastern, Kiev, Odessa, Urals, Siberian, and the Volga military districts, of the Moscow Air Defense district, and those of the organizations

directed by comrades N. Andreyev, V. Bozhko, V. Vylgin, V. Imnadze, V. Kondratyuk, L. Likhtenshteyn, V. Svirskiy, Ya. Tauber, P. Fedchenko, and F. Yastin failed to meet their plan assignments and social obligations for 1987.

The remaining collectives still lack a precise orientation regarding priority goals. They have not overcome the aspiration to achieve the plan at any cost. The available possibilities for the improvement in the organization of production, and an increase in the effectiveness of the use of construction machines and motor vehicle transport are used poorly. There is still a problem in the quality of building-installation work, and new technical solutions are poorly implemented. Construction industry enterprises have not in all cases been fully equipped. Their reconstruction and technical reequipping is going slowly. The struggle to strengthen military and labor discipline and to create safe labor conditions in the construction area has not produced the necessary results.

The growing tasks for 1988 demand from commanders, political workers, technicians and engineers, and party, union, and Komsomol organizations the implementation of urgent measures for the practical realization of the fundamental decisions adopted by the party and the government for the improvement in the economic mechanism and management, and an increase in efficiency in construction.

The time demands that we evaluate, in a more exacting and self-critical manner, work practices which have evolved. Military construction collectives which fail to meet their obligations should be an object of special concern. Energetic efforts for the introduction into construction practice of all that is new and advanced and which appeared in the course of restructuring are needed. New practical steps for the strengthening of plan discipline, the concentration of capital investments on the most important sectors and projects underway, and a decrease in the scope of construction are also needed.

It will also be necessary to raise the organization of labor to a new level which would answer the current demands for scientific-technical progress and the new conditions of management in construction. The main task is the preparation of all construction organizations and enterprises of the Defense Ministry for the switch to the collective contract, self-payback and self-financing in 1989.

The Ministry of Defense, the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, and the Central Committee of the Construction and Building Materials Industry Workers Union express their firm certainty that the personnel of the military-construction, construction, design research, and scientific research organizations, industrial enterprises and apartment management organs will do everything to greet the 70th anniversary

of the Soviet Armed Forces and the XIX All-Union Party Conference in a worthy manner, and to successfully fulfill the plans and socialist obligations for the year 1988. UD/336

**Military Construction Freight Transport:  
Adjusting to Economic Reform**

18010076 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
27 Dec 87 p 1

[Article by Col A. Novosadov, honored builder of the RSFSR: "The Economic Reform—An Examination for All"]

[Text] *The collective of the military construction organization led by Col A. Novosadov works year after year stably and profitably, and is the possessor of the competitive Red Banner of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Council of Ministers, BTSPS [All-Union Central Trade-Union Council] and VLKSM [All-Union Leninist Young Communist League] Central Committee. The growth of incomes in the collectives markedly exceeds that of wages, and this year the cost-price of goods deliveries declined more than eight percent.*

The contribution of Anatoliy Fedorovich Novosadov to the common cause was also noted. He was awarded the Order of the Labor Red Banner, and the title of honored builder of the RSFSR.

Perhaps the most noteworthy feature of our time, which is marked by revolutionary changes in the economy, the social sphere and people's consciousness, is the need for creativity. The changes that are taking place in our society are not simply opening scope for initiative; they require this initiative from each at his place of work. And how could it be otherwise? After all, there are no prepared recipes for restructuring, and no single circular, instruction or directive, no matter how perfect it may be, can provide an answer for all instances in life.

Today we military construction personnel, like workers in the other branches of the economy, are faced with the task of switching to full economic accountability, self-support and self-financing. Simple economic analysis of our organization, for example, which is engaged primarily in the delivery of goods to builders, showed that if this were done mechanically, without consideration for our specific nature, in the very first year we would lose almost half of our profit. And this means a sharp reduction in the development and incentive funds.

Unfortunately, under army conditions the weight of old approaches to production activity—arbitrary decisions, pressures, instructions not buttressed by even the most simple calculations—is still rather great. It is not easy to rid ourselves of this, but we must do so, because economic laws operate outside of orders and instructions, and they inexorably have their effects. We simply will move nothing forward without fundamental study, on a

new basis, of the economic relations among all participants in the investment cycle, and of new norms, prices and rates. For this it is first necessary to inculcate economic thinking in people.

In our organization we have many competent and knowledgeable specialists who are capable of accelerating the transition to the new economic paths; such specialists as Lt Col V. Goryainov and Capt V. Gnusov. But I am sure that we will be able to achieve a true turning point only if economic knowledge becomes a requirement of all: both the managers and rank-and-file workers. Only then will it turn into a real moving force in production.

We began by giving each driver a card, in which the income plan, the planned and actual expenditure of fuel, spare parts and so forth are counted up. By the end of each month the driver knows whether he brought the organization profit or loss. This form of control has had its results, but has not yet changed people's consciousness. We decided to go further and create economic soviets in the subunits. We began with a lagging company, which was commanded by Sr Lt M. Gerasimenko. We had here a unique point of reckoning—a 5,000 ruble loss. In literally a month or two the work of the subunit became profitable.

We satisfied ourselves that the workers and military construction troops were interested in engaging in economic computations and working with knowledge of the overall situation. When one talks in the subunit about how the plan is working out, everyone asks: And how should I plan my work? People become concerned about why the coefficient of equipment utilization was too low and how it could be raised. It became common that a military construction worker might go to the planning department and say: "Why are too few spare parts allocated to my vehicle; after all it is old and its norms should be different." And the norm is reexamined, for there is a common interest here.

I believe that these are only the first shoots of new thinking appearing in the collective, but they are already now bearing fruit. Thus, in this year alone, having reduced the automotive fleet by 10 units, we hauled an additional thousand tons of goods. More than two thirds of the profit came from increased labor productivity. Of course, as it is with any end result, these figures were derived bit by bit from various organizational and technical measures, but perhaps collective economic interest maintained in the brigades operating under cost-accounting played the main role.

Today we have relatively few such brigades, and they accomplish more than a quarter of the volume of freight shipments. Among the best are the collectives of drivers led by Nikolay Afanasyevich Abolmasov, and Aleksey Aleksandrovich Mishukov. They regularly receive prizes for savings of fuel, lubricants and tires. The people see



that their good work is rewarded, and they have a sense of collective responsibility for the common cause. This means that the initial components of economic thinking are present.

This is, so to speak, local economic accountability. We have our problems, but we also have considerable experience acquired through the years. And when we speak about the transition of an entire organization to collective contracting, this is still more like a task with many unknowns. Now a great deal depends not only on ourselves, but also on subcontractors and higher organizations. For example, at present we have considerable losses because the vehicles stand idle for a long time at the builders' sites during loading and off-loading operations. It was necessary to set up so-called time clocks that monitored idle time at construction sites. And they were immediately put out of action. Now we are restoring them, and we do not intend to "give up."

A substantial portion of our income is obtained because our equipment is concentrated in one place. We have freedom of maneuver and are able to set up its repair and maintenance. However, such "cooperation" with the subcontractors does not yet promote the development of a collective contract. Moreover, the construction organizations that we support also have their own transport. From our point of view the overall situation is paradoxical: transport exists, but there is no plan governing its use for shipments. It is understandable that every manager wants the vehicles always to be at hand. But, in a system of full economic accountability such a situation would be impermissible; the equipment must give maximum return.

In general I believe that full economic accountability will quickly force us all to "sort out" all existing reserves. Thus, we place great hopes on the use of computer equipment, and namely personal computers. They are significantly cheaper than large computers, and pay for themselves with interest. Already now we are carrying out "processing" of trip tickets, and mutual accounting with customers. In the immediate future we want to create an entire network of interconnected computers, which will make it possible to optimize shipments, eliminate cross-streams of goods and raise the coefficient of use of motor transport by 50 percent.

Of course, now with the approaching transition to full economic accountability, there is much that is of concern. Problems exist that must be solved or it will simply not be possible to embark upon the new, crucial economic stage. If we look at things realistically, every year we have a rather large number of vehicles that stand idle for months due to a shortage of drivers. The fact is that, for example, now in December we have discharged military construction troops who have completed their service. Simultaneously, we are beginning the process of completing the training of the young generation of drivers. Actually they will come on line only in the second quarter of the coming year. It is understood that the time

periods for callup to mandatory service will not be changed. But the problem is acute and it must be solved, as we suffer losses in the millions every year. As before the quality of training of drivers by DOSAAF [All-Union Voluntary Society For Assistance to the Army, Air Force and Navy of the USSR] organizations remains low. Their "retraining" requires not only significant efforts, but also material expenditures.

Not the use of modern economic terms, and not juggling of figures are required today from leaders of all ranks, but scrupulous and methodical analysis of economic work and existing reserves, and searching for ways to solve problems that arise. Efficiency and specificity will decide success; this will be a serious test for us all.

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#### Improvements in Services to Workers at Military Repair Plant

18010208 Moscow *KOMMUNIST*  
*VOORUZHENNYKH SIL* in Russian No 24,  
Dec 87 pp 41-45

[Article by Maj Gen of the Reserve A. Vorobyev and retired Col D. Shkurikhin under the "The Social Sphere—A Sphere of Party Influence" rubric: "With Concern About the Person"]

[Text] At military enterprises and construction projects, as everywhere in the country, in the process of perestroika the party's aims for the priority development of the social sphere are being realized and measures are being taken for a fuller satisfaction of the needs of people for good working, living and recreation conditions. Most economic, party and trade-union leaders have begun to recognize that social and cultural conditions are not just apartments, schools, hospitals, stores and dining rooms but that environment in the life of a person upon which his health, mood, culture and labor and social activities largely depend. And precisely for this reason, in seeking to raise the quality of produced output and the fulfillment of planned targets, they are doing a better and better job of facing the needs and concerns of workers and employees and are striving to give them optimum conditions for the realization of their creative plans, seeing in this significant reserves for increasing labor productivity.

In this connection, the experience gained at the military repair enterprise headed by Col N. Oleksyuk is instructive. Many workers, brigades and three shops here fulfilled their personal and collective plans for the first 2 years of the five-year plan ahead of time. What determines success in the work? Above all, the great enthusiasm of working people, the friendly and coordinated efforts of the management, party committee and trade union committee, and the personal example of communists. The plant director and his deputies make consider

efforts to establish good conditions for the work and rest of people and always know that is bothering them and what difficulties and concerns they have.

In the past in this collective, however, they considered the social area secondary. And in it they basically included the daily life of workers, their cultural leisure, and concern about the maintenance of health. It is as if they separated the conditions in which they had to work every day and fulfill production targets from the social area. It was thought that this is something independent that depends above all on the will and competence of the chief. It is no accident, then, that it was frequently necessary to resort to crash programs and to cover up various organizational miscalculations through the fallacious motto "The Plan at Any Cost!"

It would be illegitimate to assert that the situation changed immediately for the better, as if by the wave of a magic wand. Some communist managers were not eager to give up their customary views and secretly hoped that everything would go back to the way it was. Col N. Oleksyuk, who became head of the enterprise, waged a determined battle against such attitudes. He received dependable support from the party committee headed by employee of the Soviet Army V. Bogatov. They began to change the style and methods of their work. They cut back on the bureaucratic fuss and on different kinds of meetings and conferences. Activists went to the people and began to take a permanent interest in them, what is bothering them and what difficulties are arising, and to provide practical help locally. Their efforts are paying off a hundredfold. In the shops, for example, where the communists Maj V. Filipchenko and employees of the Soviet Army Ye. Markelov and V. Grishkun are in charge, all of the conditions have been established for the highly productive labor and complete rest of workers and employees. As a result, the planned targets here are overfulfilled every month and the obligations accepted in honor of the 70th anniversary of the Great October performed in full.

Through the coordinated actions of the management and party organization, it was possible to activate a most important lever in raising the effectiveness of production: they began the active introduction of the achievements of scientific-technical progress into production processes and the provision of the shops with more advanced equipment. Communists warmly supported the idea of the technical reequipment of the plant and made many valuable suggestions on the practical realization of this problem. Much attention was paid to the carrying out of explanatory work on the nature of labor under the new conditions of economic activity and the importance of introducing new equipment and technology. The members of the party committee sought to have every working person realize that without the technical renewal of production it is impossible to achieve the highest labor productivity and consequently an increase in the wage. In addition, the introduction of machine

tools with numerical program control and robot-technical complexes and the assimilation of more advanced technology make it possible to alleviate the labor of workers significantly and to take away part of their physical burden. At the suggestion of activists, the shops are being equipped with new ventilation systems and powerful illumination devices and the control of the cleanliness and order at the workplaces was strengthened.

Nor did the shop managers and members of the party committee lose sight of the fact that the share of manual labor was unjustifiably high. They appealed to rationalizers and inventors and asked them to think about how to mechanize several processes and to alleviate loading and unloading operations. The plant's best specialists responded to the appeal of the party committee. Thanks to the creative thinking and innovative approach to the work by the communists V. Suslin, G. Polishchuk, A. Sofinskiy and other skillful workers, they were able to raise the level of mechanization of production processes to 70 percent. It is planned to raise it by another 10 percent in the near future. Workers now get less tired during their shift and are able to do more.

In showing concern about improving working conditions, the management and party and trade union organization simultaneously do much to strengthen the material base of social and cultural life: a Pioneer camp was built, for example, medical services are being improved, the system of public catering is being perfected, and sports and sanitation work is being carried out.

Let us take, perhaps, the housing problem, which has been acute until recently. It is under the special control of the administration, party committee and trade union. There is strict observance of the principle of social fairness in the distribution of apartments. More and more housing space is being introduced every year. In the 11th Five-Year Plan, 2 houses for 145 apartments were turned over for the enterprise. Last year, another 68 families had house warmings. A 95-apartment house is now being erected. But they have not yet been able to satisfy all those in need of housing at the plant. The management and members of the party committee discussed this with people openly and in a businesslike manner and explained that the way out is to build houses using not only the contract method but also the enterprise method. A youth housing complex is now being constructed at the initiative of the collective's Komsomol members. The Komsomol committee selected people for the staff of the Komsomol youth detachment taking into account their conscientious attitude toward labor, participation in public life, and behavior in work and life. The members of the construction detachment elected the Komsomol member I. Misyura as work superintendent. Under his leadership, they work in their free time and days off. Young families will receive 36 apartments in the first quarter of next year.

With the direct participation of the working people of the enterprise, they have constructed a 300-place children's combine, a secondary school for 780 students, and stores for dry goods and food. Resources were allocated for the shared participation in the building of a boarding school on the shore of the Black Sea. About 100 workers and employees now rest there every year. The collective also has its own subsidiary farm. The greenhouses alone occupy an area of almost 3,000 square meters. More than 40 tons of fresh vegetables go to the plant dining room every year and are sold to the enterprise workers at preferential prices. And here is an example of a sensible initiative, the kind that is missing among some managers and party and trade union activists. At the initiative of the party committee and with the consent of local authorities, a garden cooperative was created at the site of the former dump. Almost 300 families of workers and employees have the opportunity to grow vegetables and fruits on their own plots and to diversify their leisure time to their advantage.

Considerable efforts are also being made to improve the social area at the enterprise where Lt Col V. Zaika is secretary of the party committee. This doubtless has had a positive effect on the quality of the produced output. At the initiative of the administration and with the active participation of the party and trade union committees, they have now put into operation a complex system of measures of a technical, organizational and social nature. For example, they have established the firm rule: passes to recreation bases and sanatoriums are issued primarily to advanced workers in production, to the best workers and employees. In expanding the introduction of housing space and constructing preschool institutions, communist managers obtain the possibility of further stimulating the labor of working people and of directing them above all toward the high-quality fulfillment of production targets. For again the right to improve housing conditions is granted to the advanced workers of socialist competition, to people whose contribution to the overall successes is rather significant. They are assigned places for children in the kindergarten and day nursery.

One can say with complete justification that a reversal has taken place in these collectives with respect to social questions. They ask for their resolution at all levels just as in the case of production questions. At the same time, the members of the party committees watch closely to ensure that people do not develop a consumerist attitude toward the obtaining of social benefits. The following principle is affirmed: not only take but yourself participate in their creation, through conscientious labor respond to the concern about improving the material and everyday conditions of life.

Unfortunately, however, such a turning to the urgent problems of rank and file workers is not taking place everywhere. In a number of places, communists are in no hurry to tackle the resolution of everyday questions, to proceed from general judgments on closeness to people

to specific actions, and to show true concern about workers and employees. At some enterprises, perestroika has practically not touched the social area, organizational and educational work with people continues to be poor, and the management prefers to deal with paper rather than with people. It is precisely because of the adherence to primarily administrative methods of managing production that breakdowns occur, in particular, in the repair enterprise where Maj K. Grachev is secretary of the party committee. For a long time, this collective has been lagging behind in the resolution of production as well as social tasks. Neither the administration nor the party and trade union organizations have yet been able to give workers and employees the necessary conditions for creative and fruitful work.

Let us say that in the shop headed by Maj A. Lipatov, specialists frequently have to work in poor lighting and it sometimes happens that the ventilation system breaks down. Naturally people's health suffers because of this, not to mention the fact that they tire more easily and produce more defective products. The shop workers repeatedly appealed to the enterprise management, asking that they renew the equipment and improve working conditions. But they achieved nothing more than empty promises and assurances that these difficulties are temporary and caused by objective reasons. The arms of the administration do not yet reach to such "trivialities." As before, most shops have no shower rooms or rooms for domestic services. The workers do not have the opportunity to wash up after their shift and they have to change clothes in cramped quarters. Even though it would seem to be obvious that a person's mood when he comes to work and when he leaves it will inevitably effect the results of his labor and the quality of the produced output.

The party organization of the enterprise is taking a strange position in these matters. It merely registers the existing errors in the production and social areas but does not take any measures to improve working conditions. Being guided by the administration, the party committee is not sufficiently resolute in taking to task communists, including the managing link, for inertia, indifference and negligence. In speaking at party meetings, Maj Grachev and other members of the party committee say a lot of good words to the effect that the true masters of the enterprise are the workers and that one must consider their interests and needs more carefully. But as soon as it is time to take practical actions, the enthusiasm of the activists wanes. Not a single communist manager has been heard at a past meeting of the party committee on questions involving the improvement of working and living conditions.

The enterprise is also slow to resolve the housing problem. Not a single meter of housing space has been built here in recent years. Workers and employees wait years for an apartment and even then they have no complete assurance that they will ultimately receive it. In this



matter, they frequently appeal to the trade union committee and complain to the party committee. But there they merely shrug their shoulders: this is not within our power....

People must have housing and not the illusory hope of receiving it after 7 or 8 years. And it is not just that the organized living conditions of working people help to resolve the problem with discipline and the quality of output. Having the possibility of receiving an apartment in the near future, a worker will not become a "job-hopper" and will dependably link his life with the enterprise. Do management and the party and trade union aktiv understand this? Without doubt. But understanding alone is not enough. It is necessary, as they say, to take an active part and to show reasonable initiative. But the habit of living comfortably and not showing initiative are a hindrance. Neither the administration nor the party and trade union organizations were concerned about seeing to it that the enterprise has its own kindergarten, day nursery and Pioneer camp. It is not surprising that there is no decline in personnel turnover here and that labor discipline is low.

Things are no better at the enterprise where V. Lakodey is secretary of the party committee. Complacency and a carefree attitude prevail here as well. Communist managers and the party and trade union aktiv are not embarrassed by the fact that new equipment and progressive technologies are being introduced with great difficulty and that there is still too much manual labor. For example, the loading and unloading of railroad cars with bulky production is still done by hand. One can imagine how this drains workers and what their attitude is when they arrive for the next shift. In the painting section of the woodworking shop, for example, the workers G. Chuvashov and V. Maksimov are forced to carry as many as 400 heavy boxes rather long distances every day for 8 hours. One asks: where are the means for small-scale mechanization? Chief engineer V. Shikhov could answer this question. For it is precisely the fault of the engineering and technical service headed by him that

the reconstruction of this section has been delayed. But it seems that this does not particularly worry Comrade Shikhov. And why should he worry? The plant management is not pressing him. And the party and trade union committees have taken the position of outside observers and are not about to take the chief engineer to task for such a negligent attitude toward the improvement of working conditions. Nor are things in this collective any better with respect to the resolution of other questions involving the social area, which has an effect on production indicators.

It is impossible, of course, to resolve at once the social and everyday problems that have accumulated over years. But there is no longer any way to defer them. No matter what difficult conditions the enterprise may be in, one can get many questions in the improvement of working conditions off dead center today. Provided, of course, that one does not sit idle.

A businesslike approach to the problems in the social area that corresponds to the spirit of the time must be affirmed at all military enterprises and construction projects. But the existing difficulties and unresolved questions await more active intervention by party organizations and trade union committees.

It is very important that the working and living conditions and the health of workers and employees not escape the attention of party and trade union activists for even a day. Their direct obligation is to act resolutely and high-mindedly and not to be afraid to raise a pointed question related in some way to the social area before the administration. It is essential, as the party demands, to draw practical conclusions, not to strut, but to work diligently, changing one's way of thinking, overcoming inertia and adopting new approaches.

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### Deputy Chairman Describes DOSAAF Activities, Problems

18010221 [Editorial Report] Moscow AGITATOR in Russian No 2, January 1988 publishes on pages 17-18 a 1,300-word interview with Lt Gen V. Mosyaykin, deputy chairman of the All-Union DOSAAF Central Committee [date and place not given] in connection with the X All-Union DOSAAF Congress, under the headline "DOSAAF Today and Tomorrow." Mosyaykin states: "DOSAAF today is a mass-membership patriotic-defense organization uniting workers and students fourteen years old and older. Young people under thirty years of age comprise fifty-two million of the organization's members.

"365,000 of the society's primary organizations operate in the country's enterprises, construction sites, on kolchozes and sovkhoses, and academic institutions. At their disposal are more than 34,000 rifle ranges, 21,000 air rifle ranges, 37,000 automobiles and motorcycles, 18,000 go-carts and nearly 12,000 radio stations. This allows the organizations of DOSAAF, which have the appropriate material-training base, to closely coordinate the military-patriotic education of the workers, especially the youth, by teaching them the fundamentals of military affairs.

"Today in DOSAAF's schools and aeroclubs, every third conscript receives training in any one of many specialties in preparation for all branches of the USSR Armed Forces. The aeroclubs have begun initial summer training for youth ages 15 and 16 preparing them for entrance into military schools.

"More than two million people per year receive technical training from DOSAAF. This includes for the most part drivers, radio operators, electricians, excavator operators, and machine operators ready at any moment to take their place in the order of battle.

"DOSAAF has been assigned the task of developing technical and militarily applicable sports. Today the organization's of the society are cultivating 21 different sports. And more than nine million people, beginning with young school children and going all the way up to those in their declining years participate in these sports here on a regular basis. Sports work in the society is conducted by 2860 member technical-sport clubs, 259 rifle clubs and 175 service-dog breeding clubs. Together with the trade unions, 152 children's technical-sport schools have been created where 42,000 children study."

Mosyaykin went on to say that DOSAAF is "directing the efforts of all of the organizations towards attracting reserve servicemen, especially those who received their military experience in the fulfillment of their international duty in Afghanistan, to work with pre-draft youth."

Speaking of the problems which DOSAAF is experiencing, Mosyaykin said that "certain DOSAAF committees in Kirghizia, Estonia, Dagestan, and in Smolensk, Kalinin, Magadan, and other oblasts of the RSFSR are not sufficiently preparing specialists for the Soviet armed forces. As before, a weak knowledge of Russian among the youth of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenia, and Uzbekistan complicates the mastery of the military profession.

"There is a need for an improvement in the material-training base. Eleven percent of the training organizations are still located in poorly maintained facilities. The situation is particularly bad in the Karelian ASSR, Altai Krai, and in Vladimir, Tomsk and Tyumen oblasts. Even in Moscow, where 7 autoschools train drivers for the army, only two have tracks to train them on." COPY-RIGHT: Izdatelstvo TsK KPSS "Pravda", "Agitator", 1988.

### Yegorov Interview on State of DOSAAF on Eve of X DOSAAF Congress

18010225 [Editorial Report] Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 February 1988 publishes on page 2 a 1,700-word interview by V. Izgarshev with Fleet Admiral G. M. Yegorov, chairman of the All-Union DOSAAF Central Committee [date and place not given] on the eve of the X All-Union DOSAAF Congress. Yegorov criticizes the practice of some who "talk more about restructuring than practice it" and goes on to say that "the initiative and creativity of people who are freed from the influence of the command-administrative style of management will tell in the results." Yegorov mentions several other areas deserving of criticism: formalism; a weakening of democratic foundations; insufficient cooperation with the Komsomol and other organizations that work on the military-patriotic upbringing of youth; training of specialists for the military which is complicated by a weak knowledge of Russian; the current state of the material training base; the failure to assign conscripts according to specialty; and the merely formal inclusion of the population as members. Towards the end of the article Yegorov states: "Life persistently dictates the need to grant DOSAAF committees and organizations a high degree of independence and to put an end to excessive centralization. The first steps in this direction have been taken. In particular we have supported the initiative to create at large-scale production enterprises and on village farms, base primary organizations provided with training materiel and athletic equipment and capable of helping small defense collectives on a sponsorship basis." UD/336

### Central Asian Meeting on Pre-Draft Training Problems

18010223 Alma-ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 13 Jan 88 p 4

[Article by special correspondent V. Dik: "But the Service is Strengthened by Friendship: What was Discussed at the Meeting Between the Warriors and the Public"].

[Text] Afterwards a meeting was held between the commanders and political workers of the Red Banner Central Asian Military and Eastern Border Districts and representatives of the mass media, writers and artists and the community at large. At the meeting, it was emphasized that our warriors are marking the approaching 70th anniversary of the USSR Armed Forces with growing activity in military and political training. In the subunits, intensive winter training is taking place. The number of outstanding companies, battalions, and fighting detachments is growing. At the same time, much remains to be done. It is no secret that at times a contingent of young conscripts does not meet the growing demands for completing service in the Soviet Army. It is not rare to encounter a young soldier who cannot do even one pull-up. This is the result of weak general-physical and military training in the schools and in DOSAAF organizations. As analysis shows, in some schools this training is being conducted by people without prior military service.

But by no means do all of the questions arise within DOSAAF's purview. Here emphasis is given mainly to the technical side. No one denies that the contemporary army needs qualified specialists who have received initial training in organizations of the voluntary society. However the human factor must not be undervalued one iota. Results of recent polling among the troops of the Central Asian Military District show, for example, that in draft units, the young people occupy themselves predominately with parasitical interests, new recruits have a poor understanding of the international situation, and are poorly oriented with regard to military affairs. Of course a certain allowance must be made for the fact that a certain percentage of conscripts consists of so-called problem teenagers. But experience shows that where we work with youth, sparing neither efforts nor time, we are able to overcome such problems.

Unfortunately, examples of such experience in the republic are few. And here the Komsomol must make its case. It must be admitted that recently, various informal youth associations have become popular. But is there an example of such an association of 'informals' which made its goal the training of youth for service in the Soviet Army? Alas, there is no such association. We could be talking about the creation of military-patriotic clubs of a new type. In the final analysis it is not a question of names. Associations, sections etc., will play their role if they are founded on live interest and have a definite specialization.

The principles and the horizons of military-patriotic upbringing are included in the ideas of the contemporary restructuring which touches all spheres of our life, including the army. At the head of the line we must place the main goal—quality and again quality in the training of our young guard and the raising of genuine internationalist-warriors. In this matter there is no, and can be no formalism or self-congratulation. Is it worthwhile, for example, to talk seriously about the driving school

training of holders of the "Prepared for Labor and Defense" medal if only a few hours of their programs are devoted to physical fitness training, and those few hours spent merely on the organization of the fitness tests themselves? Furthermore the infamous 99.9

is still to be found in test results. All of these questions should be reflected in the work of the VI Congress of the Kazakh SSR DOSAAF which opens tomorrow in Almaty.

The speakers at the meeting also talked about the necessity for improving Russian language training as a fundamental means of international communication which is always important in army conditions. The weak communication between workers from the political departments and newspaper, radio, and television journalists and the unsatisfactory condition of mentoring were also noted.

A decision was taken to hold similar meetings on a regular basis.

#### **Turkestan Military District Commander Comments on DOSAAF Shortcomings**

18010222 [Editorial Report] Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian for 2 February 1988 publishes on pages 1-3 a 10,000-word unattributed report on the IX Uzbekistan Communist Party Central Committee plenum under the headline "The Deciding Factor of Restructuring" which includes comments attributed to Colonel General N. I. Popov, Commander of the Turkestan Military District, on shortcomings in the work of the republic's DOSAAF organizations. According to the article, Popov said: "According to the final results from 1987, the general educational level of conscripts has risen somewhat. There are now more Komsomol members among them. However in spite of the positive developments, there has not been a fundamental breakthrough in this area of work.

"According to the final results from 1987, a part of the republic's conscripts do not in fact have a command of Russian or have a poor command; about 70 percent of them are fakes, that is, on paper they are holders of the "Ready to Labor and Defend" medal or are ranked athletes. Thus it happens, many of the republic's organs and organizations participate in the organization of pre-draft training and military-patriotic upbringing but the situation does not improve.

"The army however, is a kind of gospriyemka where no one is fooled, where no one is protected by paper and inflated figures, and where increased demands are made of the conscript and of his moral, psychological, and physical preparedness.



"Serious shortcomings remain in health care in connection with training young people for service in the army. This has already been noted at many levels. The Ministry of Health and comrade Bakhramov have given their attention to this problem but significant results have not been achieved."

"I consider it expedient to raise to a qualitatively new level the heroic-patriotic upbringing of young people. Preparations for the 70th anniversary celebrations of the Soviet Armed Forces and the Red Banner Turkestan Military District which will take place in 1988 give wide possibilities for the activation of youth."

"It follows that we should attract to heroic-patriotic upbringing more young internationalist-soldiers who have received their combat training in Afghanistan, a most serious examination of stability and civic maturity."

"Initial military training in the republic, its organization and quality, continue to be a weak spot in the preparation of young people for service in the army. The principle reason for this is the neglect of work with the voyenruky as the central figures in the organization of such training. An increase in the effectiveness of initial military instruction cannot be considered without a serious improvement in the material-training base of educational institutions. This pertains to schools, vocational institutions, technical schools, DOSAAF training organizations, and training points. Unfortunately, here too, we are far from attaining the necessary requirements."

"The DOSAAF central and oblast committees and professional-technical educational institutions have not restructured their work so as to fundamentally improve the training of specialists for the military. Here there is too much showiness and chatter and not enough work, and there is poor control over the implementation of decisions regarding the construction of the material-training base in the DOSAAF schools."

#### **Misuse by Military of Technically Trained DOSAAF Grads Lamented**

18010224 [Editorial Report] Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian for 3 February 1988 carries on page 2 a 500-word article by a group of teachers from the Odessa DOSAAF Joint Technical School led by ret. Col. I. Stetsovskiy and ret. Lt. Col. V. Luzin entitled "Not According to Speciality" complaining about the misuse by the military of graduates of DOSAAF schools. The authors state: "We are writing about the use, or if you call things by their right names, the disgraceful state of affairs in the use of graduates of the DOSAAF schools. Year in and year out, many of them after being called up into the army and air force serve anywhere, only not in their area of speciality." The authors mention letters of complaint by their former students and go on to ask:

"How are we supposed to work with the young people, how can we teach them when many of them are convinced that this training is merely wasted effort." UD/336

#### **Sportsman Offers Own Candidacy for Oblast DOSAAF Post**

18010205 Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 15 Dec 87 p 4

[Letter from B. Babichenko under "Physical Culture and Sport" rubric: "I Offer Myself for the Post...: Perestroika Dictates It"; first two paragraphs are boxed material]

[Text] Tselinograd—To the chairman of the DOSAAF Central Committee of the Kazakh SSR from Boris Andreyevich Babichenko:

"I ask you to examine my candidacy for the post of director of the Tselinograd Oblast sports-technical club of the DOSAAF."

In this connection, I want to share with you several considerations in regard to the state of automotive sports in the republic.

Some 20 years ago in Kazakhstan, they carried out different contests in motor races on the ice and motor ball that attracted large numbers of spectators. At that time, the sports vehicles were imperfect by today's standards: there were no expensive foreign "Chezet," "Mitsubishi" or "Esso" and the sportsmen did not wear company helmets or leather uniforms. As for the technology, this was a wonderful amateur level. And their was the fanatical devotion to their favorite sport.

In the evenings after work, they turned out studs on lathes for motorcycles, they boiled, tin-plated and sawed.... In preparing for the races, there was always 1 day too few. In those days, well-known masters of track motorcycle races on ice in the republic included: I. Sharonov from Ust-Kamenogorsk, P. Kislyy from Alma-Ata, A. Lapochkin from Karaganda, A. Getman from Petropavlovsk and many other outstanding figures in Kazakh automotive sports. There are so many wonderful words that can be said about them. They made Kazakhstan famous in the all-union arena at that time. It was difficult to get to the stadiums during the time of the motorcycle competition taking place in Ust-Kamenogorsk, Kokchetav, Petropavlovsk and Tselinograd—the influx of fans was so great. And take the combined motorcycle events! For here the people of Kazakhstan were invariably the leaders of the all-union championships.

The example of the masters served as a guiding star for many thousands of youths who took part in numerous sections with enthusiasm. Besides sporting mastery, the young people received solid technical skills that are so necessary in adult life and, what is important, they used their free time to advantage.

The fans of motor ball also had their idols. "Avtomobilist" from Alma-Ata played in Class "A" and won the cup of the journal ZA RULEM. And the people from Kokchetav were not last in Class "B".

Real enthusiasts ensured the successful development of automotive sports in the republic: the judge of the all-union category G. Shepelev from Alma-Ata, V. Baranov from Petropavlovsk, A. Serbin from Tselinograd.... Their names were very well known to thousands of fans, for whom the competition carried out by these enthusiasts became a true sports celebration.

But all of this is in the past. In recent years, they began to plan the activities of the DOSAAF under a gross-numbers approach and they started to make not creative work with young people most important and not the improved mastery of the sportsmen but the sum of members' dues collected. Precisely these magical figures, which were planned higher and higher every year, became the measure of the sports-technical clubs. It is no secret for anyone that for the purpose of reaching the next plan mark the DOSAAF obkoms sent a large quantity of sports motorcycles—those from the CSSR and GDR that are somewhat more expensive—to remote areas for sale. "It is bad that the motorcycles have no headlights and seat only one person," a herdsman acquaintance from Krasnoznamensk Rayon of Tselinograd Oblast complained to me. That is how he assessed the "gift" from the oblast.

Sensing their uselessness, many recognized masters left the arena at that time. Where are they today? Are they in competition? Are they involved in training judges and sportsmen in the DOSAAF clubs and the societies of Kazavtomotolyubitel? I doubt it....

The automotive sport, which was once so popular in Kazakhstan, has lost a lot of ground. Almost the primary grievous result of this was the fact that many hundreds of "difficult" youths were left to themselves and to the street instead of learning real man's work and young people with little knowledge of machinery began to join the ranks of the Soviet Army.

What feelings besides disappointment can such facts as these evoke: the republic has no Federation of Automotive Sports and for more than 20 years not a single judge has been trained? Clearly, such a situation is also produced by the fact that the professional sports societies are not interested in developing automotive sports. Since 1967, after all, they have not been including categories and titles in this sport.

Tselinograd, just as other oblast centers, has its own DOSAAF sports-technical club. But sports work in outside the field of vision of the club leadership. Here they are primarily involved with the cost accounting preparation of drivers. In my view, such an approach to the work distorts the very nature of DOSAAF as an organization called upon to educate Soviet young people to be technically competent and prepared to defend the Motherland.

It is necessary in the most decisive way to turn the sports-technical clubs in the direction of the development of automotive sports and to revive republic competition in motor races on ice and motor ball. In addition to the doubtless benefit the new generation obtains, the joy of association in sports also comes to tens of thousands of fans of these wonderful spectator sports.

I am prepared to begin this important work and I think that I possess the necessary knowledge. I am 41 years old, a USSR sports master, a member of the combined teams of Kazakhstan in the years 1962 through 1980, and I have completed special courses for trainers. By speciality I am a mechanical engineer for automotive transport and I am a member of the CPSU. At the present time, I work as deputy director of Rural Vocational and Technical School No 11.

#### FROM THE EDITOR'S OFFICE

This is the letter we received. It could come only in the present time, which gives considerable room for the boldest undertakings and initiatives. Enthusiasts were always needed and we especially need them now, when it depends upon each of us whether or not the positive changes now taking place in our society will last. But what does the republic's DOSAAF Central Committee think about this?

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**Lt Gen Reznichenko Reviews Book On Armed Forces Since 1945**

18010215 Moscow *KOMMUNIST*  
*VOORUZHENNYKH SIL* in Russian No 1  
Jan 88 pp 86-88

[Article by Lt Gen V. Reznichenko, honored scientist of the RSFSR, doctor of military sciences, professor: "The Soviet Armed Forces in the Postwar Period"]

[Text] Soviet military historiography has been augmented by a work whose characteristic feature is the fact that for the first time it is devoted entirely and fully to an examination of the history of the construction of the Armed Forces of the USSR after the Great Patriotic War.<sup>1</sup> Previously published monographs, for example, such as "Sovetskiye Vooruzhennyye Sily. Istoriya stroitelstva" [The Soviet Armed Forces. History of Construction], published in 1978, devotes only the fourth part of the book to a treatment of this period.

The work is intended for generals and officers, teachers and students of military academies and schools, and also for a wide circle of readers interested in military history. It can serve as a source of various scientific and factual material for propagandists who address themselves to problems of war and peace, and the achievement and maintenance of parity between the USSR and the U.S., and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO.

The book competently traces the history of the re-equipment and improvement of the organizational structure, system of manpower acquisition, and training of command-political and engineer-technical cadres for all of the uniformed services and components of the Armed Forces of the USSR. All of these problems are analyzed fully, in a chronological sequence and in relation to the economic and socio-political conditions of the building and perfection of socialism in the USSR and an international situation that indicated an increase in U.S. aggressiveness.

The monograph briefly and convincingly throws light on the guiding role of the Communist Party in the reorganization and further improvement of the structure of the Soviet Armed Forces that was prompted by the revolution in military affairs. Examining the history of the creation and development of nuclear missile forces in the USSR, the author focuses the attention of the reader on the fact that for the Soviet Union this step was a response compelled by nuclear blackmail on the part of U.S. imperialism, which had an atomic weapon monopoly going back to the end of the second world war. As is known, immediately after the end of the war the U.S. began to conduct a policy "from a position of strength" and "brinkmanship" with respect to the USSR. This situation underscores to an even greater extent the responsibility that the USSR took on itself for the preservation of peace and the prevention of a new world war by creating and perfecting its own nuclear potential.

Using extensive factual material, the author traces the process of the development of nuclear weapons, missiles of various classes and purposes, supersonic jet aviation, nuclear-powered submarines, and more improved conventional weapons systems, all of which led to a radical reorganization of the Armed Forces, the creation of the Strategic Rocket Forces, new branches of troops (forces) in the Ground Forces, PVO Troops of the Country, the Air Forces and the Navy. The work successfully directs attention to the fact that in this period the entire system of training of officer cadres, staffs, troops and naval forces had as its aim the mastery of weapons entering the inventory of the army and the navy and methods of employing them in combat operations. Party-political activity in the Armed Forces, the activity of military councils, political organs and party and Komsomol organizations, was directed at resolving the new tasks.

The work examines the central questions of Soviet military construction, and it analyzes in detail the social aspects of the development of the Armed Forces, reflected in the Constitution of the USSR adopted in 1977, in particular the features of the development of the Armed Forces as an organ of the national state. The thorough treatment of the measures of the CPSU and the Soviet state in strengthening the defensive capabilities of the country and the combat capabilities of the Armed Forces in connection with the restructuring of all aspects of the life and activity of socialist society that was unfolding in the middle of the 1980s is a substantial contribution to the historiography of the problem. In addition, emphasis is given to the significance of the 27th CPSU Congress and the new version it adopted of the Program of the Communist Party for the future development of the Armed Forces of the USSR, an increase in the quality of training of military cadres, and the strengthening of discipline and organization in the army and in the navy.

The work is also not without shortcomings.

The most fundamental of these, in our view, is the weak analysis of the influence of the changes that occurred in the construction of the Soviet Armed Forces for perfecting methods of conducting combat operations. The criterion on whose basis the chronological limits of the chapters is based is not entirely clear (1945-1953, 1954-1961, 1962-1972, 1973-1986). In recent times, a somewhat different division of periods in the history of the development of the Soviet Armed Forces in the postwar years has become prevalent (1945-1960, 1961-1970, 1971-1985 and since 1985). Perhaps the author should have adhered to it. But if he had to introduce his own periodization, then it should have been argued convincingly and comprehensively.

As can be gathered from the formulations of the chapters, the author relates the military-technical revolution and the revolution in military affairs only to the years 1954-1961, and the achievement of a military-strategic balance in the world, to the years 1962-1972. Actually,



the scopes of these processes are much broader. Profound qualitative changes in military affairs, revolutionary in their character, are also continuing at this time, and the efforts of the USSR to achieve military-strategic parity also encompass the 1950's and even the end of the 1940's, when the U.S. atomic weapons monopoly was eliminated.

It should also be noted that the chapters and sections of the work gravitate towards a description of events and facts without a cause and effect analysis of their origins. In our view the evaluation side of the analysis appears to be inadequate. Thus, for certain reasons the author does not assess the decisions on the elimination of the position of commander in chief of the Ground Forces and his staff in the years 1950-1955 and 1964-1967. Nor does the work contain an analysis of the reasons for the liquidation in 1959 and reinstitution in 1967 of political departments of the central staff of the USSR Ministry of Defense, military academies and scientific research institutes. The repeated assertions of the author on the increased guiding role of the CPSU in military construction also did not receive extensive argumentation on the pages of the monograph.

It is altogether impossible to agree that party-political work at one or another stage in the development of the Armed Forces is considered in relation only to the training of military cadres. Obviously inadequate attention is given to party-political work as an independent direction of Soviet military construction and the most important means of party management of all aspects of the life of the army and the navy. For this reason, the author was unable comprehensively to show the party-political work being conducted in the forces by military councils, commanders, political organs and Komsomol organizations. For example, in the fourth chapter, which examines the construction of the Armed Forces in a situation of preserving strategic parity, the most important party-political actions occurring on a forces-wide scale are only enumerated and commented on briefly in not quite seven pages. Unfortunately, party-political work is treated in the very same manner in earlier chapters as well.

Along with what has been noted, certain chapters and sections of the monograph appear to be unnecessarily overloaded with minutia and details of a factual nature. The conclusions of the sections and chapters of the work are very superficial. They do not focus the attention of the reader on the trends and directions of the development of the process under examination.

As a consequence of an inadequate definition of the structure of the work, there is a repetition of individual facts and propositions in various sections and chapters, and also the inclusion of material in them that is outside the chronological scope set by the author. Thus, characterizing the expansion of the economic capabilities of the CEMA member countries at the beginning of the 1970s, the author cites figures on the share of the socialist

countries in total volume of industrial production of the world and the average annual rates of growth of industrial production according to 1979 conditions. Invalid also, in our view, is the reference concerning the publication of the journal "Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil" in the period from 1962 to 1972. It is known, in fact, that a journal carrying this name has been published since 1960.

There are also individual contradictions and inaccuracies. For example, there is an assertion in the second chapter that "in April 1955 the CPSU Central Committee decided on the formation of political directorates according to services of the Armed Forces," and the third chapter notes the adoption of similar decisions, but not until 1963 and 1967. Moreover, no clarifications or reasons are given. There is an error in the book in the initials of a prominent military commander (see page 29).

The monograph analyzes only the positive aspects of the experience in the construction of the Armed Forces of the USSR, which, of course, is inadequate for a work that claims to be an objective presentation of the analytical process, especially under conditions of the restructuring that is proceeding in the country and the expansion of glasnost and democracy. In our view, the author should have taken a critical approach to the comprehensive evaluation of Soviet military theory in 1945-1953 of the status and direction of the development of the means of strategic attack of the imperialist states and the peculiarities of a possible war and to the evaluation of the timeliness of the transition of our Armed Forces to the study of atomic weapons and methods of combat operations under conditions of their employment. Besides, it is necessary to take into account the fact that U.S. imperialism, as is noted in the book, was preparing an atomic war against the USSR beginning in 1945. There should have been a fuller disclosure of the deficiencies in the study of the experience of the Great Patriotic War, especially of its initial period, and the negative influence of the cult of personality on the development of Soviet military science, and other shortcomings. An analysis of shortcomings and the causes that led to them, it seems to us, would contribute to a correct understanding of today's tasks in military construction and a determination of the most reliable avenues for their resolution.

On the whole, the work under review contributes to the further development of the theory of the construction of the Soviet Armed Forces. Devoted to one of the most important areas of military organizations: activity of the Communist Party and the Soviet state, it will help military personnel to master more fully the experience of military construction and the basic trends that have appeared in the development of the Armed Forces of the USSR in the postwar years.

#### Footnote

1. Babakov, A. A., "Vooruzhennyye Sily SSSR posle voyny (1945-1986): Istoriya stroitelstva" [Armed Forces

of the USSR After the War (1945-1986)): History of Construction], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1987, 287 pp, 1 r 2 k.

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13052

### Career of MSU Bagramyan Outlined, Praised

#### Comments on Bagramyan

18010106 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
2 Dec 87 p 4

[Article by S. Lagodskiy under "Called by the Revolution" rubric: "Through Whirlwinds of Fire"; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] Marshal of the Soviet Union [MSU] Ivan Khristoforovich Bagramyan.... They call him their son in Russia, in the Caucasus, in the Ukraine and in Belorussia. The Letts, Lithuanians, Estonians, Belorussians, Ukrainians and Russians do so because Bagramyan took the most active part in the liberation of their native land from the German fascist invaders. The Azerbaijanians do so because he was born in the territory of their republic. And the people of Armenia do so because from time immemorial the village of Chardakhly has been considered Armenian. Almost all of the young boys born here dream of becoming soldiers. And this is understandable: Chardakhly gave the country two marshals—MSU I. Bagramyan and Chief Marshal of Armored Forces A. Babadzhanyan.

The military biography of the twice Hero of the Soviet Union Ivan Khristoforovich Bagramyan, who would have been 90 years old today, is woven from numerous campaigns and battles. He went through difficult trials at the very beginning of the war: battles in the Ukraine, in the vicinity of Rostov and Kharkov, and near Moscow, later in the Kursk arc, in the operation "Bagration," and in the course of the offensive in the Baltic region. His colleagues and comrades in arms tell about how this was and about their joint service and friendship with Marshal Bagramyan.

Retired Lt Gen Ivan Vasilevich SAFRONOV, member of the CPSU since 1920: "It can be said that Ivan Khristoforovich and I are of the same age. And in many ways, our fates were similar. The year 1917 was a turning point for us. There was a feeling at the time that you were afloat in the very middle of a turbulent river. On which shore should you land? Numerous eloquent orators were at every turn. And who among them looks after you to see that you do not drown, that you come up?

"Although he was literate, Ivan Khristoforovich also did not grasp everything at once. The revolutionary storm did a good job of slapping the young Bagramyan about before it finally threw him ashore....

"He made his definitive choice and joined the Red Army.

"In general, Ivan Kristoforovich did not like to talk a lot about himself. He considered that deeds rather than words are the best evidence of human valor and weaknesses. During many years of service under his orders, I became convinced that this was not a pose but a position. For us, his comrades in arms, Marshal Bagramyan always was and remains a model of faithful service to the Fatherland and nation."

NOTE: In June 1942, I. Kh. Bagramyan was appointed commander of the 16th Army of the Western Front. Under his command, the army repelled the strike of the enemy grouping (August 1942) and carried out an offensive operation, penetrating deep into the echeloned defense to the north of the Zhizdra River (February-March 1943). Because of its successful combat actions, the army was renamed the 11th Guard Army.

Retired Maj Gen Rafgat Akhtyamovich VALIYEV, winner of the Lenin Prize: "I often reread the memoirs of Marshal Bagramyan. Again and again it is as if I return to the events that took place in January 1943. It was then that I first met the person to whom I consider myself indebted for so much in my life. This is the way it was. Our division, composed basically of militiamen from the capital city, had been given the title of guard division the day before. Commander of the Army Lt Gen Bagramyan surprised us completely by coming to the presentation of the awards.

"I received my first order, the Red Star, from his hands. My comrades asked me to speak on behalf of those receiving awards. I, of course, was terribly nervous. I remember that I promised in the name of all the soldiers that in the future as well we would relentlessly crush the enemy. We would try, I said, to do everything possible....

"Here I hesitated. Ivan Khristoforovich hastened to help out and finished my speech for me: 'and impossible....' They applauded and I understood that it was not for me but for the army commander.

"Now, in reflecting on the best qualities of Marshal Bagramyan, I think: it was by no means by chance that Ivan Khristoforovich pronounced those words on that day. For him, they contained the meaning of life, work and service.

"Let us recall with what energy and enthusiasm he worked with the young lads when he stood at the helm of the Central Staff of the All-Union Campaign of Komsomol members and young people at the places of revolutionary, military and labor glory of the Soviet people. After all, he was over 70. And his health was no longer outstanding in those years. Thus, to the end of his days Ivan Kristoforovich continued to command an army of

millions of kids in the game of 'heat lightning.' As a former teacher, I can understand what it cost him to be always in the mood, always young."

NOTE: The plan of the Orlov Operation was developed by the command of the Western and Bryansk fronts. The 11th Guard Army was to break through the enemy's defense to the south of Kozelsk and to develop its strike strictly toward the south, toward Kotynets. But Bagramyan saw some vulnerable points in the plans of the front staff involving the tasks of his army. In particular, there were doubts about the possibility of organizing close interaction between the flanking armies of the two fronts under the difficult conditions. Bagramyan proposed his own version: put all the forces that were supposed to attack from the Zhisdra theater of operations under the 11th Guard Army.... And this became a subject of a special conversation at headquarters.

From the memoirs of MSU Ivan Kristoforovich BAGRAMYAN: "General Antonov informed about the plan of the Orlov Operation and the proposals of the front commanders. I sat very uneasily. The Supreme Commander will now confirm the plan and it will attain the force of law. But how could I dispute the proposals of the front commanders already approved by the General Staff? The Supreme Commander asked: 'Does everyone agree with this decision?' I asked permission to state my position. Stalin looked at me not without surprise but benevolently: 'Please.' The maps were again unfolded. Trying to contain by excitement, I stated my point of view.... Stalin, who up until this time had been studying the map attentively, raised his head, took the pipe out of his mouth, and unhurriedly smoothed his mustache. Reyter (commander of the Bryansk Front—author) gave me a reproving glance, as if he wanted to say: 'We warned you to keep quiet but you paid no attention. Now you have only yourself to blame.' And suddenly the Supreme Commander said very quietly and very calmly: 'Bagramyan does make sense. And it seems to me that we have to agree with his proposal. As for the concern of the army commander about more favorable conditions for the fulfillment of the task, this is commendable. After all, he will bear full responsibility in case of failure.' No one wanted to continue the dispute."

NOTE: In the battle at Kursk, the army under the command of Bagramyan delivered a deep blow against the flank of the enemy's Orlov grouping and carried out a series of effective strikes in the Bryansk theater of operations, which ended with the destruction of significant numbers of Hitlerites and the forced crossing of the Desna.

Col Gen of Aviation Nikolay Pavlovich DAGAYEV: "Ivan Kristoforovich Bagramyan took over command of the First Baltic Front on 19 November 1943. At that time, I was chief of staff of the Third Air Army, which was part in this front. The plan of the Belorussian Operation with the code name 'Bagration' provided that the troops of the First Baltic and First, Second and Third

Belorussian fronts would destroy the grouping of the fascist forces in the region of Vitebsk and Bobruysk and later surround and rout the main forces of the group of 'Center' armies.

"The Belorussian Operation was the first strategic operation in which the front under the command of General of the Army Bagramyan took part. The air and ground forces 'worked' closely together. Near Vitebsk, for example, we supported the advance of the infantry and helped tankmen in the depth. Here we destroyed an enemy group numbering 50,000 troops.

In December 1944, after the successful offensive actions in Belorussia, expressing their gratitude to General of the Army Bagramyan, the working people of Armenia turned over to the personnel of the Third Air Army a squadron of Il-2 aircraft built with their own savings. They named this squadron after their fellow countryman. In the first combat sorties, the squadron imeni I. Bagramyan inflicted powerful blows against the enemy forces. It was repeatedly mentioned in the orders of the command."

NOTE: From 1958 through 1968, Ivan Khristoforovich Bagramyan was deputy minister of defense and chief of rear services of the Armed Forces of the USSR.

Col Gen Ivan Makarovich Golushko, chief of staff of the rear and first deputy chief of the rear services of the Armed Forces of the USSR: "I worked for several years under the command of Marshal Bagramyan. It was often necessary to visit the troops. The inspection trips to the Far North and Far East were interesting.

"Being a person of rare tact, Ivan Khristoforovich was greatly respected by the officers and soldiers. Association with him in a specific case was useful for us as well as for those whom we were inspecting. He always unerringly revealed the basic shortcomings from which some commanders and managers sought to distract the eye of the inspectors. In such instances, Ivan Khristoforovich asked those wanting to cover things up:

'Why are your reports inaccurate? Why and from whom are you hiding these flaws? From yourselves....?'

"Our military fate is such that we really get to know one another not in the tranquility of an office and not in meeting halls but in remote garrisons. There were so many encounters and they are all remembered as though they took place yesterday.

"In the Siberian Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences, where we were invited by Academician M. Lavrenyev, a group of participants in the Great Patriotic War surrounded the marshal right there. A conversation got started. Ivan Khristoforovich asked the veterans of the front to tell about their current work and plans, letting them understand that this is by no means of idle interest for us.



"It was a harmonious conversation. Former scout P. Nesterov, it turned out, is still scouting but in geology.

"Right now we are preparing the party for a long-range expedition," Nesterov reported. "We are occupied with the selection and equipping of transportation and with the completing and delivery of loads for the prospecting routes."

"So before dealing with active prospecting you have to organize the rear?" Bagramyan responded. "In any major undertaking, you first have to provide for the rear. Is it not so? Thus, all of us are specialists of the rear of some kind."

"Ivan Khristoforovich was joking but everyone took his words very seriously."

NOTE: From 1968 through 1982, MSU I. Bagramyan was head of the group of general inspectors of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR.

**Retired Col Anatoliy Aleksandrovich TOMIN:** "As director of the secretariat of the group of general inspectors, I once had the occasion to accompany the marshal on a mission to Transcaucasus Military District. All of the work was finished. We were getting ready to take off for Moscow from the Baku airport. We had arrived in Baku beforehand and were waiting for the arrival of Bagramyan. And here I turned my attention to a group of about 70 people at the entrance to the airport. They were dressed simply. When Ivan Khristoforovich appeared, they all rushed toward him. In front was an elderly woman who in the presence of everyone hugged and kissed Bagramyan as if he were her own son. Then they all went up to the marshal, embraced him and shook his hand. And every time Ivan Khristoforovich found some warm words for the person. Later, in the airplane, I asked Bagramyan who these people were. He answered: 'They are my fellow countrymen. And in the Caucasus, by tradition countrymen always meet that way, no matter where circumstances bring them together.'"

**Ogannes Tigranovich GANALANYAN, doctor of philosophical sciences and professor:** "Ivan Khristoforovich Bagramyan was an intellectually rich person. He loved the poetry of Pushkin and Lermontov very much and called them 'great adopted sons of the Caucasus.' And, as he himself said, he read the novel 'War and Peace' several times and always with ecstasy. The marshal esteemed and appreciated the works of Ovanes Tumanyan, Avetik Isaakyan and Yegishe Charents. Whenever he came to Armenia, he would be sure to visit his favorite Charents Museum in the city of Charentsavan. He once asked a young woman working at the museum to recite the poem 'Armenia' by Charents. And when she answered that she did not remember it by heart, he merely shook his head. And he then proceeded to recite the poem himself.

"Avetik Isakyan introduced me to Ivan Khristoforovich. Our second meeting took place during the days of the 100th anniversary of Ovanes Tumanyan. The marshal came to Yerevan together with A. Mikoyan. In the museum of the poet, Ivan Khristoforovich talked with a group of people. I greeted him and tried to go on past, thinking that Bagramyan had already forgotten me. But he stopped me:

"Wait a minute, Ogannes Tigranovich. I read your book on Tumanyan the other day. I congratulate you."

"I asked about the marshal's health. Ivan Khristoforovich responded with an Armenian joke that can be translated into Russian approximately as follows:

"I am getting along, just kicking stones with my foot."

"A happy, sensitive and intelligent person—this is how I have remembered our countryman, Marshal Bagramyan."

The participants in today's conversation recalled what is dear to them from the great life of MSU I. Bagramyan. A demanding nature and sensitivity, responsiveness and perseverance, kindness and a strong will harmonized in this person. Ivan Khristoforovich came from the people and remained close and understandable to them right up to his final days. Bagramyan was a deputy of the supreme soviets of Armenia, Latvia, and the USSR and a member of the Central Committee of the party of Lenin. Adults and children alike loved him. They spoke of him simply and clearly: "Our Bagramyan." He belonged to Riga, Vilnius, Orel, Charentsavan and Razgrad in Bulgaria—cities that called Ivan Khristoforovich Bagramyan, a son of the Armenian people, their honorary citizen.

#### Marshal Kurkotkin on Bagramyan

18010106 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Dec 87 p 6

[Article by MSU S. Kurkotkin, Hero of the Soviet Union: "In Accordance with a Soldier's Duty: On the 90th Anniversary of the Birth of Marshal of the Soviet Union I. Kh. Bagramyan"; first paragraph is PRAVDA introduction]

[Text] Every military leader has his own biography. But much unites the glorious sons of our multinational Motherland, whose direct participation forged victories in the years of the Great Patriotic War. The rigorous time promoted a whole group of talented commanders whose names have been written into the history of the armed forces in gold letters. One of them is Ivan Khristoforovich Bagramyan.

There is a well-known photograph that immortalized the front commanders in the final stage of the Great Patriotic War: an entire constellation of glorious commanders who chose that moment to be photographed together in

memory of an unforgettable time. By that time, Army Gen I. Kh. Bagramyan had gone through 4 years of war and covered thousands of kilometers of roads along the fronts.

The ability not to give up in the face of difficulties, to analyze the situation comprehensively and in depth, and to make responsible decisions does not, of course, come by itself. I. Kh. Bagramyan formed that ability on the battlefields of World War I and the civil war and in the course of many exercises. The conviction goes back to that now distant time: it is not enough for a commander to have personnel valor and the will for victory; profound knowledge is needed. For this reason, I. Kh. Bagramyan persistently learned military science.

The Great Patriotic War found him in the position of head of an operational section, that of deputy chief of staff of the Southwest Front. The troops of the front fought with self-sacrifice for the capital of the Ukraine. The stubborn struggle of the Soviet warriors played an important role in disrupting the plans for a Blitzkrieg and stopped the advance of the enemy in the direction of Moscow. For his part in carrying out this defensive operation, I. Kh. Bagramyan was awarded the Red Banner order and given the rank of major general.

I remind you that it was in the first months of the war and awards were infrequent at that time. Receiving the order, Ivan Khristoforovich promised that he would justify their confidence. And just a little over a month later, circumstances developed so that he had to prove his loyalty to this words through action: acting in a critical situation, General Bagramyan led a large detachment out of an encirclement.

Here, of course, were seen the effects of experience in commanding a regiment and a broad operational-tactical range of vision acquired during the prewar years of service in different staff positions. In June 1942, Bagramyan was appointed commander of the 16th Army of the Western Front, that same 16th Army whose glory after the victory near Moscow resounded on all fronts. He took over his post from long-time acquaintance K.K. Rokossovskiy.

Among military people, they justifiably think that it is good commander under whose leadership subordinates become heroes. Rokossovskiy was such a commander. In taking leave of Bagramyan, he expressed his confidence that the position of army commander would not be his highest. The words of farewell turned out to be prophetic. The leadership ability of the commander of the 16th Army, which subsequently became the 11th Guard Army, matured and improved from operation to operation. Original and bold, for example, was the decision to carry out a deep strike against the flank of the enemy's Orel grouping in the summer of 1943. The guardsmen destroyed significant enemy forces and forced the crossing of the Desna. In the battles of Orel and Bryansk, advancing continuously, the army covered more than

200 kilometers in combat, breaking the resistance of 13 infantry, 7 armored and 2 motorized divisions of the enemy. In November 1943, I. Kh. Bagramyan, now already general of the army, became commander of the First Baltic Front.

His action in the new position began with the carrying out of the Gorodskaya offensive operation. The Hitlerites occupied a large ridge; they were hanging over the Soviet divisions that had broken through. It was necessary to cut through the dangerous knot and to secure their own troops as soon as possible. For this reason, the commander of the front acted without delay.

And still another very important circumstance contributed to the fact that the Gorodokskiy ridge was successfully "cut." It was a matter of the ability of Ivan Khristoforovich to see to it that each soldier knew "his own maneuver." Speaking the language of the present day, he was already making full use of the very rich possibilities of the human factor. The commander of the front knew how to mobilize it, how to interest people and how to focus on the best performance of the set task. And the people, sensing the genuine attention and concern, made every possible effort.

Bagramyan considered the most important qualities of all military leaders to be self-control, composure, and respect for subordinates. Eyewitnesses remembered with what genuine interest toward his interlocutor Ivan Khristoforovich spoke, with what attention he listened, and with what strictness he asked generals and officers how their soldiers were being fed and clothed. Is it any surprise that the soldiers loved "their commander" and believed him? This had great significance on the scales of the war.

We have to admit that there were also commanders at the front who thought that war and correctness in relation to subordinates are incompatible. But it is also legitimate to say that such people were less frequently victorious. Conversely, the example of K.K. Rokossovskiy, I.D. Chernyakhovskiy, I. Kh. Bagramyan and many other commanders is evidence of the great living force of confidence in people and respect for them.

Important milestones on the military path of the commander were participation in the liberation of Belorussia and the Baltic region, the capture of Koenigsberg and the rout of the Zemlandskaya grouping.... On 24 June 1945, at the head of the consolidated regiment of the First Baltic Front, Ivan Khristoforovich passed in front of the Lenin Mausoleum during the time of the Victory Parade.

In the postwar years, Ivan Khristoforovich occupied the positions of commander of the forces of the Baltic Military District, chief inspector of the Ministry of Defense, and head of the Military Academy of the General Staff. He was deputy ministry of defense and chief of rear services of the Armed Forces of the USSR for 10 years. Precisely then began a new stage in the

development of this complex military organization. To a considerable extent because of the efforts of Marshal of the Soviet Union I. Kh. Bagramyan (he was given this rank in 1955), the rear became mechanized, mobile and capable of doing a significantly greater volume of work. Under the leadership of I. Kh. Bagramyan, much was done to raise the level of the technical equipment of the rear.

Ivan Khristoforovich was a person of amazing industry and devotion to the cause, to which he dedicated his life. He did much public work, was a member of the CPSU Central Committee and a deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet. He nevertheless found time to prepare his historical memoirs, in which he convincingly, truthfully and instructively told about the war and about the people with whom he served. Thus, his last book was named "Velikogo naroda synovya" [Sons of a Great Nation]. In it, with wonderful warmth, the author told about outstanding commanders.

The merits of Ivan Khristoforovich were twice honored with the title of Hero of the Soviet Union and he was awarded many orders and medals. His entire life, given to the army and the people, was a brilliant page in the military annals of our Motherland.

#### **Babin on Bagramyan Anniversary**

18010106 Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian  
1 Dec 87 p 3

[Article by Maj Gen A. Babin, doctor of historical sciences and professor: "An Outstanding Commander: On the 90th Anniversary of the Birth of I. Kh. Bagramyan: A Life Covered with Glory"]

[Text] Ivan Khristoforovich belongs to a entire pleiad of glorious commanders who came from among the people and went through the crucibles of the civil and Great Patriotic wars.

Ivan Khristoforovich was born 90 years ago on 2 December 1897. He served in the czar's army. After the Great October Socialist Revolution, he took an active part in the struggle for the establishment of Soviet authority in Armenia and Georgia. In December 1920, he voluntarily joined the Red Army, in which he served for 62 years until the final days of his life. After the end of the civil war, I. Kh. Bagramyan remained in the ranks of the Red Army and held a number of command positions. In 1931, his remarkable abilities, combat experience and desire to obtain a higher education led Ivan Khristoforovich to the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze.

Then came service in Kiev Military District in the position of chief of staff of the cavalry division. The district command almost always gave a high evaluation to the work of the staff that he headed. In 1936, I. Kh. Bagramyan was a candidate for appointment to a higher position and, at the same time, there was the possibility that he could go study at the just-established academy of

the General Staff. In a conversation with him, the commander of the military district I.E. Yakir said: "We intend to make you a chief of a corps staff but now you have another enticing opportunity—to study at the academy of the General Staff. The choice is yours." Without hesitating, Ivan Khristoforovich asked that they send him to study.

After the successful conclusion of his studies at the academy, I. Kh. Bagramyan was left in teaching work.

In 1939, Ivan Khristoforovich joined the ranks of the Communist Party. In the fall of 1940, after a number of persistent requests, they sent him to the Kiev Special Military District. On the eve of the war, I. Kh. Bagramyan became head of an operational section—deputy chief of staff of this district. The year 1941 was a difficult one for our army. Under the pressure of the numerically superior enemy, the Soviet forces, including those of the Southwest Front, retreated and suffered heavy losses. A difficult situation was created in the approaches to Kiev. The district command, knowing the abilities of Bagramyan, sends him to the staff of the consolidated rayon with the task of elaborating measures to strengthen the defense of the Ukrainian capital. For more than 2 months, from 11 July to 19 September 1941, the Kiev Consolidated Rayon was in the path of Hitler's troops.

At the end of December 1941, Bagramyan is given the next rank of Lt Gen. In the spring of 1942, he is appointed chief of staff of the Southwest Front. It must be said that Bagramyan repeatedly appealed to headquarters that they transfer to a command position. In July 1942, he is appointed commander of the 16th Army of the Western Front. In February and March 1943, General Bagramyan's ability to direct troops was revealed especially in the course of the army's offensive operation in the direction of Bryansk in a difficult situation. In April 1943, for successful actions in this operation, the 16th Army was renamed the 11th Guard Army and its army commander was awarded the commander's Kutusov Order First Class.

In the summer of 1943, the 11th Guard Army took part in the Orlov Offensive Operation. Ivan Khristoforovich was also invited to headquarters for a meeting where the plan of the operation was being discussed. In his memoirs, he writes that after the report by the deputy chief of the General Staff, Gen A.I. Antonov, Supreme Commander I. V. Stalin expressed his agreement with the essence of the plan but at the same time he asked: "Perhaps there are other opinions on this matter?"

"I decided to take advantage of the question asked," writes I. Kh. Bagramyan, "and declared that I had my own opinion in regard to the delivery of a blow against the left wing of the Hitler grouping.... It seemed to me that a dispute would arise and I would be crushed by the authority of the big three—the deputy chief of the General Staff and two front commanders. But it turned out quite differently. My report was followed by a



minute or two of silence. Apparently I had been successful in arguing my proposal sufficiently convincingly. It was adopted without serious objections."

General Bagramyan showed himself to be a talented commander in the Orlov Offensive Operation. The Soviet Government highly valued the merits of Ivan Khristoforovich, awarding him the commander's Suvorov Order First Class and giving him the rank of colonel general.

In November 1943, I. Kh. Bagramyan is appointed commander of the First Baltic Front. His outstanding abilities as a front commander were revealed in the preparation for the carrying out of the Belorussian Operation in the summer of 1944. In the first 6 days of the offensive, the troops of the front broke through the enemy's defense, forced the West Dvina and, with the help of the forces of the Third Belorussian Front, surrounded and destroyed the enemy's Vitebsk grouping and liberated Vitebsk. On 29 July 1944, for outstanding successes achieved by the troops of the front in the Belorussian Operation and for personal courage, Army Gen I. Kh. Bagramyan was awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

In speaking of Army Gen I. Kh. Bagramyan, one must not fail to mention his actions in the role of commander of the Zemlandskaya Group of forces in carrying out the East Prussian Operation. The situation that had developed in East Prussia required the unification of all forces that were in this direction at the time. In this connection, the forces of the First Baltic Front were reorganized into the Zemlandskaya Group of forces, which became part of the Third Belorussian Front. Gen I. Kh. Bagramyan was appointed group commander and deputy commander of this front.

The successes of the forces of the Soviet Army in the spring operations of 1945, including in East Prussia, led to the utter defeat of fascist Germany and its capitulation. For outstanding merits in the operations of this period, Army Gen I. Kh. was awarded still another commander's order, the Suvorov Order First Class. On 19 April 1945, he was made commander of the forces of the Third Belorussian Front.

After the war, Army Gen I. Kh. Bagramyan commanded the forces of the Baltic Military District for 9 years. Here he earned the popular approval and respect not only of the commanders and soldiers of the district but also among the population of the Baltic republics. In May 1954, he was promoted to the position of chief inspector of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR. And within a year, he became deputy minister of defense and was given the high rank of marshal of the Soviet Union. Subsequently Ivan Khristoforovich was director of the Military Academy of the General Staff, deputy minister of defense and chief of the rear services of the Armed Forces of the USSR, and general inspector in the group of general inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

For outstanding merits in the postwar years, I. Kh. Bagramyan received a number of government awards and was also awarded many foreign orders. On his 80th birthday, he was awarded his second "Gold Star" medal. He authored a number of scientific works and memoirs. Beginning in 1924, he was elected member of local soviets in a number of cities in the country and beginning in 1946 until the final days of his life he was elected deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet. In 1952, Ivan Khristoforovich became a candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee and in 1961 he became member of the CPSU Central Committee.

Ivan Khristoforovich died on 21 September 1982. He was buried at the Kremlin wall in Red Square.

**'Strategic Computer Initiative': C3 Component of SDI**

18010084a Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 12, Dec 87 p 31

[Article, published under the heading "Imperialism Unmasked," by Yu. Karbovskiy, candidate of technical sciences: "Strategic Computer Initiative"]

[Text] The Washington leadership, in its drive for a chimerical military superiority over the USSR, as is known, has been wagering on realizing the Strategic Defensive Initiative. In analyzing the prerequisites for realizing the SDI, American scientists hired by the Pentagon have concluded that for the conduct of Star Wars it is essential to develop fundamentally new computers which will control the ground and space objects. For this reason, in October 1983, the United States announced the development of a program for a Strategic Computer Initiative (SCI). Over a billion dollars have already been allocated for the given purposes, a special agency has been organized and around 15,000 firms put to work.

It is assumed that as a result, by 1995 it will be possible to design systems which will have an artificial intelligence and definite elements of "logical thinking" and be able to take independent decisions. The Pentagon is hoping that these systems, in being isolated from side effects, will behave in unpredictable situations as the best specialists. Their "memory" will include a certain amount of knowledge called an expert artificial intelligence system with not only general information but also data which sometimes contradict classic views and are the result of "human" experience and based on a "sixth sense." Naturally, the chief component in such a system is a powerful computer with colossal speed and an enormous on-line memory.

Within the SCI, research is being carried out in three areas.

The first is work on an "autonomous means of transport" (AMT) which is a ground propulsion unit which without human involvement can choose the optimum path of movement, possesses the capacity to determine the danger arising from the enemy and in the event of necessity open fire with nuclear warheads. The AMT is conceived of as an offensive weapon of an automated battlefield and in addition can stand guard duty at particularly important facilities.

The contract for developing the AMT has been obtained by the well-known defense firm Martin Marietta and as the basis for the software they have employed research by the Artificial Vision Laboratory at the University of Maryland in analyzing images received with the aid of TV cameras. At present, they are developing a visual system making it possible for the AMT to move at a speed of 6 km an hour in bypassing obstacles and secretly from the enemy.

The main problem in the work on the AMT is the onboard computer. Even the presently most powerful microcomputer cannot process the information on the surrounding situation and requires that the AMT stop every 5 m. In order that the AMT can move without halting, it is essential to increase the computer speed by approximately 100-fold, bringing this up to 10 billion operations a second while its size should not exceed the dimensions of a typewriter. Incidentally, the analysis of a photograph employing a microcomputer presently requires around 3 weeks, while a supercomputer weighing several tons and occupying a space of a hundred square meters can carry out this task in an hour. For the AMT an analysis of everything "seen" by its TV cameras should be performed virtually instantaneously.

The SCI Program also provides for the development of an "assistant astronaut (pilot)," that is, a computer which should quickly process the information received by the spacecraft or aircraft and provide man with recommendations on possible actions in one or another specific situation. It should replace the flight engineer, the gunner, the navigator and the co-pilot. If the astronaut is unable to assess the situation, the "assistant" itself takes the decision and begins to carry it out. At the same time provision is made that the man can block the action of the computer if he is not in agreement.

It is felt essential to incorporate in the "assistant" a unit for flight life support and this will be responsible for the functioning of all the in-flight systems and monitor them continuously and determine what units have failed and which ones of those still surviving in the course of combat will assume their functions and how the created situation influences the carrying out of the task posed for the astronaut.

Finally, the third component of the SCI is the system for controlling the theater of operations. A superpowerful computer will be its brain. It is assumed that by 1990, they will have created computers with a speed of 10-20 billion operations a second and by 1995, a system will be developed based on artificial intelligence. The system should ensure decision taking and the preparation of scenarios for combat over the next 96 hours. There are plans to develop a center which would employ 40 persons and capable of processing information even with a 10-fold increase in its volume.

All that has been mentioned above is more like an advertising brochure or a science fiction work. However, Washington considers the ideas as completely feasible. Starting in 1987, 18,000 highly-skilled scientists and engineers will be involved in the SCI. The Pentagon even now is hiring 30 percent of the graduates from the nation's engineering schools and one out of eight of these is to be involved in the SCI.

Certainly, the decision to put the responsibility for the employment of superdestructive weapons on computers can only be termed irresponsible. Thus, the AMT in

operating without human involvement can in the aims of self-defense, that is, defense of an iron being, use a nuclear weapon. The same can be carried out by the "astronaut's assistant" if the astronaut is wounded then the system takes the decision itself. In other words, the development of military facilities based on artificial intelligence means that in real combat situations, control over them can be lost, their conduct becomes unpredictable and the consequences of their actions are irreversible.

But the main danger comes from the low reliability of the extremely complex programs which are used to operate the computers controlling the military systems.

For example, according to information in the press, in the most crucial instances, a written and fully developed program should still be tested out by a commission of skilled specialists. As has been stated by the journal *Scientific American*, the program for the in-flight computers of the Space Shuttle was studied by a group of experts which was almost as large as the collective of compilers. The test took as much time as the elaboration of the program. But, regardless of the close inspection, the very first flight of the Space Shuttle showed major programming shortcomings.

The complexity of the programs for the SDI computers is even difficult to imagine. On the other hand, it is well known how difficult it is to avoid errors even in shorter programs. The French magazine *Le Point* has written that at present between the American scientists there is no unanimity on the question of the possibility of developing dependable programs for the SDI. Some are hoping for new methods and for new programming languages which are close to ordinary English and for the testing of programs by other programs. Others are persuaded that no one can detect all errors down to a single one and any of these can put the world on the brink of disaster.

The American Star Wars Plans bring mankind the real threat of annihilation. At present, all the progressive forces of the world must be mobilized to resist these.

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10272

**PRAVDA Notes Arrival of U.S. F-5s in Honduras**  
18010060e Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Dec 87 p 5

[Report by PRAVDA correspondent N. Ognev: "Under the Pentagon Flag"]

[Text] Mexico City, 18 Dec—Two American F-5 interceptors have arrived at Honduras' Goloson air base in La Ceiba Department. They are the first of 12 combat aircraft sold to Honduras by the Pentagon to be delivered within the next 2 years.

As a result of the efforts of the American military, just about the poorest state in all of Latin America has been turned into the largest military air power in the region in the past few years. That nation's air force is armed with more than 60 combat aircraft of different types.

A representative of the Honduran Ministry of Defense has stated that the combat aircraft which have just arrived from the American MacDill Air Base have a maximum speed exceeding 1,700 kilometers per hour and are equipped with powerful armament.

Such awesome weapons are hardly necessary for a nation with a total area of only 112,000 square kilometers, whose borders are threatened by practically no one. Other interests are evident. Turned into a Pentagon military base, Honduras not only permits shipments of American weapons onto its territory but also serves as a cover for the buildup of U.S. combat strength in Central America.

11499

**U.S. F-16s in Spain Said To Conduct 'Training Raids' Toward Soviet Border**

18010060c Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
18 Dec 87 p 4

[Report by IZVESTIYA correspondent V. Vernikov under the rubric "Spain-USA": "Another Postponement"]

[Text] Madrid—It is not such a simple matter, it turns out, to get the Spanish-American talks on bases moving again. They were broken off in October "until better times," which were expected by both sides.

The U.S. was hoping for at least some sort of concessions or weakening in official Madrid's position. The latter, in turn, called for respecting the opinion of the majority of Spaniards, who, during a referendum on the nation's membership in NATO, indicated that they wanted a reduction in the American military presence, and particularly the removal of the two air bases. Incredible as it seems, the Soviet-American Agreement to Eliminate Intermediate-and Shorter-Range Missiles has recently been used by both sides as a unique argument in the drawn-out talks.

Using the very fact of the signing of the agreement, the U.S. has attempted to convince its intractable partners that right now, when there will be no American missiles in Europe, talk about eliminating the bases is the equivalent almost of egotistical obliviousness to "NATO's strategic interests in southern Europe." The Spanish Government has maintained in response that since there will also be no Soviet missiles, it makes no sense to have on its territory American aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons, all the more since the press has already published reports on training raids by F-16s from the base at Torrejon toward the borders of the USSR. In



short, on the eve of the next round of talks, scheduled for 17-19 December, there has been a fairly lively propaganda squabble, which included a leakage of information, clearly arranged from overseas, to the effect that these aircraft could find a haven either in Portugal or in Belgium, from which it would be approximately the same distance as from Madrid to Italy and Turkey, where they would be armed with nuclear missiles in case of a conflict.

This "trial balloon" did not float very long, however. First the Belgian Government and then, during a recent visit to Spain, Portuguese President M. Soares absolutely rejected this option. Furthermore, a representative of the Spanish Government has announced, "there have been no perceptible moves recently in the U.S. position toward a coming together with the Spanish side in the approach to this problem," and there is therefore no point in meeting again.

A new date has now been set for the next round, mid-January of next year, but no one here is expressing any confidence that it will take place.

11499

#### **U.S. Defense Memorandum Said To Increase Israeli Aggressiveness**

180100606 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
17 Dec 87p 3

[Article by V. Vinogradov under the rubric "Military-Political Commentary": "They Reward the Occupiers"]

[Text] The UN Security Council, convened at the demand of the Arab member nations, continues to consider the situation which has developed in Israeli-occupied Arab land. The participants in the sessions stressed the fact that there has recently been an unprecedented campaign of violence against the indigenous Arab population. Syria's representative directed special attention to the fact that the local residents are subjected to the cruelest of repression if they make any attempt to respond to the violence.

During the past week alone several dozen people have been killed and more than 700 wounded on the West Bank of the Jordan River and in the Gaza Strip. The Jordanian newspaper AD-DUSTUR states that the scale of the present protests by the Arab population, driven to desperation, is such that there is every basis for speaking of a popular uprising. Women, old people and children are taking an active part in the riots by helping the patriots to erect barricades.

The "hawks" in Tel Aviv, alarmed by the growing wave of protests, have announced that the strictest of steps will be taken with respect to the Arab population in the occupied territories. An order was issued to open fire on the participants in street processions and at "suspicious" gatherings of Palestinians, and to use tear gas. And the

occupiers are firing and using gas. A few days ago they burst into the central hospital in the city of Gaza and tossed tear-gas grenades into wards containing sick and wounded Palestinians. They threw people from their beds and beat them with the butts of semi-automatic rifles. According to the American television company CBS, the Israelis are tying Arab hostages captured on the street to their police vans and military trucks to protect them against stones and Molotov cocktails.

Tel Aviv has simultaneously drastically stepped up its acts of armed provocation against neighboring Lebanon. Concentrated in the so-called "danger zone," Israeli troops are not only subjecting the peaceful population to rocket and artillery shelling but also carrying out predatory raids deep into Lebanese territory. Aircraft with Israeli markings are inflicting strikes against Palestinian camps, with women and children as their victims.

At a time when the condemnation of the criminal acts of Israel's ruling elite is growing in the world and demands are increasing that it cease its policy of massive terror, in Washington, where they like to boast about "protecting" human rights, an event has occurred which can be assessed as nothing other than direct encouragement of the Israeli punitive expeditions. Israeli Defense Minister Y. Rabin, in Washington on an official visit, signed an agreement with Pentagon Chief F. Carlucci, which raises military cooperation between Israel and the United States to a fundamentally new level. This document, called a "memorandum of mutual understanding," grants Tel Aviv privileges enjoyed only by the European NATO nations in the joint implementation with the USA of arms research and development projects. The memorandum also calls for the removal of the last formal restrictions on shipments of American military equipment to Tel Aviv. Also noteworthy is the fact that I. Rabin and F. Carlucci discussed also the matter of transferring from 75 to 100 American F-16 fighter-bombers to the Israeli air force. In addition, F. Carlucci assured his Israeli colleague that, despite serious budgetary difficulties, Washington will not reduce the amount of American aid to Tel Aviv, which is approaching 4 billion dollars annually.

Is it surprising, following such "memoranda of mutual understanding" and assurances from Washington, that Tel Aviv is not considering halting the "iron fist" policy in occupied Arab land or satisfying the legal right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. As long as Israel is receiving support from Washington and counting on force, the Syrian newspaper AS-SAURA states, peace and tranquility will not come to the Near East. The question of self-determination for the Palestinian people can and must be resolved by political means, by convening an international conference on the Near East, with the participation of all the parties concerned.

11499

**Peresada on U.S.-Israeli Defense Memorandum**  
*18010060d Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian*  
17 Dec 87 p 5

[Article by Vladimir Peresada under the rubric "The Commentator's Column": "A Dangerous Partnership"]

[Text] The Israeli Minister of Defense and the U.S. Secretary of Defense have signed a "memorandum of mutual understanding" in Washington. It gives Tel Aviv a number of the military benefits enjoyed by the European NATO allies of the United States.

Why was this needed? After all, Israel is already perhaps Washington's closest partner. Unvaryingly conducting a pro-American course in the Near East, it relies on the full support of the USA. An American-Israeli "strategic cooperation" agreement has been in effect for several years, which is essentially a military-political alliance. It provides the basis for "operational coordination of actions," for an active exchange of intelligence, for the development of plans for joint maneuvers, and for preparations for the establishment of Pentagon stockpiles in Israel. Finally, no other foreign nation receiving American military "assistance" receives as much as Israel: almost 2 billion dollars in nonrepayable subsidies annually.

The Israeli leaders have repeatedly stated that all of this is not enough, however, and attempted to obtain more. The fact is that there are certain restrictions on U.S. military cooperation with states outside of NATO. The main one pertains to the latest types and systems of American weapons. Such weapons are ordinarily not provided or are sent after a long delay to "friendly" nations not linked to the bloc.

This restriction is now being lifted with respect to Israel. Furthermore, Tel Aviv is being granted more extensive rights to sell its weapons in the USA, and Israeli companies are being granted permission to compete on an equal basis with American and NATO companies for Pentagon military contracts. In other words, Tel Aviv has been granted "most favored military" status.

It is no accident that Washington has taken this step precisely now, when demands are growing throughout the world for an end to the drawn-out conflict in the Near East and for a political settlement there based on the removal of Israeli troops from occupied Arab land and the guaranteeing of the rights of the Palestinian Arabs. These demands were reflected in new resolutions recently passed by the UN General Assembly. And literally immediately afterward, as we can see, the U.S. moved to meet Tel Aviv's "needs," thereby demonstrating support for its aggressive course and its own line of sabotaging attempts to achieve a settlement in the region.

The "memorandum of mutual understanding" places American-Israeli militaristic cooperation onto an even more dangerous level. This creates the danger of new, large-scale adventures in the Near East and exacerbation of the international situation as a whole.

11499

**Review of Western Views on Future Fighter Aircraft**

*18010081b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian*  
6 Jan 88 p 3

[Article, published under the heading "Military Technical Review," by Col A. Krasnov, doctor of military sciences, professor: "Fighter Aircraft: A Look to Tomorrow"]

[Text] The change in generations of fighter aircraft, as foreign military observers have pointed out, is coming to the next round. A particular feature of it is that design thought is searching intensely for new engineer ideas for broadening the area of aircraft combat employment in a greater range of altitudes and speeds. As follows from statements in the foreign press, success can be achieved here, in addition to all else, by controlling the engine thrust vector and utilizing an automatic system for controlling the aerodynamic forces.

In the interests of close air combat, as before, it is considered essential to have a convenient cockpit which does not limit the view and possibility of the pilot to constantly have visual contact with the aircrafts of the opposing side as well as good controllability in flight modes close to critical.

In the area of weaponry, regardless of the essential differences in designs and the over-all concepts determining them, one can not rather clearly a tendency to outfit the fighter aircraft with long- and medium-range all-angle missiles as well as short-range missiles and cannons. Behind this one can spot a desire to create powerful weapons which could hit air targets at different ranges and at any angle.

The foreign specialists see the surmounting of the difficulties which stand on this path in establishing autonomous missiles, that is, those which after launching are guided to the target without constant tracking by the onboard radar. In having free-flying missiles, the pilot is able, immediately after launching them, to begin carrying out another maneuver. In other words, "fire and forget."

A qualitatively new technical idea is seen by the foreign specialists in the possibility of launching missiles away from one's aircraft and altering the thrust vector of their engines. It is assumed that this would make it possible to compensate for the insufficient fighter maneuverability and improve the effectiveness of the missiles. As has

been announced by the magazine *Air Force*, the possibilities are being sought out for the pilot to launch missiles against different targets. This will have the greatest impact upon the tactics of air combat, as foreign specialists have pointed out. But here one must stipulate the difficulties of developing the corresponding aircraft radars.

The next generation radars being designed for fighters, in the opinion of developers, will be an organic part of a unified flight and weapon control system. In addition to the radars, this will include electron optical and navigation equipment and a multifunctional display system. Such automated systems which bring together the information sensors for tracking air targets with the displays and controls, as the foreign specialists assume, will ensure the simultaneous tracking of a large number of targets and greatly ease the pilot's work.

There is the natural desire, as the magazine *Flight* has pointed out, to further increase the detection range for air targets, primarily the low-flying and small ones. The designers are endeavoring to increase the power of radar irradiation, using along with the pulsed mode, the pulsed-Doppler mode with coherent signal processing with a high pulse repetition rate.

At the same time, the search is under way for dependable means to identify and recognize air targets. For example, the U.S. Air Force is developing systems based upon programmable processors the memories of which store the entire range of irradiation from the radio electronic equipment of a probable enemy aircraft. At the same time, equipment is being developed for disclosing the modulation of the returned signals which is specific for each type of aircraft and which is caused by the rotation of the engine compressor blades and the means are being sought for rapidly processing the signals employed to analyze the detection features. These are certain traits in the new generation of fighters. In possessing high performance, powerful weapons and highly automated control systems, they, as the observers have emphasized, create the prerequisites for a fundamental change in the tactics of air combat. But in order for these prerequisites to be turned into a reality, the statements emphasize, there must be a great creative search in tactics. The attempt to take over a new aircraft with old tactical procedures has never brought success to anyone.

10272

**Pentagon Said To Seek Japanese Aid for New Conventional Weapons**

18010074a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
24 Dec 87 p 3

[Article by V. Vinogradov: "They Entrap..."]

[Text] The creation of military robots and the latest models of weapons, and the development of ultra-fast computers for automated systems to control combat

operations—such proposals have recently been directed to the Japanese corporations from Pentagon offices, which are attempting to drag Tokyo into the next large-scale militaristic program. According to the newspaper IOMIURI, already in January of next year Washington counts on obtaining an agreement from Japanese Prime Minister N. Takeshita when he arrives in the U. S. on an official visit to participate in the so-called "Balanced Technological Initiative" (STI). Under this cloudy name, states the newspaper, is concealed a comprehensive plan for creating fundamentally new types of non-nuclear weapons of increased accuracy and destructive force. With their assistance, emphasizes IOMIURI, the Pentagon hopes to patch up the "gaps" that in its opinion implementation of the treaty between the USSR and U. S. on the elimination of intermediate and shorter range missiles will create.

Washington plans to involve its main allies in this new "initiative," distributing among them the financial burden for cranking up the latest spiral in the arms race. One of the primary roles is allocated to Japan. The authors of this program intend to use the scientific and technological capability of the Land of the Rising Sun, first of all to create RPVs [remotely powered vehicles] capable of operating independently at low altitudes, for example against tanks. The list of potential orders of the American side also includes radar stations to guide short range missiles and torpedoes, and miniature computers for comprehensive battlefield control. It should be noted that Japanese specialists have already been involved in creating a robot tank in the U.S., which is to independently find and destroy targets. According to Kyodo news service, a group of Pentagon experts is coming to Japan to become familiar with the most promising developments of local companies.

As is known, already in July of this year the Japanese Government signed an agreement with Washington about the conditions for Japanese participation in the American "Star Wars" program. A few days ago the U. S. administration proposed that the Japanese Government and private companies in this country take part in research on creating a "Japanese variant" of SDI. In the words of the newspaper NIKON KEIDZAI, Washington views this project as an integral part of SDI, and in order to entice Tokyo states that it will serve the goals of "the defense of Japan." The "Japanese variant" provides for extensive involvement of Tokyo in development of the latest military technology and participation of Japan in plans for the militarization of space. Six Japanese companies, in particular Mitsubishi, Hitati, and Fujitsu, are already planning to undertake joint steps to obtain the corresponding orders from the U. S. in the new year.

So Washington, using various channels, will strive to involve Japan, having in mind especially her scientific and technological capability, in its militaristic programs. And, judging by everything, there are those on the Japanese islands who, for the sake of possible profits, are not against allowing the country to be dragged into a



costly arms race, including in space, and one which, most importantly, is fraught with serious consequences. Moreover, in the plan for conventional arms, Japan doesn't look all that bad in Washington's opinion. Senator Rockefeller reported with satisfaction during a speech in the U.S. Congress that by 1990 Tokyo will move up from its current sixth place to fourth in terms of the level of its expenditures, overtaking Britain and France in this index. The growth rates of Japanese military expenditures serve as a guarantee of this, the senator believes. In the last five years they have comprised 5.6 percent, which is more than three times that of the similar NATO index. Rockefeller also cited other figures that indicated the growing might of the Japanese "Self Defense Forces." Thus, in terms of the size of her Air Force, they have exceeded all of the U.S. Air Force deployed in Asia, and the size of the Japanese naval forces is almost half that of the U.S. 7th Fleet.

The newspaper MAINITI, which published this data, states that Japan "is already a major military power." But, this is not enough for Washington and Tokyo. They display interest in further increasing the military might of the Land of the Rising Sun.

9069

#### Vilenkov on NATO Naval Mine Tactics, Hardware

18010054h Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
18 Dec 87 p 3

[Article by Cpt 2nd Rank V. Vilenkov under the "In the NATO Staffs and Armies" rubric: "They Are Preparing a Mine War"]

[Text] A sea mine. Much has been written about this insidious weapon in textbooks and numerous military memoirs. The appearance of ultramodern arms somewhat blunted the attention of military specialists to mine weapons. But not for long. Today they have again begun to talk about mines and with the most serious note. Materials have appeared in NATO military periodicals whose authors, in analyzing the experience of the local wars and conflicts of recent years, including the current crisis in the Persian Gulf, invariably stress the fact that mines remain a quite effective, reliable and comparatively inexpensive means of armed combat on the seas. In accordance with such an assessment, the conclusion is drawn that the proper importance must be given to the preparation for the waging of "mine warfare."

What meaning do NATO military specialists assign to the concept "mine warfare"? Extremely specific meaning, it must be noted. It is a complex of measures aimed, in the first place, at the use of mine and antimine weapons for the purpose of making difficult the actions of the enemy's war and transport ships; in the second place, the establishment of favorable conditions for the utilization of their own naval forces. It is thought that "mine warfare" will be waged systematically in the form

of special operations for the laying of mines and the organization of antimine defense using naval forces as well as aviation. In this connection, no special secret is made of the main intention of NATO strategists, which consists in gaining an advantage from the special features of the geographic position of the Soviet Union from the very start of a war and the "bottling up" of the ships of the Soviet Navy in internal seas, thereby realizing the concept of "advanced naval boundaries." In particular, it is a matter, for example, of setting up mine barriers in the water areas between North Cape and the island of Spitsbergen, in the Baltic Sea and in the straits zone of the Black Sea.

In the course of the waging of military actions, it is planned to set up offensive as well as defensive mine barriers. The primary role is assigned to the former. Their use, in the opinion of the NATO command, will make it possible to restrain and impede to the maximum extent possible the deployment of the enemy's naval forces in the regions of active military actions in his territorial waters and in the exits from his naval bases and ports.

It is planned to lay defensive mine barriers in the territorial waters of the states participating in NATO and in regions in which the joint naval forces of the bloc intend to achieve supremacy. Their objective is to protect the coastal regions against strikes from the sea and a possible landing of naval forces and to hinder the breakthrough of the enemy's ships into the Norwegian, North and Mediterranean seas and into the eastern Atlantic.

In the course of the working out of the tasks in the laying of mines in exercises, the NATO command puts strict demands on the stability of mine barriers. In its opinion, this is achieved through the antimineweeping characteristics of the mines (above all explosive mines), the necessary protection of minefields, and the possibility of their being replenished promptly in the event that the enemy is able to weaken these fields as a result of measures in antimine defense. The closest attention is being paid to the utilization of so-called self-transporting mines released from submarines. NATO military specialists think that the utilization of this type of mine will make it possible to attain a high degree of secrecy and will make the deployment of the enemy's naval strike forces substantially more difficult.

At the end of April of this year, the joint naval forces of NATO carried out a special exercise of the minesweeping forces under the code name "Blue Harrier 87," in which more than 40 warships and auxiliary ships of the naval forces of the FRG, Great Britain, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands and Norway were put into action. Furthermore, questions in the laying of mine barriers were worked out in the comprehensive exercises of the NATO joint naval forces "Botany Bay 87" and "Ocean Safari 87" as well as in the course of the recently concluded exercise of the national naval forces of the

FRG "SEF-2/87." A characteristic feature of this exercise is that submarines of Project 206 equipped with special mine belts were involved in the laying of mines in the most important regions already checked by the minesweeping forces of the enemy. As the foreign press notes, by utilizing the mine belts (one on each side), the submarine can carry up to 24 bottom mines (in addition to its basic armament).

In the opinion of NATO admirals, antimine operations are an integral part of "mine warfare." They are intended to ensure the combat operations of naval forces and navigation under the conditions in which the enemy is utilizing mine weapons. In discussing antimine operations, some Western specialists get so carried away at times that they allow themselves to fantasize on what can hardly be done in practice. Thus, retired Belgian Vice Admiral Shlim, who previously occupied the post of chief of staff of the Belgian Navy, gives preference, as he puts it, to "offensive" antimine operations. He includes in this concept the disruption of the enemy's measures for the laying of mines through the destruction of the industrial enterprises producing the mines (!), the destruction of naval bases and depots as well as the suppliers of mines at dislocation points, in advancement routes, and in the regions for the laying of mine barriers.

It is planned to carry out antimine operations actively, above all by means of the organization of minesweeping tasks in the detection, determination of the boundaries and destruction of mine barriers, the escorting of ships behind minesweepers, the search for and destruction of floating mines, and the detection, raising and neutralization of moored and bottom mines. Simultaneously with this, it is planned from the beginning of combat operations to organize continuous and intensive observation of the enemy's naval forces carrying out minelaying operations, to determine precisely safe routes for their own ships, to strive for the strict observance in these routes of the measures to weaken the magnetic field and noises, etc

At the present time, the NATO countries have activated work to equip the naval forces with the most efficient minesweeping equipment. It is thought, for example, that the use of sweepers and mine searchers equipped with up-to-date hydroacoustic stations and self-propelled heat-guided underwater devices significantly raises the safety of the performance of minesweeping work, because it is no longer necessary for the ships to pass directly over the mines. In addition, in this case the strong sides of combined detonators, multiplicity instruments and other devices raising the degree of protection of mines are neutralized.

At the same time, as they believe in NATO, traditional sweepers equipped with contact and noncontact sweeps also maintain their value. The fact is that contemporary

sweepers-searchers and helicopters-sweepers are not always suitable for the destruction of outdated models of mines. The fighting experience in the Persian Gulf confirms this.

Great hopes are being placed on the multipurpose ships of this class. Thus, a ship was recently built in Denmark whose entire armament is accomplished in the form of interchangeable containers. Because of this, the ship can be converted into a sweeper, a small rocket boat, or a patrol or guard boat within 4 hours. The innovation interested many companies involved in the building of warships.

In conclusion, I would like to note a detail of considerable importance. In connection with the signing of the treaty between the USSR and United States on the elimination of medium and shorter-range missiles, voices are already being heard in the United States and NATO in favor of the taking of the corresponding "compensating" measures. In part, these measures imply the strengthening of the American naval presence in European waters and the expansion of naval bases. All of this will surely also be reflected in the specific area of the military actions of the NATO joint naval forces that in the bloc is usually called preparation for "mine warfare."

9746

#### **Zheglor Comments on S. African Incursion Into Angola**

18010054a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
10 Dec 87 p 3

[Article by Cpt M. Zheglor: "Accomplices of the Aggressors"]

[Text] Alarming news is coming from the southern part of the African continent. The racist regime of the Republic of South Africa has come down on the People's Republic of Angola with its entire military might, including armored units, aircraft and large-caliber artillery. To achieve his criminal objectives, the aggressor does not hesitate to use any means including chemical weapons in the regions of Angola bordering Namibia.

As reported by the Nigerian newspaper GUARDIAN, the racist troops invaded Angola not only to save Unita bands but also to destabilize the situation in the country as a whole.

The regime in Pretoria is trying to justify its aggression by referring to the fact that Cuban servicemen and specialists from the Soviet Union are helping the Government of Angola.

As V. Vasev, staff member of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, emphasized at a press conference on Monday, the Cuban troops are in Angola at the request of its legal government in full accordance with the UN Charter. Their task is to provide assistance to a sovereign

state in defending it against aggression by the racist regime. The Soviet specialists in Angola at the request of the government of this country are not participating in any military actions.

The regime of Pretoria is carrying out a well-planned aggressive policy in relation to Angola as well as other sovereign African states. It is sending its agents into these countries, is financing and arming antigovernment groupings, and is carrying out propaganda campaigns. At the same time, the racists are building up their military potential and developing a military industry. In so doing, they are paying primary attention to the development of offensive weapons: missiles and armored materiel. According to press information, the Republic of South Africa has already created an engine for its own cruise missile and has given its industry the task of creating a reliable guidance system for it. They have begun to develop up-to-date anti-aircraft missiles and are formulating plans for building new models of a tank and armored vehicle.

It is necessary to say right out that the increase in the military potential of the South African racists is being carried out with the blessing and support of their protectors abroad. They not only are undertaking attempts to break through the political isolation of the Republic of South Africa but are grossly violating Resolution 418 of the UN Security Council that prohibits deliveries of arms and military technology to the regime of Pretoria. Tel Aviv in particular is thriving in this. As the English newspaper SUNDAY TELEGRAPH reported, the aircraft of the South African air forces that have been circling over Angola and Mozambique are equipped with an Israeli electronic system that makes it more difficult to aim anti-aircraft missiles at them. Also participating in the aggression of the racists against Angola is a reconnaissance aircraft built with the help of Israel on the basis of a "Boeing" passenger aircraft, from which air strikes are aimed at targets in Angolan territory.

The Zionist and racist regimes have also organized close cooperation in the creation of military equipment. Israeli specialists helped the Republic of South Africa in the production of the "Chita" jet fighter based on the Israeli aircraft "Kfir." According to the South African newspaper STAR, more than 50 Israeli engineers have recently come to the Republic of South Africa. They will help organize the production of a South African version of the "Lavi" fighter bomber for the racist air forces.

Israel's help to the regime of the white minority in the south of Africa is not, however, limited to deliveries of arms and the transfer of military technology, the cost of which, according to the English journal ECONOMIST, was more than \$1 billion last year alone. More than 300 Israeli servicemen are in the Republic of South Africa at all times transferring their "experience" in punishing the defenseless population of the occupied Arab lands to their colleagues from the racist armed forces. Neither

was Pretoria able to hide from the public the fact that some of the Israelis are in the southern regions of Angola participating in military operations as advisers.

And Great Britain is trying not to lag behind Israel. More than 600 of its firms have established close ties with the Republic of South Africa. With their help, the racists set up the production of armored plate, artillery shells and napalm. Facts of the regular exchange of military information between the armed commands of the Republic of South Africa and Great Britain have been made public. According to the newspaper JORNAL DI ANGOLA, English specialists are supplying the regime of Pretoria with information from spy satellites on the military potential of the African "front" states. The Republic of South Africa also obtained access to English nuclear technology by recruiting fanatical nuclear specialists.

Nor are West German firms abandoning their own attempts to get around the UN embargo on deliveries of weapons to the Republic of South Africa. At the end of November, for example, the Messerschmidt-Boelkow-Blom concern transferred a batch of helicopters to the regime of Pretoria. The deal was carried out through the Bantustans of Siskei and Venda but this does not change the essence of the matter, since their military formations are an integral part of the army of the racists.

Many such examples could be presented. The main thing is that the policy of complicity with the racists being pursued by Western states disrupts the plans for a peaceful settlement of the conflict in the south of Africa and does not help to fulfill Resolution 602 of the UN Security Council that decisively condemns the racist regime of the Republic of South Africa and contains the demand for the unconditional withdrawal of all South African troops from Angolan territory.

9746

#### **Japanese Said To Plan Procurement of V/STOL Carriers for 1990s**

18010081a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
5 Jan 88 p 4

[Article, published under the heading "This Has Become Public Knowledge," by S. Agafonov: "A New Element in the Japanese Navy"]

[Text] Tokyo (*Izvestiya* correspondent). During the first new year days, the Japanese press has been rather sparse for news and one can clearly feel the holiday fatigue. However, even in these doldrums sensational stories are indispensable. The guilty party this time was the nation's largest newspaper *Yomiuri* which on the first page of its Sunday edition published an article which stated that the Japanese Navy was planning in the not distant future to fill out its arsenal with aircraft carriers.



*Yomiuri* had succeeded in obtaining an unique document from the military department in which aircraft carrier construction for the Japanese Navy was established as one of the central tasks for the 1990s. It was a question of vessels capable of carrying 8-10 vertical take-off fighters. As the newspaper wrote, rumors on the aircraft carriers had been circulating for a long time in Japan, however this was the first time that the specific plans of the National Defense Agency (NDA) had been made public.

In accord with this, the aircraft carrier design should become a new stage in boosting the might of the Japanese Navy after they have carried out the tasks formulated in the 1986-1990 five-year military program.

Let us recall that this envisages outfitting the Japanese Navy with the most modern equipment and weapons, including the Aegis ship system for firing at multiple targets, the so-called over-the-horizon radars with a range of 3,000 km and aircraft equipped with the AWACS system. The carrier fleet should supplement these arsenals with a new element and, as *Yomiuri* writes, this will be established in the new weapons development program which will start in 1991.

The basis of these plans is the series of research being carried out by specialists from the NDA together with American colleagues and in particular the computer games during which they work out the tactics of combat operations "under conditions of attack" against Japan. Seemingly, during these games the Japanese frightened themselves in concluding that the Japanese Navy in its present state is completely unsuitable and would be destroyed by an enemy attack. The enemy, incidentally, was not anonymous and the Soviet Union was clearly meant.

Precisely for opposing the "Soviet threat" a packet of proposals was drawn up to strengthen the Japanese Navy within the context of the Japanese-American concept of "defending the sealanes" as approved last year. The carriers, as far as one can judge, are one of the elements of this packet and the fact that for now they are just on paper is scarcely any consolation.

In announcing this, *Yomiuri* has pointed out that the appetite of the Japanese defense department may not be seen as a joke by the states neighboring Japan, since the NDA plans question the very principle of "exclusive defense" which has been proclaimed official by Tokyo. The proposal, we must say directly, is completely reasonable, as the characteristics of the new weapons which the NDA is claiming in no way could be termed "defensive weapons" and the military potential which Tokyo already possesses could not be styled harmless.

One other point in conclusion. In July 1986, another Japanese newspaper *Mainichi* on its pages published a comment that it was a question of a nuclear plan for the Japanese Navy. In particular, they announced the study

in the NDA of the question of the commissioning of nuclear submarines by the Japanese Navy in the next decade. Now after the carrier project which has been confirmed by documents, the nuclear submarines will no longer seem mere newspaper fiction.

10272

### Japanese GLSM Launcher

180100\*4h Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
24 Dec 87 p 3

[Unsigned Article: "From Shore... Against Ships"]

[Text] According to a report by the weekly AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Japan has completed the development and testing of a ground self-propelled system intended to use SSM-1 cruise missiles to destroy enemy ships. The missiles are launched from a six-container launcher, created on the chassis of a three-axle high mobility truck.

The SSM-1 missile has a solid-fuel booster that accelerates it to near supersonic speed; a turbo-jet sustainer engine and combination (inertial and active radar) self-guided warhead. Its maximum flight range is 150 km.

The Japanese Ministry of Defense plans to purchase the first six SSM-1 missile launch platforms in fiscal year 1988. In the next five years it intends to acquire 54 launch platforms and to form three missile battalions on Hokkaido Island.

It is anticipated that a ship-to-ship missile (range 120 km) will be created based on the SSM-1 missile, to replace the American Harpoon Anti-Ship Missiles.

9069

### Notes of Soviet U.N. Observer in Near East

18010060a Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
23 Dec 87 p 3

[Report by Lt Col S. Kireyev: "A Line of Contact: From the Notes of a U.N. Military Observer"]

[Text] The Soviet UN military observer. Who is he? What are his missions? For almost 15 years only a small group of people have been aware of his work. Today we are publishing the comments of one who served as a UN military observer from 1984 to 1987. During his last year he was senior member of a group of Soviet UN military observers in the Near East and commanded a joint Soviet-American-French detachment of UN observers in Damascus.

"Oh, no! I'm not going to take this one to the observation post. They couldn't feed him." Canadian Captain Douglas Meyer said in his deep voice, surprised at my 2-meter stature. This was when I first showed up in the company of Major Vladimir Alenichkin, my mentor, at

the Villa, the club for UN military observers in Damascus. "Why are you so surprised, Douglas?" Alenichkin entered into the banter. "They are all like that in our army."

Almost 4 years have passed since that conversation, which somehow immediately attuned me to the particular atmosphere typical of the UN's military forces in the Near East. These forces were set up, of course, to prevent the escalation of military conflicts and to maintain peace in this area of the planet. The UN Agency For Monitoring Observance of the Truce in Palestine (ONVUP) is the oldest and the main one. It will have its 40th anniversary next year. (Along with this monitoring force UN troops are deployed in the area of the Golan Heights and in southern Lebanon, which, unlike the observers, are armed with light firearms and monitor the observance of Security Council decisions.—S.K.) The monitoring force consists of around 300 officers from 17 nations.

The UN observers must have a good knowledge of tactics and operational art, be able to get their bearings easily on Western topographic maps, be able to identify various models of weapons and combat equipment of the Near East nations, to operate radio equipment under the radio traffic rules accepted in the West and to operate various types of vehicles at any time of day and in any kind of weather, be familiar with UN staff and regulating documents and, naturally, be fluent in the English language.

Soviet UN military observers arrived in the Near East following the October War of 1973. The first combat missions assigned to them by the UN monitoring force command were those of assisting with the deployment of the UN Emergency Forces on the Egyptian-Israeli front, patrolling the buffer zone in the Sinai, performing mine-field reconnaissance and performing combat duty at observation posts between Israeli and Syrian troops on the Golan Heights. The Soviet officers performed these missions with honor. Today we recall with pride those who began this important and honored work. It was easier for those who followed, after all, the operational missions became simpler with the passage of time. Also significant is the fact that Soviet officers were no longer a novelty for the observers from the capitalist nations. The fact should also be mentioned that the political and ideological importance of all this work not only did not decrease but actually grew.

What is the group of UN Soviet military observers like today? It consists of 36 officers from the Soviet Army and Navy placed under UN authority by agreement between the USSR and the Security Council and working as members of joint, multinational UN Agency subunits in Syria and Egypt at the instructions and under the control of the UN monitoring force leadership and the Security Council. They patrol the west bank of the Suez Canal, perform reconnaissance and escort operations in Syria, serve at communication centers of the monitoring force in Cairo and Damascus, and so forth.

These could not be called combat functions, but their importance is indisputable. It is defined by the very fact that the leading world powers are present in this extraordinarily sensitive and explosive area of the planet. Directly observing the situation in the areas of the Suez Canal and the Golan Heights, officers in the UN monitoring force's subunits can immediately inform the Security Council and the UN Secretary General's office of the slightest changes there. That is, they can make known any attempts by the opposing sides to step up military activities.

The officers-and-observers from various nations do not simply interact in carrying out this important work; they jointly perform the assigned mission. Naturally, success depends directly upon the relations which have developed within the international subunits. Primarily—and I would like to underscore this well—relations between the Soviet and American officers.

It should be mentioned that the leaders of the American observers, Colonel D. Elger in Washington and Lieutenant Colonel A. Ingalls in the Near East, take this fact thoroughly into account. "In the selection and briefing of candidates we try to orient them toward patience and mutual understanding in their work with the Soviet colleagues," Colonel Elger once said. Good and proper words, but it still has to be noted that most of the American officers with whom I have had contact during my 3 years of service in the UN monitoring force have been typical victims of the American propaganda machine and of the shortage of objective information typical of it. "The barrier of mutual distrust," says Lieutenant Commander Kuntz, senior member of the American group in Syria, "is the most difficult and awful thing which separates us." It would be difficult not to agree with this. I recall the mutual suspicion and caution with which preparations were made in May of this year in the UN subunit in Syria to celebrate Victory Day over fascism. Our American and French colleagues checked every aspect of the protocol and went over every word of the speech, which by joint agreement was to be delivered by a representative of the USSR.

When the celebration ultimately came off extremely well and the tension produced by the preparations had abated, one of the American officers told me: "You know, my father fought in the Mediterranean. The war is not just history for him, and he will therefore be pleased to tears when I write and tell him how well we commemorated Victory Day here with you Russians."

The whole world recently witnessed the triumph of political realism and of the new thinking on questions of world politics reflected in the signing by the leaders of the USSR and the USA of an agreement to eliminate two classes of nuclear missiles. It would be difficult to overstate the importance of this step. One thing is clear: it leads us directly toward a warming of the political climate over our entire planet. The destruction of the barriers of fear and distrust is underway. And not just

leading political figures, representatives of foreign trade organizations, cultural and scientific figures are participating in the process, but military people as well.

The army is a special kind of organization, of course, and is by its professional nature least designed for peace-making missions. The fact remains, however, that when military people representing different social systems jointly carry out a common, noble mission of maintaining peace in the direct sense of the word, this confirms

the idea that peace can be preserved. In this respect the work of the UN military observers truly conforms to the spirit of the times. It permits us to meet those for whom we were represented only as the orange color of an enemy on operations maps. A line drawn on the maps separated two armies, two sociopolitical systems. Here, in the UN military forces, that line is a point of contact between the sides.

11499



### Further Report on Farakh as Peace Province

18010122 [Editorial Report] Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 March publishes on page 3 a 800 word article by D. Meshchaninov under the "Afghanistan Reportage" rubric, entitled "The Hopes of Farakh." The article describes how peace is returning to the small southwest town of Farakh now that protocols on cooperation with representatives of the "peoples power" have been signed. According to the article armed struggles are being curtailed, refugees are being drawn back, and Farakh has declared itself a "Zone of Peace." UD/334

### Soviet Troops Clear Roadway

18010109b Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Dec 87 p 2

[Article by Guard Sr Lt O. Derevnin, limited contingent of Soviet forces in Afghanistan, under "From the Mail of These Days" rubric: "Courage of the Engineers"]

[Text] This happened on the highway between Gardez and Khowst. The dushman had blown up about 5 km of the roadway in a poorly accessible mountainous region. Communication with remote district centers and villages was temporarily stopped and numerous columns of motor vehicles with food, fuel and other essential loads came to a halt on the shoulders of the important transportation artery. The local authorities turned to the soldiers of the limited contingent of Soviet forces in Afghanistan for help.

The commandos were the first to respond to the appeal for help. The company under the command of holder of the Red Star order Guard Cpt V. Zubarev arrived at dawn. After organizing the protective force—the column had been subjected to fire several times during the march—the officer proceeded to reconnoiter the locality. The information obtained was not encouraging: rock fragments had covered the roadway with a layer many meters thick. And the rags, oily paper and containers for the transporting of antitank and antipersonnel mines indicated unequivocally that the mountains surrounding the pass were literally full of dangerously explosive devices.

But the experience, great mastery, courage and valor of the engineer commandos turned out to be stronger than the ingenuity of the dushman demolition specialists and their tutors abroad. By the evening of the first day of the difficult and deadly work, tons of rubble had been removed and dozens of mines had been disposed of.

Among those distinguishing themselves was the crew of the engineering clearing vehicle made up of the guard junior sergeants G. Ishchenko and A. Dolgoplov. The flames of explosions flared up repeatedly under the caterpillar tracks of their vehicle that day but each time the bloody hands of the selfless soldiers quickly replaced the torn track links and the heavy vehicle again rushed forward.

### Activities Described at Salang Outpost

18010109c Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 28 Nov 87 p 3

[Article by Lt Col N. Belan under "On the Land of Afghanistan" rubric: "Morning of the Battalion Commander"]

[Text] The shots struck at night, when a piercing silence hung over Salang and the hoarse echo of frightened birds rebounded in the mountains. The shooting quieted down for a moment, giving hope to those who were at their posts guarding the pass. But again angry bursts from automatic rifles were heard and machine guns rattled with their irregular cadence.

"Attack against the guard post 'Pamir,'" they reported from the frontier post to Battalion Commander Lt Col A. Abramov.

He requested communication with the post. But "Pamir" did not respond.

The uncertainty troubled and tormented the battalion commander with oppressive thoughts. While everything was troubling and conjectural for Lieutenant Colonel Abramov, what about there, at "Pamir"? And this waiting for communication and with it the explanation of the situation became more and more unbearable for him.

The moon hung like a huge flare over the Hindu Kush, the mountains in whose rocky and wild ranges lies Salang. Frontier posts are scattered over many kilometers there and each dominating peak over the road is fortified with guard posts of the battalion commanded by Lt Col Abramov Aleksandr Ivanovich. The pass is locked to the dushman but they do not stop trying to find the master key to it.

"Inform all posts and frontier posts about the attack against 'Pamir' and let them strengthen their vigilance," said Abramov to chief of the battalion staff Maj V. Fedovov. And he again asked about communications with "Pamir." The post was silent.

Abramov left the staff and listened. The crack of automatic rifle fire continued to rend the air in the mountains. Within a few minutes, Sr Lt L. Kedys, deputy political officer of the company will lead a reserve group to the aid of "Pamir." He will lead them from a frontier post not far from the post. But the battalion commander will have to wait for news here. Only after dawn can he reach the frontier post, because it is prohibited to travel on the road at night.

The battalion staff is located high on the pass by the road. A mountain is to the left and a gorge to the right. Rocky wastes, naked cliffs, and black crevices like toothless mouths.... But it was not the severe landscape that surprised Abramov when he arrived here and not the snow that hung on the pass then, in July, but something else.

Lt Col S. Antonenko jumped lightly from the armored personnel carrier.

"It is safe further on here, we will go in the uasik," he said.

Lieutenant Colonel Abramov, the new battalion commander whom Antonenko was driving to Salang so that he could learn the situation locally, looked around with surprise. They still had a long way to go from the control post where they had stopped to the pass, going up steep mountain slopes. And, as everyone knows, danger can lurk behind every rock in the mountains. And suddenly—"safety." Could Lieutenant Colonel Antonenko be joking?

No, he was serious. Here they turned the BTR's [military mine-clearing vehicles] off the road and shut their motors off. Antonenko took off his armored jacket.

After the BTR's and infantry combat vehicles, our main means of transportation on Afghan roads, the uasik seemed to Abramov to be something forgotten, almost unreal.

Antonenko seemed to read his thoughts.

"The people are well organized: all around our soldiers and officers do not leave the armored vehicles but here they ride around in uasiks. Admit it, that is what you thought?" he asked and smiled. "Almost everyone thinks that when they arrive here. But few know the price that is paid for this safety. I now hand the responsibility for it over to you, Aleksandr Ivanovich."

Later Abramov will understand the meaning that Antonenko gave to these words. When he learns what it is like to be fired upon on the road. He will see the burned out skeletons of "nalivniki." He will visit all the guards posts and he himself will experience what it means to climb up to some of them—just to climb!—risking with every step becoming the target of a dushman sniper and following in the footsteps of the engineer in front of you. A step to the right or the left can be your last.

This getting to know his new service and new responsibilities began for him on the day of his arrival. At three in the afternoon, they reported: the dushman have a remote frontier post under fire.

"Where is it?" he asked Major Fedorov.

The chief of staff explained.

"Right now," he added, "a reserve group is headed there."

"I am going with it," the battalion commander decided. "It is a good opportunity for me to get to know the frontier post."

This is how his days passed at Salang. At times rapidly, like scudding clouds in windy weather, but most often they were long and drawn out like the columns climbing up to the pass.

Every morning starts the same for Abramov. Along with the commander of the roads and transportation subdivision, he opens the road through Salang. The length of their route is 4,853 meters. It has been measured exactly and not out of some sports interest; the battalion commander answers for this road with his head. His battalion is here so that each day will begin the same: so that Salang, the heart of the main highway linking the Soviet Union and Kabul, can take up its work on time and calmly.

It is quite a task. And it by no means of a tactical scope although all the rules of military science dictate that this is precisely the scope of a battalion.

By the way, these were not the only rules violated here. Salang dispersed the battalion and broke it down into small groups and sections. A guard post in the mountains of the Hindu Kush is a point of support, a section is an independent subdivision, and a sergeant, the senior officer of a post, is chief of the fort, garrison commandant, who often has to act separately from the main forces of the battalion. As in the case of "Pamir" now.

"Comrade lieutenant colonel," they called Abramov, "contact with 'Pamir'."

Salang is the highest mountain pass in the world. The "Pamir" guard post is located at the summit of the highest mountain at Salang.

There, in a small area ringed by a wall of rock, they have set up a control and observation point, stationary points for firing, a position for a mine thrower, and ammunition and food depots. The barracks were hidden behind a piece of the crag on which the flag undulates. Here the soldiers are on duty around the clock. They come down from the post once a week for a bath and during this time they are replaced by their comrades from the frontier post. They prepare their own food with only the bread being brought in.

This evening senior officer of the post Sr Sgt Mukhiddin Abdurakhimov carried out the regular changing of the sentries. Returning to the barracks, he sat down to write a letter home. His parents were asking about his comrades and about how they were living.

Mukhiddin was prepared to tell endlessly about the comrades and friends that he met here in the army. The most respected person at their post was Pvt Vladimir Meleshko. He, being 22 years old, was older than all the rest, wise, fair and well read. A native of Mogilev Oblast, he finished the mining tekhnikum and worked in a mine. At the end of November, when the snow covers the mountains thickly and decides to come down to the frontier post for the winter, Volodya will leave. He is being released from duty. How will they get along without him, without his jokes and managerial efficiency?

Pvt Fayzarakhman Gilazhev, a grenadier, is also being released. He is from Bashkiriya and invites everyone to visit him, saying that he will treat them to kumiss and his Bashkir honey, such as they have never tasted before. They agreed: upon dismissal, the entire post will go visit him, then to Pvt Khukur Zakirov in Dushanbe, from there to Pvt Nikolay Kuznetsov in Penza, to Meleshko in Mogilev Oblast, and Pvt Makhmud Allamov in Khorzmskaya Oblast. But they will gather first in the Uzbek village of Arabkhon, in the home of Mukhiddin. This is natural, for he is commander.

"How is service here? Everything fine. Calm and basically quiet, so their is not need to get excited...."

Four rifle shots rang out outside the window. Abdurakhimov was off the bench like a shot. Getting the resting shift on its feet: "To your rifles," he rushed to the post.

"That was sniper fire from there behind those rocks on top of the mountain," Private Zakirov reported to him.

This time they struck the post again. With bursts.

The battalion commander was relieved when he heard Senior Sergeant Abdurakhimov. Everything is normal with them, everyone is alive. The dushman were not able to catch the post by surprise and now, when the defense was occupied, just let them try to take it.

Abramov breathed a sign of relief and his face lit up. This is it, the moment when the commander is happy—everything is normal at the post. In one of the "Afghan songs," they sing: "How I wanted the Motherland to sigh when I came out of combat alive." It is a nice tune. But it is the commander who is first to sigh with relief.

The battalion commander knows this from his own experience as well as from many stories of his relatives. Both of his grandfathers participated in the civil war. And his paternal grandfather, Semen Petrovich, also fought in the Great Patriotic War. Ivan Semenovich, the battalion commander's father, went through the fire of war. And here there is a similarity in their fates. In the years 1919 and 1920, Semen Petrovich commanded a company in the Tashkent machine gun courses; in the years 1959 through 1961, his son Ivan Semenovich taught at the Higher All-Army Command School imeni

V.I. Lenin in Tashkent, which begins with machine gun courses; in 1972, his son, today's battalion commander Lt Col Aleksandr Ivanovich Abramov, graduated from the all-army school.

Two brothers and a sister of his mother fought against the fascists. Brothers of his father became military pilots and now one of them is a lieutenant general of aviation and the other is a colonel. And the two brothers, Aleksandr and Anatoliy Abramov, also chose the officer's lot for themselves. Both are lieutenant colonels. Anatoliy Ivanovich is a deputy regiment commander and Aleksandr Ivanovich is a battalion commander. There are more Abramovs defending the Motherland: three cousins of Aleksandr Ivanovich are officers and a fourth, Mikhail, is a cadet at the flight academy; he is now the youngest in the military dynasty of the Abramovs.

Thus, this family knows well the value of the soldier's bread. And each of the elder Abramovs had his front pass where he went through the severe test of strength of spirit and command skills. Aleksandr Ivanovich now faces such a pass.

...Leaning over the map, the battalion commander began to reflect: what was the reason for this firing at "Pamir"? In the heat of the skirmish, one must not forget that the enemy is cunning and insidious and must not be underestimated.

Abramov again communicated with the post.

"They are continuing to fire from the mountain," the senior sergeant reported, "it is quiet on the other sides."

"Pamir" observes the mountain and the section of the gorge where the road to the tunnel lies.

"Listen, Mukhiddin, take a look at the gorge," said Abramov. "Illuminate it with flares. I feel in my heart that they are distracting you from the main action."

One after another, the flares hung in the sky. The senior officer of the post and two soldiers probed the folds of the gorge and the crevices with their gazes.

"Give us more light," Abdurakhimov requested.

Again the flares went up. Shadows flashed on the slope behind the boulders. So that is why they are firing from the mountain.

The guess that the dushman had decided to distract the post and furtively lay mines on the road was confirmed by the skirmish of the reserve group that went to "Pamir." The group of Senior Lieutenant Kedys noticed four other bandits and hit them.

Yes, the battalion commander was right.



He climbed up to the post, not feeling his legs. The path here is steep, difficult and long but the battalion commander did not notice how he covered hundreds of meters toward the summit at dawn.

At "Pamir," he was met by Senior Sergeant Abdurakhimov. Putting his hand to his helmet, he took a step. Spent shells clinked underfoot.

"Comrade lieutenant colonel...." Abramov interrupted him.

"Are you all right, no one hit?"

"Everything is fine. They did not strengthen the positions with rock in vain."

The battalion commander stretched out his hand. "Well, how are you?" And he briefly embraced the sergeant. Then Private Meleshko standing next to him. Then Private Zakirov. And then...all of them.

And that morning, as usual, the battalion commander opened the tunnel. The columns went over the pass. And there was nothing at Salang to indicate the uneasy night that they had just lived through, unless it was the shadow of fatigue on the face of the battalion commander.

9746

### **Correspondent Describes Activities of Mine-Clearing Unit**

18010109a Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
16 Dec 87 p 5

[Article by D. Meshchaninov under "Afghan Report" rubric: "Military Mine-Clearing Vehicles Go in Front"]

[Text] The columns left their disposition unhurriedly, as if unwillingly. In advance of them went the homely military mine-clearing vehicles ("BMR's") that had been pounded by many fragments. I remembered the words of Lt Col Gennadiy Leonidovich Belous: "If they ever put up a monument to an engineering vehicle, a BMR will certainly stand on the pedestal."

Once at the disposition there was a field crisscrossed by ravines and completely covered by huge boulders. The soldiers expended considerable time and energy to set themselves up on this abandoned scrap of generally useless land extending behind the broad and fruitful Charikarskaya Valley not far from a strategically important highway leading from Kabul through Salang Pass to northern Afghanistan.

They cleared the territory with bulldozers and drilled artesian wells. In short, they set themselves up for normal everyday activities, just as a military collective is supposed to. Here, draped on all sides by a green camouflage net, there is also a yard with well-maintained lawns, flower beds and a small oval pool with goldfish.

No, this is not overindulgence. After combat, it is necessary to get rid of the extreme nervous tension and gain strength for the next mission.

Two-thirds of the time the personnel are in different provinces of Afghanistan carrying out military operations. They clear roads of mines, restore bridges and passes that have been blown up, escort army columns and destroy the weapons and ammunition depots of the dushman. The engineers go first and ahead of them are always military mine-clearing vehicles.

The BMR's are built on the basis of a tank. A sweep is hung in front on the frame. After the explosion of a mine under it, the deformed removable sections are replaced and the sweeping continues. The crew is comprised of two people, a commander and a mechanic-driver. On especially dangerous stretches, only a driver is in the vehicle.

In escorting a column, the BMR's usually move "in steps": one vehicle is in front and a second is behind it to the left at a distance of several dozen meters sweeping the right part of the road and the shoulder. The crews take the first blow, deciphering the boundary of the minefield. Then the engineers go into action with mine detectors and probes. When the section of solid mines has been traversed, the crews of the BMR's again move their vehicles forward. They proceed until the next explosion. Such is their dangerous but necessary military occupation.

"The scale of 'mine warfare' has increased several times over in recently years," related the officer Taras Petrovich Povarchuk and, finding the page in the writing pad, he continued: "Here is just one example. Last year, in the stretch of highway between Talukan and Fayzabal, we discovered 28 fougasses weighing 50 to 100 kg each and 47 antitank and antipersonnel mines. Recently, escorting a column along the same route, we disposed of 110 fougasses and 217 other mines. It is not just a matter of quantity but also of the quality and subtlety of minelaying: one can clearly see the guiding hand of Western advisers who train the dushman not only in special camps in the territory of Pakistan but also in Afghanistan itself.

At the practice firing range, they showed me many examples of cunning minelaying. A few shell cases from large-caliber weapons, each of which is linked by wire with an explosive charge, are scattered about in the ruts of the road. A wheeled vehicle passes and everything is normal. But if the steel track of a tank, infantry combat vehicle or BMR runs over the shells, the circuit is closed and there is an explosion. The explosive charges can be controlled by radio or by a wire running hundreds of meters into the rocks. At the place where the mines are laid, the dushman frequently scatter severed nails and

nuts. Then a solid peeping is heard in the headphones of the mine detectors. Considerable experience is required to distinguish the "voice" of the mine or fougasse in this cacophony.

"One has to solve deadly enigmas in each individual case," continued T.P. Povarchuk. "It is not enough merely to detect the charge. It is necessary to think through all the possible variants of combined mining. For example, a large fougasse can be linked with several small antipersonnel mines. The calculation is this: the engineers congregate to discuss how best to dispose of the fougasse and someone steps on the "infantry mine." There is a detonation, an explosion. Or this version. We usually dispose of discovered explosives using an applied charge. Naturally, it is necessary to find shelter. We utilize a nearby pile of stones, crag or hole and that is where the mines are."

Still another refined trick that Taras Petrovich told me about: the contactor is set up a few meters from the charge. Then the explosives do not detonate under the sweep of the BMR but under the driver's seat or under the caterpillar track. Powerful fougasses are frequently laid on mountain roads so that the vehicle will be thrown over a precipice.

That is what happened on 3 September of this year during the sweeping of a highway in the region of the city of Kishim. The explosion was so powerful that a BMR weighing almost 50 tons flew into a chasm 30 meters deep as if it were a matchbox. No viable systems were left in the vehicle. They wrote it off. The crew, privates Vorontsov and Melnikov, miraculously lived. They refused to go to the hospital.

In this terrible story with a happy end, I was surprised not so much by the fact that a heavy BMR flew into a chasm as if it were a bit of fluff or that the crew was unharmed; all kinds of wonders happen in war. Something else was surprising. People who experienced a terrible shock (in the direct and figurative senses) did not want to leave the combat zone. And just a few days later, they again sat down behind the controls of a BMR so

that, taking a deadly risk, they could again blow up mines. Where, I asked, do these 20-year-old kids get the unyielding courage and heroism in the highest sense of the word?

"A sense of duty and responsibility for the fulfillment of their fighting task," answered political worker Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Shcherbay. "An explosion produces shell shock. Weak or average, perhaps, but still shell shock, after which one is supposed to go to the hospital. It sometimes happens that you pull a soldier out of a blown-up BMR and he is bleeding from the nose and ears. They give anesthetizing shots, he sniffs ammonium chloride and sits in the shade for a little while, then he goes to his own vehicle to help his comrades repair it. For time presses. It is necessary to take the command farther. It is necessary...and only then to the hospital."

All of this applies in full to Jr Sgt Viktor Sinitskiy, whom I met here. He is from the Ukraine. His parents live in the village of Uspenovok in Zaporozhe Oblast. His father drives a tractor and his mother milks cows. After graduation from school, Viktor also worked as a tractor driver. Then came the army: training section: Afghanistan.

The Afghan period in the life of Sinitskiy was exceedingly rich in events. By his count, there were 17 battles. Three times his BMR was burned out with a grenade launcher and eight times he was blown up. Eight times! And only one explosion was under the sweep. The rest were under the bottom and caterpillar track. A BMR can take only a few such explosions. Then it has to undergo major repairs and the loose assemblies have to be replaced. A person turns out to be more resistant than a machine forged in armor.

Viktor Sinitskiy was awarded the medals "For Valor" and "For Merits in Combat." He was presented for still another high government award.

After covering a half kilometer of a dirt road, the column pulled onto the highway and headed for Salang. Ahead of them were the homely and beat-up military mine-clearing vehicles. The BMR's are always in front.

9746

**END OF**

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